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A BSTRA CT
E xploring A dolescent Inner Experience

by

Sarah A. A khter
Dr. Russell T. H urlburt, Exam ination Com m ittee Chair
Professor o f Psychology
University o f N evada, Las V egas

Adolescence fam ously is know n as a time o f storm and stress, horm ones, and
crises o f identity, yet psychology know s rem arkably little about adolescents’ actual inner
experience. This study aim ed to describe the actual phenom enology o f adolescent inner
experience by using D escriptive Experience Sampling (DES) with a sample o f six
adolescents aged 11-14 years. Each w ore a random beeper in his/her natural everyday
environm ents for five days. They observed the phenom enology o f their inner experience
each time the beeper sounded and described that inner experience to the investigators in
expositional interviews. W e found substantial differences in the com plexity o f inner
experience across subjects, suggesting that adolescents may be in the process o f
developing inner experience itself. W e also found very infrequent experience o f em otion
despite the fact that they had frequent em otional behavior, suggesting that (a) acting
em otionally, (b) recognizing em otion in a third-person way, and (c) feeling em otion in a
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first-person w ay may be three separate skills that are acquired at very different rates and
times across development. That is, we speculated that adolescents’ stormy emotional
behavior may reflect a lack o f emotional experience, not chaotic em otional experience.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Textbooks on adolescence begin with publicly observable criteria for defining
their subjects: age and puberty. Textbooks then break dow n their subject m atter
into seem ingly separate, although presum ably interacting, parts. There are
chapters on theories o f adolescence, on cognitive developm ent, moral
developm ent, sexual developm ent, social relations, social deviance and pathology,
and education and career options. Each chapter review s research, w hich inevitably
is quantitative. There are straight statistical presentations; ‘35% o f white subjects
and 23% o f black subjects had never gone steady during the previous 3 years.’
There are correlational data: ‘Teachers’ grades w ere rather highly correlated with
achievem ent test scores for disadvantaged students and black students, but only
m inim ally correlated with achievem ent test scores for advantaged students and
w hite students.’ A nd there are sem i-experim ental data: ‘2,062 subjects in grades 6
through 12 rated them selves on a 7-point sem antic differential scale. The selfconcept ratings w ere factor analyzed and four factors em erged: (a) achievem entleadership, (b) congeniality-sociability, (c) adjustm ent, and (d) sexappropriateness o f the self-concept.’ Such findings provide food for thought about
adolescent life. However, we are left to w onder ju st w hat these data point to in the
actual lives o f these people. (Eischer & Alapack, 1987, p. 105)

I

This project explores the actual lived inner experience o f adolescents. Fischer and
A lapack’s characterization (1987, quoted above) that psychological research has much to
say about adolescents in general but very little to say about what their experience is really
like, still holds today. One explanation for this state o f affairs is that psychology has not
yet system atically applied to adolescents a m ethodology capable o f sensitively accessing
inner experience. The present study is an attem pt to remedy that by exploring adolescent
inner experience using D escriptive Experience Sampling (DES), a m ethod specifically
designed to capture and explicate the phenom enology o f inner experience with high
fidelity.
To date, only one DES study o f adolescent inner experience has been conducted.
In this exploratory investigation, M onson (1989) collected random samples o f inner
experience from five adolescent subjects. The following is one exam ple o f a sample
excerpted from M onson’s study;
[At sample #12, W endy] was reading the book Five L ittle Peppers about a little
girl who got a nail stuck through her foot ju st behind the toes. W endy had ju st put
the book down when the beep occurred. An image was present in her imagination
at that mom ent, and was black and w hite and dark and fuzzy, a little out o f focus.
The image was o f a foot, side view with a dark spot on it ju st above the toes. The
foot was located a bit above W endy’s eyes so that she had to look up to see it;
W endy did not notice the ankle or leg. She was o f the opinion that this image was
in the process o f forming; that if the beep had not interrupted her, this image
w ould have becom e clear and in color. Furtherm ore, the dark spot on the foot in

the im age would likely have becom e the nail that stuck through the foot in the
story. (M onson, 1989, p p .87-88)
By collecting random samples o f inner experience such as this instance o f
W endy’s form ing an image, M onson discovered detailed idiographic and
phenom enological information about her subjects’ inner w orlds, data that stand in stark
contrast to the statistical, correlational, experim ental know ledge about adolescents
criticized by Fisher and Alapack (1987). M onson’s prelim inary findings on adolescent
inner experience shed new light on the “actual lives” o f teenagers.
The present study seeks to reopen the exploration o f adolescent inner experience
using DES. Eighteen years have passed since M onson’s (1989) original investigation and,
during that tim e, statistical, correlational, experim ental research program s devoted to the
study o f adolescent experience have proliferated. D espite these efforts, there remains
little know ledge o f the actual inner experience o f adolescents. From our perspective, this
shortcom ing is a methodological issue: though the w idely used m ethods o f exploring
adolescent experience provide new inform ation about adolescents, none explore that
experience at the level o f fidelity necessary to build a detailed and accurate understanding
o f the phenom ena o f adolescent inner experience. This study is as m uch about sorting out
differences in m ethodological approaches to studying inner experience as it is about
learning about the inner experience o f adolescents. Therefore, the introduction and
literature review has four parts. In the present introductory chapter, we will (a) discuss
inner experience and introspection in general; and (b) discuss the DES method. In
C hapter 2 we will (c) review the literature that has used m ethods in some w ays sim ilar to

DES to explore adolescent inner experience, and, finally, (d) com pare and contrast those
m ethods to DES.

Inner Experience and Introspection
Inner experience refers to any thought, perception, sensation, em otion, or any
other inner phenom enon consciously apprehended by a person (H urlburt & Heavey,
2006). O ur definition o f inner experience does not include unconscious processes or
those too m iniscule to be detected consciously; instead, the “experience” o f inner
experience im plies that the experiencer is conscious o f his experience, w hatever that may
be. The excerpted sam ple from M onson’s study above is ju st one exam ple o f inner
experience. W endy was in the m idst o f form ing an image o f a foot and that phenom enon
was present in her conscious aw areness; that is, she was able to apprehend it.
The quest to understand inner experience dates back to the birth o f consciousness
itself and is fam ously m arked in the W estern tradition by S ocrates’ exhortation to “Know
Thyself.” U nderstanding inner experience has been and rem ains an explicit and
fLindamental question driving the field o f psychology as well. H urlburt and Heavey
(2004) asserted, “aw areness is worthy o f scientific study, if for no other reason than
because [it] has long been held to be central to the scientific study o f consciousness” (p.
113).
Because inner experience is by nature private and subjective (i.e., it exists within,
and can be directly know n only to the person to whom it belongs), access to it requires
some form o f introspection, self-reflection, or “looking w ithin” to know. W ithout
introspection, it w ould be im possible to access and describe inner experience. In Eastern

spiritual traditions such as Buddhism , Hindu and K ashm iri teachings, and Taoism,
introspection is used as a means to achieve spiritual evolution. Through m editative and
yogic practices, spiritual students com e to direct observation and understanding— and
often transform ation— o f their inner experiences (Almaas, 2004). In the W est,
introspection is m ore a secular and externalized endeavor derived from a natural science
approach to observation and description. Introspectors report their experiences to
investigators in order to advance an objective scientific understanding o f the human
being.
Early W estern psychology attempted to create a system atic introspection
(som etim es called “classical introspection” or “Introspection” w ith a capital I) and used
this approach to understanding internal processes o f the hum an mind from the end o f the
nineteenth to the beginning o f the tw entieth century. By the second quarter o f the
tw entieth century, however, introspection had faced severe criticism and was essentially
abandoned. It never regained its footing as a legitim ate scientific m ethod (Danziger,
1980). Three factors contributed to the downfall o f introspection: conflict among
researchers about how to do introspective research (m ethodological differences), debate
am ong researchers about how to characterize findings (interpretive differences), and
severe criticism o f introspection by rising behavioral researchers (D anziger, 1980). We
briefly discuss these three factors here.
D ifferences in introspective m ethodologies can be traced back to the conflicting
approaches o f W ilhelm W undt and W illiam Jam es (Lyons, 1986). W u ndt’s was a
structuralist approach to introspection; he investigated tightly controlled, strictly
m anipulated “fundam ental” aspects o f inner experience. W undt advocated “inner

perception,” a form o f introspection in which subjects were exposed to controlled stimuli
and asked to observe and report only those specific features o f perception occurring in
reaction to those stimuli. In contrast, Jam es’s approach was functional; he investigated
those aspects o f inner experience that naturally and organically presented to
consciousness. Jam es practiced “self observation,” a freer, fluid, and spontaneous process
that asked subjects to dip into the stream o f consciousness and report about found mental
events.
As introspection evolved as a science, a m ajor disagreem ent erupted among
structuralists: two W undtian schools o f introspection— the Titchenerians and
investigators from W ürzburg— vehem ently disagreed about how to interpret introspective
findings (H urlburt, 1993; M onson 1989). Specifically, this debate centered on the
existence o f an elem ent o f consciousness called “im ageless thought.” (The phenom enon
behind im ageless thought is known as unsym bolized thinking in the DES lexicon.)
M onson and H urlburt (1993; M onson 1989) conducted a detailed analysis o f the
im ageless thought debate and found that Titchenerians and W ürzburg investigators had
actually collected sim ilar phenom enological descriptions o f im ageless thought. W hat they
could not resolve was w hether or not it was possible to have a thought w ithout an image.
Both schools’ data show ed that subjects experienced thought w ith no easily detectable
image. But the Titchenerians still asserted that some form o f an im age, even vanishingly
faint, m ust lie at the heart o f every thought. A ccording to this belief, im ages that
accom pany thought could be visual, kinesthetic, auditory or o f som e other sensory form,
but the argum ent was that every single thought had to have an im aginai core o f some kind
or another. The W ürzburg investigators, on the other hand, believed that it was possible

to have a thought that did not involve im ages at all. In a sense, the W ürzburg
investigators stuck to the discovered phenom enon: if on careful and repeated inspection
using rigorous m ethodology subjects did not report an image at the core o f some
thoughts, then this was evidence that som etim es thoughts do not have imaginai cores.
Thus the im ageless thought debated was not rooted in a discrepancy in data but instead
was based on a difference in theoretical positions. The controversy was a lengthy, heated,
and ultim ately deadly disagreem ent for introspection; largely as a result o f this standoff,
introspection was dism issed by psychology (H urlburt, 1993).
As introspection suffered due to internal strife, the rising field o f behaviorism
sim ultaneously leveled attacks at introspection from the outside, which expedited and
intensified its downfall. The behaviorists— including Skinner— were explicitly critical o f
inner experience and introspection (Lyons, 1986), and in fact used the term
“introspectionism ” as an opposing contrast to their own “behaviorism ” approach
(D anziger, 1980). Surprisingly, how ever, Skinner actually did believe in the vital
im portance o f inner experience to psychological understanding. His criticism s were
squarely aimed at what he saw as three fundam ental and inherent difficulties in exploring
inner experience: (1) people are not skilled at talking about inner experience because the
verbal com m unity cannot easily shape that talk; (2) it is im possible to access o n e’s full
inner experience; and (3) it is dangerous to extrapolate causation from the contents o f
inner experience, but the tendency to do so would be great (H urlburt & Heavey, 2001).
Despite its rocky history in W estern psychology, H urlburt and Heavey (2004)
asserted that the study o f inner experience rem ains critically im portant and valuable to
m odern psychology. They suggested that past criticism s o f introspective m ethodologies

should be used constructively— that is, to strengthen the approach, not to destroy it: “The
radical exclusion o f introspection from scientific method throw s the hahy out with
bathw ater” (p. 114). They concluded that exploring inner experience is neither “trivially
easy” nor “im possible,” but that fruitful investigations o f inner experience require a
rigorous m ethodology that avoids the traps and pitfalls o f prior attempts.

DES: A M ethod o f Exploring Inner Experience
H urlburt developed a thought-sam pling m ethod (later transform ed into
D escriptive Experience Sampling or DES) in 1973, in response to the need for a m ethod
capable o f accessing inner experience that did not suffer many o f the problem s and
inadequacies o f previous attempts at introspection. Perplexed by the dilem m a o f how to
do this, H urlburt found inspiration in a “Fortune M agazine” article investigating how
executives spend their tim e (W heeler & Reis, 1991). The article suggested that secretaries
check in on their bosses at h a lf hour intervals and log their b o sses’ activities at those
times over the course o f a day. W hen aggregated, these data provided a clear and accurate
picture o f w hat the executives actually spent their tim e doing. Though H urlburt w asn’t
particularly interested in how executives spend their time, he did think this “sam pling”
approach m ight be useful if modified. He decided to try random ly sam pling people in
their natural environm ents to see if this m ight be a viable introspective methodology.
Hurlburt w anted a method that w ould elicit “real,” “pure,” or “raw ” inner
experience data. He created a beeper that cued subjects to “freeze” their cognitions at
random m om ents and asked them to record, right then, the details o f their samples. Fie

rigorously interview ed his subjects about those samples, going after clear descriptions o f
experience rather than general descriptions or interpretations.
In his first published study using thought-sam pling, H urlburt and Sipprelle (1978)
used the random beeper to collect samples o f inner experience from a single subject.
“D onald” recorded his cognitions when cued by the beeper across two days, collecting 28
samples. H urlburt and Sipprelle found many o f his samples to involve feelings o f anger,
irritation, and hostility tow ard his children, a finding that greatly surprised Donald
himself. Prior to sampling, D onald’s self-perception was that he experienced only loving
and positive feelings tow ard his children and, during the early stages o f sampling, he
resisted H urlburt and Sipprelle’s characterization that his experience involved frequent
anger. H ow ever, he cam e to realize that he was, in fact, often experiencing anger tow ard
his children despite his staunch self-im age o f having only positive feelings tow ard his
children. A pparently H urlburt’s thought-sam pling m ethod was able to uncover
inform ation about D onald’s inner experience about w hich not even D onald was aware.
O ver time, H urlburt refined the thought-sam pling procedure and eventually
nam ed it D escriptive Experience Sampling (DES), but the core aspects o f the m ethod—
collecting samples using a random beeper in subjects’ natural environm ents— remained
the same. The DES procedure to explore and describe idiographically the salient
characteristics o f each subject’s inner experience w as articulated by H urlburt (1990). In
that explicitly structured version o f DES, H urlburt im plem ented six phases o f the
idiographic analysis o f one subject’s experience: (1) prior to sam pling, the subject was
asked to w rite a b rief account o f w hat she expected to find in her inner experience (to
make explicit any presuppositions), (2) the sam pling itself, w hich required the subject to

w ear the beeper from morning until night, collecting as m any as 30 sam ples per day, (3)
writing the narrative descriptions o f each sample o f inner experience, (4) review ing each
sample o f inner experience and refining the narrative version to be an accurate account o f
the sam pled experience, (5) com paring the narrative descriptions to the pre-sam pling
expectations (i.e., did the subject actually experience what she expected to experience?),
and (6) conducting a follow-up period o f sampling and com paring those samples to the
first set o f samples. These six steps em bodied H urlburt’s (1990) efforts to avoid
contam inating the apprehension o f the subject’s raw inner experience.
The m ost recent descriptions o f the DES m ethod (H urlburt & H eavey, 2006;
H urlburt & A khter, 2006) do not refer to those six steps because the m ethod has evolved
from its 1990 em bodim ent. H urlburt (personal com m unication, N ovem ber, 2007) now
holds that it is a m istake to ask subjects to perform step 1 because that step focuses
subjects on what they expect to find, rather than their actual experience. Elim inating step
1 necessitates elim inating step 5 as well. Step 6 is now incorporated into the “iterative”
nature o f DES (H urlburt & Akhter, 2006). Instead o f conducting one follow-up sampling
and com paring that to the original sampling, the iterative procedure considers each
sam pling day in com parison to all the previous days. Thus iterativeness is a m ore organic
or continuous em bodim ent o f the original step 6.
Thus, DES can be characterized as a random tim e sam pling and qualitative
interview m ethodology that enables the investigation o f the phenom ena and
characteristics o f inner experience. It accesses and describes inner experience at a level o f
depth and accuracy not possible using other m ethodologies (H urlburt, 1997), and it
reliably yields high-fidelity inform ation about the characteristics and features o f inner
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experience (H urlburt & Heavey, 1999, 2002, 2006). DES “seeks sim ply to describe inner
experience rather than quantify it based on the view that careful descriptions should be
the foundation on which subsequent quantification should be built” (H urlburt, 1997, p.

946).
So how exactly does DES w ork? A DES subject is given a pocket-sized beeper
program m ed to sound at random intervals and is instructed to w ear the beeper while
going about usual daily activities in his/her natural environm ent. At the time o f each
beep, the subject writes down (or records on tape) any thoughts, feelings, sensations, or
any other aw arenesses consciously present at the last undisturbed m om ent before the
beep. Subjects collect betw een four and six samples during each sam pling session and,
within 24 hours, meet with a DES investigator for an “expositional interview .”
D uring the expositional interview, the investigator and subject work to distill the
characteristics o f the subject’s phenom enological experience. This is done by guiding the
subject to focus recall efforts precisely and specifically on retrieving the contents o f
aw areness at “the last undisturbed m om ent” ju st prior to each beep; this is sim ilar to
being asked to describe the characteristics o f a photographic snapshot in time. The unit o f
inner experience data collected is narrow ly defined tem porally by the beep and therefore
the interview er’s task over the course o f the initial expositional interview is to train the
subject to home in on the subject’s inner experience at the exact m om ent o f the beep. The
subject learns that the investigation is not about general narrative reporting o f a period o f
time near the beep, but instead about reporting the contents o f experience at the specific
m om ent o f the beep. Furtherm ore, the interview er trains the subject to report only those
characteristics o f experience that are overtly apparent and factually present in the
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subject’s awareness; assumptions and deductions about what was “probably” or “must
have been” happening are dismissed. The first sampling day and interview are considered
to be training exercises to help the subject become skilled at “capturing” the contents o f
aw areness in a given mom ent and reporting only what was confidently and actually
occurring.
Once a subject understands the task, she wears the beeper and reports for
expositional interview s typically five tim es. This provides betw een 20 and 30 samples
per subject, enough to reveal some o f a subject’s idiographic characteristics and patterns
o f inner experience. The “data” o f DES are phenom enologically based, detailed
descriptions o f an individual’s inner experience. The goal o f the m ethod is to gain access
to the inner world o f the individual, to exam ine the details o f experience with precision
and accuracy, and to report that inform ation with fidelity. In this way, DES provides a
rich and truly idiographic glim pse into inner experience.
Though DES does not actively “search out” com m on characteristics in subjects,
since the m ethod’s inception, common or frequently found characteristics o f inner
experience have em erged across subjects. The five main characteristics consistently
found across adult subjects are inner speech, unsym bolized thinking, images, feelings,
and sensory aw areness (H urlburt & H eavey, 2006). These characteristics refer to the fo rm
o f experience, or how experience is happening for an individual. For exam ple, inner
speech is “the experience o f speaking w ords in the person's own voice, with the same
vocal characteristics (timbre; rate; inflection for com mas, question marks, etc.; pauses;
accents; stutters; etc.) as the person's own external speech, but w ith no external (real)
noise. In its pure form, the experience o f inner speech is identical to that o f external
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speech except that the m outh does not move and no external production o f sound is
produced” (H urlburt & H eavey, 1999, p.2). This is in contrast to content, or the about
what o f experience, which may be im portant but does not typically em erge as a salient
characteristic o f an individual’s inner experience.
In addition to discovering idiographic patterns o f inner experience within
individual subjects, DES can also derive patterns and trends in inner experience across
individuals w ithin groups (H urlburt, 1990, 1993; H urlburt & H eavey, 2006). DES
research has explored the inner experience o f psychologically norm al and various
clinically diagnosed psychiatric populations, including individuals w ith schizophrenia,
depression, anxiety disorders, and eating disorders, and found distinctive similarities
am ong characteristics o f inner experience in persons draw n from the same clinical
population.
DES findings som etim es contradict the findings and assum ptions o f extant
research. For exam ple, the general psychological literature describing the inner
experience o f bulim ia suggests that bulim ia is characterized by a lack o f body awareness
and sensitivity. H ow ever, Jones-Forrester (2006) sampled the inner experience o f
bulim ics and found an abundance o f body-based sensory aw areness experiences across
subjects. Furtherm ore, DES has been able to dem onstrate links betw een inner experience
and externally observable behavior (Hurlburt, Koch, & Heavey, 2002), as well as
personality variables (H urlburt & Heavey, 2006).
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CH A PTER 2

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
There are three categories o f research approaches that share core methodological
characteristics with DES and that have been applied to the study o f adolescents: tim e and
event sampling (including the Experience Sam pling M ethod and Ecological M omentary
Assessm ent), think aloud paradigm s/protocol analysis, and phenom enological
approaches. These approaches are described below along with their respective
adolescent-relevant literatures. Finally, DES is reviewed in contrast to these approaches.

Time and Event Sam pling
Experience Sam pling M ethod (ESM)
The Experience Sampling M ethod (ESM ) is the m ost prolific o f the research
paradigm s discussed in this paper. Though some review ers (H ektner & Csikszentm ihalyi,
2002; Hormuth, 1986) treat ESM as an um brella term used to encom pass all time
sam pling m ethods (including DES), this review takes a narrow er and m ore com m on view
and defines ESM as the specific time sam pling m ethodology developed by
Csikszentm ihalyi and colleagues at the U niversity o f Chicago in 1977 (see Larson &
Csikszentm ihalyi, 1983). ESM grew out o f the social psychological tradition, which
view s the individual as inseparable from context. Therefore, a core characteristic o f ESM
is ecological validity, or the collection o f data from persons w hile they are engaged in
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their everyday activities within their natural environm ents— in situ (Horm uth, 1986).
ESM seeks to correlate people’s experiences with aspects o f their external situations, and
to draw conclusions based on the frequency and intensity o f certain com binations. ESM
is predom inantly a quantitative m ethodology; its explicit aim is to collect and analyze
data pertaining to: (1) internal and external aspects o f experience, (2)
situational/contextual variables, and (3) relationships between experience and situation.
ESM subjects w ear pagers program m ed to emit signals on random time schedules
during w aking hours over the course o f a week. A t the time o f each signal, subjects
com plete (via paper-and-pencil or, more recently, using palm top com puters) a roughly
40-item self-report questionnaire designed to describe im m ediate experience. The
questionnaires, or Experience Sam pling Forms (ESFs), can vary according to research
objectives, but generally consist o f brief, open-ended questions about each subject’s
location, activity, and com pany, as well as m ultiple choice items and Likert-type scales to
ascertain aspects o f thought content; cognitive, em otional, and m otivational states; and
perception o f current situation. Typically, a single subject com pletes 40-50 ESFs over the
course o f data collection; thus depending on the sample size, ESM studies can yield
thousands o f data points. D ata are coded and can be analyzed at the “beep-level” (data
from a single ESF), the “person-level” (data from all o f one individual’s ESFs), and
across groups o f people (data from an entire sample, or across sam ples). This data
structure allows researchers the flexibility “ ...to focus analysis on situations, on persons,
and on the interactions betw een situations and persons” (H ektner & Csikszentm ihalyi,
2002, p. 236).
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Early ESM studies investigated traditional social psychological topics, including
interpersonal com m unication and relationships (see H ektner & Csikszentm ihalyi, 2002);
solitude (see Larson & Csikszentm ihalyi, 1983); urban relocation (Hormuth, 1986), and
mental disorders including schizophrenia, anxiety depression, m ultiple personality
disorder, and bulim ia (see deVries, 1992). M ore recent ESM studies have explored a
w ider range o f psychological interest areas, such as happiness (Csikszentm ihalyi &
Hunter, 2003); antidepressant treatm ent (Barge-Schaapveld & N icholson, 2002); risk
perception in high-altitude rock clim bing (D elle Fave, Bassi, & M assim ini, 2003);
cannabis use (Toum ier, Sobara, Gindre, Swendson, & Verdoux, 2003); moods in the
w ork setting (M iner, Glomb, & H ulin 2005); parenthood (D elle Fave & M assimini,
2004); and em otions across cultures (Scollon, Diener, Oishi, & B isw as-D iener, 2004).
Since the m ethod’s inception, adolescence has been a core research focus o f ESM
(Arnett, 2001; Csikszentm ihalyi & Larson, 1984; Csikszentm ihalyi, Rathunde, &
W halen, 1993; Larson & Richards, 1994a). The com m on assum ption underlying this
body o f research is that the socialization o f adolescents is a product o f how they spend
their time. Furtherm ore, the shared goal o f these ESM investigations is to shed light on
the developm ental processes associated with socialization during this critical life stage.
ESM adolescent studies exam ine daily activity patterns in conjunction with aspects o f
affective experience and then analyze and interpret these data w ithin the context o f
developm ental theories and hypotheses (Csikszentm ihalyi & Larson, 1978, 1984;
Csikszentm ihalyi, Larson, & Prescott, 1977; Kleiber, Larson, & Csikszentm ihalyi, 1986;
Larson, Csikszentm ihalyi, & Freem an, 1984; Larson, C sikszentm ihalyi, & Graef, 1980;
Larson & Richards, 1989, 1994a). Thus, each ESM study is basic science in the sense
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that it yields novel “real-tim e” data on experiences, situations, and experience-bysituation interactions, but each investigation is also tbeoretically driven. ESM captures a
com pletely original type o f data on adolescent experience, and bas the valuable ability to
illum inate old theories in new ways.
C sikszentm ibalyi and Larson are the pioneers o f ESM adolescent research. In one
o f the first ESM studies, they exam ined patterns o f daily activities and the affective
experiences associated with those activities in a sample o f 25 adolescents aged 13 to 18
years (Csikszentm ibalyi, Larson, & Prescott, 1977). Based on the assum ption that daily
activity significantly influences attention, the aim o f this study was to explore bow
attentional structures in adult personality m ight becom e established during adolescence as
a result o f daily activity. Researchers collected and analyzed 753 random time samples
and found that their sample o f 25 teenagers engaged in the follow ing activities (ordered
here by frequency o f occurrence): talking with peers, talking with adults, w atching TV,
playing sports/gam es, eating, grooming, walking, work, reading, studying, class. O f
these, playing gam es/sports and talking with peers provided the m ost positive affective
experience, w hile w atching TV and studying generated less positive affective experience.
Because peer interaction was by far the m ost com m on venue for adolescent socialization,
investigators concluded that peer interaction m ust have a significant im pact on the
developm ent o f adult attentional patterns.
N ext, Larson and Csikszentm ibalyi (1978) focused on the experiential correlates
o f tim e spent alone in adolescence. The central question here w as w hether time alone was
developm entally productive or if, instead, it would lead to patterns o f isolation and
loneliness. ESM sam ples revealed that adolescents spent roughly one third o f their
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w aking hours in solitude, the most frequent solitary activities heing free-floating
thinking, listening to m usic/reading books, sleeping, and personal grooming. Results
indicated that, although aloneness was experienced as not enjoyable, it was associated
with low er alienation, a positive trait. Furtherm ore, adolescents who spent no time alone,
and those who spent a significant am ount o f tim e alone, were found to he the most
alienated. Thus, researchers concluded that adolescents who spend an intermediate
am ount o f tim e alone are least alienated and m ost likely to succeed at the developmental
task o f establishing autonom ous identities.
C sikszentm ibalyi and Larson (1984) designed a larger protocol in which they
used ESM to sample 75 random ly selected Chicago area high-sehool students. They
stratified subjects on the basis o f sex, grade, and socioeconom ic status, and collected
4,489 s e l f reports over the course o f the study. The self-reports were designed to capture
data both on external aspects o f subjects’ experience, including location, activity, and
com panionship, as well as on internal dim ensions o f experience, such as m ood, cognitive
state, and m otivation. Results revealed that this sample o f teenagers spent 41% o f their
time at home, 32% at school, and 27% in public places (friends’ homes, work, store, etc.).
Forty percent o f their time was devoted to leisure activities (socializing, w atching TV),
31% to doing m aintenance activities (chores, eating, personal care), and 29% to
productive activity (studying, classw ork). R egarding com panionship, the sample reported
spending 29% o f their w aking hours with friends, 27% alone, 23% w ith classm ates, and
19% w ith family. The data on subjective states showed that location had less o f an im pact
on adolescents’ internal experience than did activity and com panionship. A dolescents
w ere far m ore m otivated to engage in leisure and m aintenance activities than in
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productive activities, and they evidenced m ore positive affect when engaged in leisure
pursuits. They were happiest to be with friends while engaged in leisure activities and
least m otivated to he with classm ates w hile doing m aintenance activities. Despite lower
m ood states, adolescents evidenced high levels o f concentration w hile engaged in
productive activities alone.
D ata from Csikszentm ihalyi and L arson’s longitudinal protocol (1984)
contributed to several additional substudies in which the data were analyzed to inform
theoretical and special topic questions. For exam ple, Larson, C sikszentm ihalyi, and G raef
(1980) explored the theoretical assum ption that adolescents experience greater mood
variahility than adults. They sam pled 107 adults, aged 19 to 65 years, and compared the
adult data to the adolescent data collected by C sikszentm ihalyi and Larson (1984).
Findings indicated that adolescent moods were m ore variable than adult m oods, and that
adolescents evidenced a w ider range o f m oods (higher highs and low er lows) and more
rapid changes in moods (short-lived and changeable) than did adults.
Larson, C sikszentm ihalyi, and Freem an (1984) also investigated the influence o f
social and contextual factors on substance use and experience in teenagers. To do so, they
focused on the 25 instances o f alcohol use, 19 instances o f m arijuana use, and 4 instances
o f com bined use reported in Csikszentm ihalyi and Larson (1984). They discovered that
teenagers consum ed alcohol predom inantly on w eekend evenings at friends’ homes
am ong large groups o f people. In contrast, teenagers used m arijuana in small groups or
alone at m any different tim es o f day, across all parts o f the week. W hereas alcohol was
associated with more positive m oods, m arijuana use revealed a m ore com plex pattern o f
moods: teenagers reported m ore negative affect, less em otional variahility, but
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sim ultaneously endorsed experiences o f high excitem ent and freedom. Investigators also
noted that descriptions o f experience during m arijuana use m ight have been characterized
m ore positively in retrospect than was actually the case when experienced at the time o f

use.
In an investigation into leisure time in adolescence, Kleiber, Larson, and
Csikszentm ihalyi (1986) explored different types o f leisure activities and speculated
about how these activities m ight contribute to adult development. They found that
adolescents engage in two broad types o f leisure activities: (1) relaxed leisure, which
included, socializing, w atching TV, reading, and listening to music, and (2) “transitional
activity” leisure, w hich included, engaging in sports, gam es, arts, and hobbies.
Investigators argued that transitional activities contribute m ore to the developm ent o f
motivation and task engagem ent than do leisure activities, and that sports, games,
artwork, and hobbies were valuable tim e spent for adolescents because they engender
“the subjective experience o f leisure w ithin a context o f effort and dem and” (p .175), thus
leading to the developm ent o f positive adult characteristics.
Follow ing up on an earlier finding by Larson, Csikszentm ihalyi, and Freem an
(1984), Freeman, Csikszentm ihalyi, and Larson (1986) investigated differences in ESM
reports o f im m ediate experience and reports o f recalled experience in adolescents.
Twenty-seven adolescents each com pleted two sets o f ESM , each set spaced two years
apart. Investigators found alm ost no differences in subjects’ reports o f im m ediate
experience betw een the two years; m oods appeared stable across time. H ow ever, an
additional com ponent o f the study involved asking adolescents at tim e tw o to describe
their recalled affective states at tim e one (i.e., to retrospect about their m oods two years
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earlier). Results revealed that teenagers retrospectively rated their moods significantly
m ore positively than they had rated them at the tim e (that is, at tim e one). Instead o f
foeusing solely on the magnitude o f the disparity betw een reports, investigators proposed
an “Inteipretive M odel o f D evelopm ent” suggesting that teenagers’ inaeeurate
inteipretations o f past experience m ight actually be a sign o f positive developmental
funetioning. The disparity in mood appraisal at tim e two about tim e one was interpreted
as a sign o f developm ental work in which teenagers were learning how to eontextualize
their experiences into a larger personal narrative and w orldview . Investigators further
suggested that this developing perspeetive m ight help teenagers beeom e better able to
make realistie appraisals o f their moods based on aequired life experience and refleetion
on that life experienee. Thus, teenagers’ reform ulation o f perspeetive on their own
experienees across time was seen by investigators to constitute m ajor developmental
w ork in adolescents (Freeman, Csikszentm ihalyi, & Larson, 1986, p. 183).
In the largest ESM adoleseent protoeol to date, Reed Larson and M aryse Riehards
(1989) sam pled 483 fifth through ninth graders to investigate the transition into
adoleseenee and the charaeteristies o f life space during this life stage. Participants were
drawn from two suburban Chieago com m unities (one m iddle-elass, the other workingelass), belonged to stable families, and were predom inantly white. The sample was
stratified by grade and sex, whieh faeilitated eom parisons am ong life stages and between
genders. O ver a tw o-year period, 18,022 self-reports revealed adoleseents spent 75% o f
their w aking hours engaged in one o f the following; sehoolw ork, m aintenanee,
soeializing, media, and sport. Several investigators partieipated in this protoeol and
sim ultaneously eondueted their own investigations into the teenagers’ experienees using
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the ESM data (D uekett, Raffaelli, & Riehards, 1989; Kirshnit, H am , & Richards, 1989;
Larson, K uhey, & Colletti, 1989; Leone & Richards, 1989; Raffaelli & D uckett, 1989).
Leone and Richards (1989) investigated how well school-related aetivities prepare
adolescents for adulthood. They exam ined the am ount o f time teenagers spent doing
sehoolwork, teen ag ers’ suhjeetive experienees o f doing sehoolw ork, and w hether or not
they had com panionship while doing homework. Results indieated that the sample o f
students spent 21.5 hours a w eek engaged in sehoolwork, with only six o f those hours
devoted to hom ew ork. Tim e spent doing hom ew ork correlated w ith bad m oods, and
elassw ork was assoeiated with low levels o f attention. H ow ever, tim e spent doing
hom ew ork w as assoeiated with better aeademic achievem ent, partieularly if the
hom ew ork was done with parents. Overall, results suggested that sehoolw ork was not
intrinsically m otivating, leading investigators to conelude that adolescents d o n ’t learn to
internalize w ork-related values from school-related tasks.
In a related investigation, D uekett, Raffaelli, and R iehards (1989) explored
adolescents’ experienee o f basic daily tasks, including personal and household
m aintenance aetivities, and hypothesized about how these tasks m ight shape soeial
development. Tasks were found to be subjeet to sex typing. For exam ple, girls engaged in
groom ing m ore often than did boys, and boys did m ore outside chores than did girls.
Investigators proposed that sex differenees in adolescents’ experiences o f daily tasks
m ight lead to gender intensification and eventually to sex-role stereotyping.
R affaelli and D uckett (1989) proposed “talk” to be one o f the m ost salient
indieators o f soeialization and explored adoleseents’ patterns o f eom m unieation with
family and friends. They diseovered that talking was indeed a m ajor activity for
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adolescents and that, overall, tim e spent talking increased with age. Time talking doubled
for girls from fifth to ninth grade, with a similar, though smaller, increase in hoys’ time
talking. Adolescents evidenced a significant increase in tim e spent talking with peers as
age increased, while time spent talking with family rem ained constant across age.
Investigators also found sex differences in the subjective experience o f talk; in girls, as
they becam e older, affect increased when talking with intim ates (fam ily and friends). As
a result, researchers suggested that talk w ithin close relationships has a heightened
im portance for girls over hoys.
In an attempt to explore how leisure time activities influence socialization in
adolescents, Larson, K ubey, and Colletti (1989) and K irshnit, Ham, and Richards (1989)
investigated two contrasting leisure time choices: m edia use and sports, respectively.
Larson, K uhey, and Colletti (1989) found that adolescent m edia use was associated with
relatively passive subjective states. A dditionally, data indicated that a shift occurred
across adolescence from TV w atching with family to listening to m usic with friends. The
decline in TV watching was attributed to less time spent w ith family, w hile the increase
in m usic listening, especially in the com pany o f peers, suggested a m ove toward
independence from family. K irshnit, Ham, and R ichards (1989) found sports to he
associated with positive affect, high m otivation, and intense attention in adolescents.
Investigators suggested that sports were highly constructive in term s o f developing the
ability to derive positive affect w hile doing hard work. Investigators also noticed a trend
am ong teenagers: as they got older, they tended to drop out o f sports, despite reports o f
high m otivation and positive em otions w hile playing sports. On the basis o f the data
collected, K irshnit, Ham, and R ichards proposed that sports attrition w ith age increase
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may be due to increasing self-judgm ents related to sporting ability, as well as a new agespecific need to allocate time in ways other than for im m ediate gratification.
A nother segm ent o f ESM analyses focused specifically on exploring the
assum ption that adolescence is a time o f “stoim and stress,” characterized by increasing
em otional lability and affective instability (Green, 1990; Larson & Ham, 1993). Though
early ESM data appeared to support this idea (Diener, Sandvik, & Larson, 1985; Larson,
Csikszentm ihalyi, & Graef, 1980), subsequent findings revealed a m ore com plex picture.
For exam ple, Larson and Lam pm an-Petratis (1989) com pared the em otional states o f
preadolescents to adolescents and did not find evidence o f increased em otional variability
with age. H ow ever, older participants did report more negative m ood states than younger
participants, indicating an overall shift tow ard more “had m oods” with age. Larson,
Richards, Raffaelli, Ham and Jewell (1990) investigated daily states and tim e use patterns
associated with depression in adolescents. ESM reports revealed that teenagers’
subjective experiences o f depression w ere characterized by low interest, lack o f energy,
and m ore m oodiness. Though both depressed and nondepressed youth reported doing the
same types o f daily activities, depressed teenagers— particularly males— tended to
experience m ore social isolation than their nondepressed counterparts.
Larson and A sm ussen (1991) explored adolescents’ negative em otional
experiences and found that teenagers’ patterns o f em otional stress shifted significantly
across age. Specifically, in preadolescents the locus o f em otional traum a appeared to he
related to concrete im m ediate experiences. O lder adolescents, how ever, experienced
more em otional stress in relation to abstract issues (i.e., feelings o f others, possible future
events). Investigators suggested that these differences m ight reflect cognitive changes in
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adolescents as described by developm ental theorist Jean Piaget: “ [It] resem bles a
Piagetian shift I'rom a concrete, here-and-now world to a more abstract, hypothetical, and
constructed reality” (p. 37).
Larson and H am (1993) continued investigation into teenagers’ negative
em otional experienees, this time speeifieally focusing on possible situational eorrelates.
O lder adoleseents experieneed m ore em otional distress than preadolescents and, not
surprisingly, these high levels o f distress were found to eorrelate with an inereased
num ber o f negative/stressful life events.
Riehards and Larson (1993) investigated daily em otional experience in relation to
pubertal developm ent. For both sexes, the em otional state o f “heing in love” was strongly
associated with pubertal developm ent. Boys exhibited strong associations between
pubertal status and em otional states: more physieally mature boys reported better moods,
more foeus, and feeling “strong.” Limited assoeiations between em otional states and
physieal m aturity w ere found in girls, how ever, leading investigators to hypothesize that
puberty m ight interact with other life events and transitions to induee elevated emotional
states.
ESM researchers have also exam ined adoleseent experienee in relation to family
(Larson and Riehards, 1994a). Larson and R iehards (1994h) explored the hypothesis that
adolescents’ em otions are elosely interrelated w ith their p arents’ em otions and found that,
in faet, they are not. Fifty-five m other-father-adoleseent triads sim ultaneously earried
ESM pagers for one w eek and w ere sampled at the sam e time as they w ent about their
normal everyday routines (som etim es together in the same loeation, som etim es not).
Overall, adolescents evideneed greater m ood variability and m ood intensity than their
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parents, though m odest correlations were found between parent and adolescent
m om entary affective states.
R ichards and D uckett (1994) explored the effect o f m aternal em ploym ent on
young adolescent daily experience. Contrary to popular belief, investigators found that
m aternal em ploym ent did not disrupt the daily life experience o f their children; in fact,
young adolescents with working mom s spent the same am ount o f time w ith family, in
class, with friends, and alone as did young adolescents w ith stay-at-hom e moms.
Furtherm ore, youth with working mom s reported more positive m ood states and higher
self-esteem than did their counterparts. They also spent m ore time with their fathers, and
the time they did spend with their mom s was experienced as “friendly”— that is, they felt
positively tow ard and enjoyed the time spent with their m others.
C sikszentm ihalyi and Csikszentm ihalyi (1993) explored the relationship between
the subjective experienee o f early family environm ent and the developm ent o f creativity
in adulthood. They found that creative persons em erged from one o f two early
environm ents: difficult or exceptionally excellent. Conversely, good-enough
environm ents appeared to lead to effective hut not necessarily creative adults, whereas
traum atic childhoods were found to inhibit success entirely. The data underlying these
eonelusions eam e from a five-year longitudinal ESM study that sam pled the ongoing
daily experienees o f 200 “talented teenagers” (Csikszentm ihalyi, Rathunde, & W halen,
1993). In an attem pt to uncover the elem ents o f adolescent experience that influence the
developm ent o f talent, ereativity, and optimal functioning, the talented teenager data were
com pared to average teenager data eollected in an earlier study (Larson &
Csikszentm ihalyi, 1984). Results revealed that talented teenagers often traded time spent
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having fun, relaxing, and socializing for time spent praetieing their talent. Beeause
talented teenagers ehose to postpone im m ediate fun in favor o f nurturing their talents,
their m oods suffered m ore than the average teenager. However, despite the fact that
mood suffered in talented teenagers in general, when aetually engaged in their activity o f
talent, these same teenagers reported optimal experienees (including feeling open,
cheerful, strong, excited, un-self-eonscious, intrinsieally-m otivated, suecessful and
skillful) and feeling like they w ere w orking tow ard long-range goals. In line with these
findings, R athunde and C sikszentm ihalyi (1993) found modes o f undivided interest
(operationalized hy above average spontaneous interest eoupled w ith goal-direeted
interest) to he associated with talent developm ent in adoleseenee.
M ore recent ESM studies on optim al developm ent in adolescence have exam ined
differences across cultures. Csikszentm ihalyi and Asakawa (1998) explored possible
reasons for greater académ ie aehievem ent am ong Asian A m eriean adolescents as
eom pared to Caucasian A m erican adolescents. ESM samples from 33 A sian Ameriean
adolescents were eom pared to sam ples from 33 Caueasian A m eriean adoleseents in the
sixth, eighth, tenth and tw elfth grades. Findings indicated that, although the two groups
did not differ in the am ount o f time spent studying, Asian A m eriean students reported
m ore positive experienees, enjoym ent, high m otivational states, and pereeption o f the
im portance o f w hat they w ere doing as eom pared to their Caueasian Am eriean
counterparts. In a related study (2000), the sam e investigators found that the physical
presence o f others, particularly family m em bers, affected A sian A m erican adolescents
more strongly and more positively than C aueasian A m eriean adoleseents, thus suggesting
that internalization o f eultural values via fam ily m ay relate to aeadem ie exeellenee.
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In a review o f eross-cultiiral ESM studies on adoleseent leisure, V erm a and
Larson (2003) noted that adoleseents appear to engage in eom m on leisure activities
(active sports, musie, media use, and eom puter games) but that varying eultural values
and praetiees influenee the experienees o f these aetivities in distinet ways. For example,
Korean, Japanese, and Indian adoleseents spend many hours engaged in intense studying
and sehoolw ork to fulfill a eultural im perative to excel in academ ies. As a result, their
leisure tim e involves more passive activities, whieh are experieneed as recuperation. In
contrast, A m eriean adolescents’ leisure time is driven by the eultural ideal o f
unstructured freedom, which prom otes “finding o n e s e lf’ over excelling in school.
European adolescents report experienees o f leisure time on both ends o f the continuum;
those involved in dem anding aeadem ie eurriculum s experienee leisure time as restorative
w hile those under less pressure are inspired to engage in m ore challenging leisure
aetivities.
In a study exam ining optimal experienee in Italian adoleseents, Bassi and Delle
Fave (2004) looked at changes over tim e in adoleseent experienee. Specifically, they
eom pared quality o f experience as charted by the ESM in tw o groups o f 60 adoleseents,
aged 15 to 18, at two times, 1986 and 2000, to ascertain w hether optimal experienee and
related aetivities had changed with the times. D espite changes in the external
environm ent and culture over two decades, results indieated that adoleseent experienee
rem ained relatively stable over time.
O verall, ESM studies have provided a wealth o f inform ation on where, how , with
whom, and in w hat m ood states adoleseents aetually spend their time. These studies have
provided m ore than ju st a glimpse into the actual everyday lives o f teenagers, they have
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provided a good long look. The most revolutionary characteristic o f ESM is its ecological
validity, or its ability to obtain data on peoples’ experiences as they are living those
experiences. For exam ple, Csikszentmihalyi and Larson (1984) found that adolescents are
happiest w hen engaged in leisure activities with friends. These findings w ere not
obtained hy asking adolescents about happiness, leisure time, or friends in general;
instead, this inform ation was obtained by sam pling actual m om ents o f adolescent lives in
a variety o f situations including leisure activities, and asking about mood, activity, and
com panionship in those moments.
In addition to providing base-rate inform ation on adolescent experience (i.e.,
mood), contexts (i.e., location), and the interaction between experience and contexts,
ESM studies have also m ade valuable contributions to the theoretical discourse about
adolescence and child developm ent. For exam ple, as we saw above, one com m on
assum ption made by developm ental theorists had been that youngsters with working
m others suffered from negative moods and had poor relationships w ith their mothers.
H owever, when Richards and D uckett (1994) used ESM to explore the daily experience
o f youth w ith w orking m om s they found m ore positive mood states, m ore enjoyable time
spent w ith m om s, and higher self-esteem than in young adolescents with stay-at-hom e
moms. Because these findings are ecologically valid, they take on a level o f pow er that
cannot be achieved by m ethods that tap retrospective m em ory or general narrative selfreport.
Ecological M om entary A ssessm ent (EMA)
A second tim e and event sam pling approach that has been applied to studying
aspects o f adolescence is Ecological M om entary A ssessm ent (EM A ; Stone & Shiffman,
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1994; Stone, Shiffman, & DeVries, 1999; Smyth & Stone, 2003). EM A differs from ESM
in that it is not exclusively a random time sam pling method; instead EM A sampling may
occur at regular intervals or during specific events. EM A was developed in response to
behavioral m edicine’s need to assess medieally related phenom enon in patients within the
context o f their natural environm ents. Like ESM , it is designed to eapture “real” data by
“m axim izing eeologieal validity w hile avoiding retrospeetive reeall” (Stone & Shiffman,
1994, p. 199). EM A m ight be used to investigate patients’ blood pressure variability,
cortisol levels, pain perceptions, or prophylactic com pliance. Thus, an im portant aspect
o f EM A is “selecting a sampling scheme that will optim ally eapture the phenom enon to
be studied” (Stone & Shiffman, 1994, p.200). There are three basie EM A sampling
schem es that ean be used depending on the goals o f the research: (1) an event-contingent
schedule, which requires patients to eom plete a brief-self report m easure at the time the
event o f interest oceurs, after jogging, for exam ple; (2) a tim e-contingent sehedule, which
m andates participants to self-report at regular and/or designated time intervals, every
hour for example; and (3) a signal-eontingent sehedule, w hich, like ESM , random ly cues
patients to com plete designated self-report m easures.
EM A research on adolescents is nascent, and published studies investigating this
population relate to biom edical, psychopathology, and public health issues (A xelson et
al., 2003; Holden, Bearison, Rode, Kapiloff, & Rosenberg, 2000; M erm elstein, Hedeker,
Flay, Shiffman, 2007; Simonieh et al., 2004).
Holden, B earison, Rode, K apiloff, & Rosenberg (2000) used EM A to investigate
perceptions o f pain and feelings o f anxiety in a sample o f hospitalized youth. In order to
ascertain w hether access to a private eom puter netw ork enabling eom m unieation among
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hospitalized children am eliorated anxiety and perceived pain, investigators eom pared
EM A self-reports from youth with access to the network to youth w ithout access.
Findings indieated that the group with access to the eom puter netw ork experieneed
significantly less pain intensity, pain aversiveness, and anxiety.
In a pilot study to assess the feasihility o f using EM A with youth, A xelson et al.
(2003) collected EM A reports from 16 children and adolescents with affective disorders
and five healthy youth to assess moods, thoughts, and behaviors over an 8-week period.
Investigators concluded that EM A would he appropriate for use in com plex studies o f
neurohehavioral system s and the pathophysiology o f pediatric affective disorders.
In another pilot study, Simonieh et al. (2004) used palm -top technology to
investigate EM A use in the assessm ent o f m ood variation in fem ale victim s o f sexual
ahuse. U sing a sam ple o f nine young w om en, investigators found palm -top EM A to he an
effective m eans o f collecting m ood data from this population.
In the largest yet EM A protocol involving adolescents, M erm elstein, Hedeker,
Flay, Shiffman, (2007) exam ined cigarette sm oking am ong adoleseents. Investigators
collected EM A self-reports from 507 eighth and tenth grade students to determine
contextual influences on sm oking behavior. Investigators found that teenagers smoke
m ost when w atching TV or listening to musie, using other drugs and/or alcohol, or at
parties. They rarely smoke w hen alone or with family m em bers, and m ost often smoke
w hen w ith other smokers. Investigators concluded that EM A was successful at providing
rich data on teenage sm oking both within subjects and across subjects.
Thus the few EM A studies that have been eondueted w ith adolescents provide
eeologieally valid data on specific topics o f study.
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Think A loud P aradigm s/Protocol Analysis
Since the 1970s, researchers have used a variety o f “think-aloud” procedures to
investigate internal thought processes and mood states. As the nam e suggests, think aloud
paradigm s ask subjects verbally to report their ongoing inner processes while perform ing
various tasks, thus granting access to aspects o f otherw ise private inner experiences.
Ericsson and Simon (1980; 1984/1993) exam ined think aloud approaches through the
lens o f cognitive and inform ation-processing theories. They developed the term “protocol
analysis” to describe rigorously executed think-aloud approaches that yield accurate,
valid, and non-reaetive verbal reports o f thought sequences (Crutcher, 1994). As defined
by Ericsson and Simon, protocol analysis is the investigation o f “actual concurrent
sequences o f thoughts [to] infer the underlying cognitive processes [o f people]” (Ericsson
& Simon, 1993, p. XV). An im portant characteristic o f protocol analysis is its stringent
foeus on internal thought processes exactly as they occur for a subjeet; the sole focus o f
the m ethod is the raw footage o f internal cognitive happenings. As such, during data
collection, there is no soeial/eonversational dialogue betw een subjeet and investigator (as
might occur in an interview format), nor any form o f introspective analysis/interpretation.
A second core eharaeteristie o f protoeol analysis is that it occurs in “real tim e.” Ericsson
and Simon proposed that strictly perform ed concurrent verbalization provides direct
access to cognitive processes w hile elim inating retrospeetive bias, historically the most
serious criticism leveled at self-report m ethods (N isbett & W ilson, 1977).
M ost think aloud/protocol analysis studies involving adoleseents derive from the
fields o f Education and Educational Psychology. Research in this arena specifically is
concerned with understanding how students process inform ation in order to improve
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pedagogical strategies. For example, M oore and Scevak (1997) used protocol analysis to
exam ine the various ways in which students process text and visual aids (i.e., tables and
diagram s) w hile reading. W ithin a sample o f 119 fifth through ninth graders,
investigators found that students used several different m ethods o f reading, and that older
students used a greater range o f reading strategies than did younger students. Results
suggested that educators should be sensitive to different levels o f strategy developm ent
am ong students, particularly across grades.
In an exploratory study on writing processes, 36 ninth graders w rote essays under
think-aloud conditions to ascertain w hether differences in cognitive activity while writing
w ould be related to w riting quality (Van Den Bergh & R ijlaarsdam , 2001). Results
revealed a com plex picture; cognitive activities varied across students as well as within
students while w riting, leading investigators to conclude that “the nature o f the writing
process is recursive and dynam ic” (p.381). H ow ever, results also suggested that some
patterns o f cognitive activity appeared to be m ore effective than others. For example,
students who engaged in thinking about w hat and how they w ould write before actually
w riting produced better essays than those who w rote w ithout thinking first, a finding with
clear im plications for how to teach writing.
M osborg (2002) investigated adolescents’ historical thinking using protocol
analysis. Two groups o f high school history students, one group (N=5) from a
conservative Christian school and the other (N=5) from a liberal college prep school,
were asked to think aloud while reading new spaper articles about current affairs. Think
aloud data revealed that most students used sim ilar fram eworks while engaged in
everyday historical thinking; m ore specifically, both groups o f students drew upon a
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com bination o f their prior political eonviction/heliefs and w hat they knew about the
relevant historical eras to interpret the new spaper articles. The groups differed, however,
in their views about the articles based on their background narrative and school
com m unity m ilieu. As a result o f these findings, M oshorg suggested that educators attend
to the fram ew orks students use in everyday historical thinking, as these frameworks
im pact the w ay students see the world and engage in political discourse.
V andergrift (2003) used a think aloud approach to explore listening strategies
used hy junior-high students skilled in French as a second language. Thirty-six students
listened to three French spoken text recordings and, at predeterm ined points, were asked
to verbalize w hat they w ere thinking. D ata revealed that all subjects used an “extensive
variety o f listening strategies” (p.484), and that there were significant differenees in
strategy betw een m ore skilled and less skilled listeners. For exam ple, m ore skilled
listeners used com prehension m onitoring, a sophisticated m etaeognitive strategy
involving continual verification and correction o f com prehension (top-dow n processing),
while less skilled listeners engaged in more direct translation (hottom -up processing)
while listening. In light o f these findings, V andergrift suggested that less skilled listeners
incorporate m onitoring o f their com prehension as they listen so that they ean begin to
build m ore advanced skills.
In an attem pt to inform history instruction, W olfe and G oldm an (2005) used a
think aloud paradigm to investigate how adoleseent students read and process multiple
accounts o f an event. Forty-four sixth grade students read two conflicting historical
accounts o f the fall o f Rome and thought aloud after reading each sentence. Results
indieated that the students in this study w ere able to make connections am ong
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inform ation across m ultiple historical texts, though there was significant variation in how
students achieved these connections.
A rticulated Thoughts in Sim ulated Situations (ATSS)
A rticulated Thoughts in Simulated Situations (ATSS; D avison, Robbins, &
Johnson, 1983) is a protoeol analysis approach geared tow ard understanding peoples’
cognitive processes as they occur speeifieally in response to soeial stim uli. ATSS is
designed to stim ulate and then access the resulting ongoing stream o f thoughts and
feelings triggered by exposure to a variety o f simulated yet naturalistic situations.
Subjects listen to audiotapes describing “stim ulus scenarios” designed to elicit responses
such as soeial anxiety or hostile thoughts. As they listen, they im agine aetually heing
involved in the scenarios and pay particular attention to their cognitions and emotions
during task. Im m ediately after hearing each situation, subjects have 30 seconds to
verhalize w hat they were thinking and feeling during the sim ulated situation. Typically,
m ultiple stim ulus situations are presented during one sitting. R esponses are recorded, and
the content is coded and analyzed according to relevant research goals. Consistent with
other protoeol analysis procedures, ATSS is “as close to ‘on-line’ as possible” (Davison,
N avarre, & V ogel, 1995, p .31), leaving little room for subjects to m ake retrospeetive
errors.
There is only one published ATSS study on adoleseents (D iLiberto, Katz,
Beaucham p, & Howells, 2002). In this investigation, researchers exam ined the cognitive
activity o f aggressive and nonaggressive m ale (N=41) and fem ale (N =40) high school
students (mean age= 16.22). Subjects listened to an audio recording o f an ambiguous
encounter with an unknow n peer that bum ps into them in a hallw ay at school. W hile
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listening, the adolescent subjects w ere asked to respond aloud as if they w ere actually in
the situation. Responses were recorded verbatim, and subsequently coded for analysis.
Results indicated that males expressed m ore aggressive intent than did fem ales, although
there were no gender differences in anger expression or hostile attributions.
The central m ethodological aim o f think aloud/protocol analysis paradigm s is to
access cognitive processing as it occurs, to uncover the fine details o f m ental processes.
For exam ple, the goal o f the M oore and Scevak (1997) study was to exam ine variations
in cognitive processes while reading in a sample o f adolescents. The target o f interest was
the p ro cess o f reading. Thus think aloud/protocol analysis aspires to a level o f detailed
exam ination that surpasses other m ethods that seek to understand experience. For
exam ple, ESM m ight random ly sam ple a subject and ask via palm device. A re you
reading right now? The subject either answers Yes or No. From this we m ight learn how
often a subject reads or even how he feels when he reads (if we ask), but w e will not learn
the phenom enological details o f his reading process. ESM level questions are too gross to
be able to derive that kind o f detail about experience.
A dditionally, protoeol analysis is ecologically valid to a certain degree. A lthough
typically the setting is experim ental, subjects aetually engage in the activity under study
at the tim e o f study. For exam ple, in the M oore and Scevak (1997) protoeol, subjects
were aetually reading during the protoeol— subjects were not asked to report on their
experienee o f reading som etim e after reading. By adhering to the in-the-m om ent study o f
reading processes, investigators w ere able to uncover differenees in reading processes.
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Phenom enological Approaches
The phenom enological-psychology approach to investigating inner experience is
the third and final methodological category reviewed here. Phenom enological psychology
grew out of the phenom enological philosophy o f Edm und H usserl, who was interested in
exam ining “the m ost essential structures o f consciousness— that is, phenom ena— such as
intentionality, tem porality, spatiality, corporeality, perception, cognition, and
intersu b jeetiv ity ...” (von Eekartsberg, 1998, p. 5). In order to explore these phenom ena
and their structures system atically, H usserl advanced a tw o-part process o f explicating
experienee and then deriving the essential charaeteristies o f experienee. The first part of
the process involved the application o f the phenom enological reduction, a m ethod o f
refleetion characterized by the bracketing o f presuppositions. The second part o f the
process involved application o f the eidetic reduction, or using free im aginative variation
in order to discover the core charaeteristies o f the phenom enon under investigation.
These two parts o f H usserl’s process are described below.
First, to assum e the phenom enological attitude, or to bracket presuppositions,
m eans to let go of/put out o f play/hold in abeyance any prior held beliefs, notions,
attitudes, judgm ents, interpretations, and assoeiations about a given phenom enon while it
is under investigation (Giorgi, 1987). By doing so, the phenom enon under investigation
ean be m ore fully and clearly apprehended exactly as it m anifests. The goal in assuming
the phenom enological attitude is not to forget everything one ever knew or learned, but
rather to observe the phenom enon under investigation with fresh eyes and openness to
seeing w hat is aetually there. Husserl posited that when a phenom enon is observed in
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such a m anner, the essence o f the phenom enon, which may have heen previously
occluded, is now available for apprehension.
Phenom enological psychologists aspire to bracket presuppositions prim arily in the
investigation o f psychological processes. Thus, when studying how people learn, Giorgi
(1987) bracketed his presuppositions about the process o f learning so that he could
objectively observe his subject’s experiences o f learning; that is, he suspended the trying
to interpret w hat they were saying along the lines o f his own experience or his own
“know ledge” about how learning occurs.
H ow ever, bracketing presuppositions can be applied to clinical psychotherapy as
well. F or exam ple, a therapist may begin a session with a presupposition in play that her
client needs to continue processing an unfinished topic from the prior session. Beeause
the therapist m akes such an assumption, that is, beeause she is operating based on an
activated presupposition, she will direct the session in a w ay that angles discussion
tow ard the old topic. By doing so, she is likely to overlook the fact that the client on this
day needs to discuss a com pletely different topic. In this case, the therapist’s
presupposition is driving her ability to apprehend reality in the m om ent. H ad the therapist
bracketed her presupposition about the session topic, she may have been much better
attuned to the actual and objective needs o f her client in session.
The bracketing o f presuppositions is never a perfect process. It w ould be
im possible to bracket all presuppositions about a particular phenom enon or topic or
person, and it w ould he equally im possible to quantify an investigator’s ability to bracket
presuppositions. N onetheless, it is a core m ethodological feature o f phenom enologicalpsychology investigations conducted today (Giorgi 1987; K vale 1991).
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The second part o f H usserl’s phenom enological tw o-part process is known as the
eidetic reduction, which is an attempt to arrive at the pure essence, to distill the
fundam ental/objective/universal/essential characteristics from the superfluous or nonessential aspects o f the phenom enon. To apply the eidetic reduction, Husserl proposed the
technique o ffr e e im aginative variation (von Eekartsberg 1998). A com m on exam ple
used to explain how free im aginative variation works asks one to consider an apple (von
Eekartsberg 1998). A pples exist in m any colors, m ost com m only, red, green, and yellow.
I f we use free im aginative variation to think o f an apple in a com pletely different color,
say purple, it still retains the fundam ental and essential qualities o f an apple in our
understanding. Thus color can be ruled out as being a fundam entally essential aspect o f
an apple— we have effectively used free im aginative variation to get one step closer to
understanding the m ost essential, basie, and universal understanding o f an apple possible.
Next we m ight consider shape; in our w orld, some apples are large and some apples are
small, some are perfectly round and others are som ew hat deform ed. H ow ever, if we
apply free im aginative variation to the shape o f an apple and im agine an apple as a long
thin wafer, we run into a problem; an apple loses its essential identity as an apple if we
vary the shape dram atically. Thus shape is som ew hat o f a fundam entally essential
eharaeteristie o f apple. H usserl believed that by applying free im aginative variation
system atically to objects and phenom ena, one could com e to the purest, m ost reduced
essential understanding o f the object or phenom enon under investigation.
Phenom enological psychologists rely less heavily on using free im aginative
variation to achieve eidetic reduction than do phenom enological philosophers. However,
the underlying principle that phenom ena can reveal indivisible and essential
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characteristics is a cornerstone o f phenom enological-psychology investigations. As we
will see below, A lapak (1991) conducted a phenom enologieal investigation o f adoleseent
first love, the central aim o f which was to discover the most fundam ental and essential
aspects o f that experience.
In addition to the bracketing o f presuppositions and the goal o f eidetic reduction,
there is a third eharaeteristie o f phenom enological investigation, w hieh Husserl referred
to as taking the life w orld perspective. Phenom enologists define life-w orld as the takenfor-granted hackdrop/context/underlying ground o f reality/universe within w hich humans
live and experienee hut are not necessarily aware o f and thus take for granted (Ashworth,
2003; von Eekartsberg, 1998). In the language o f m odem psychology, life-world
perspeetive could he understood as a form o f eeologieal validity, in some w ays parallel to
the Experience Sam pling M ethod’s tenet that experienee is inseparable from
environm ent.
An im portant eharaeteristie o f phenom enologieal approaches is that they
explicitly take into account the existence o f this life-w orld context and the faet o f human
em beddedness w ithin it. By seeking a life-world perspeetive, phenom enologieal
investigations are m ost often o f lived experienees, that is, experiences that subjects are
actually engaged in. For example, Petitm engin (2006) w anted to explore a subject’s inner
experienee o f thinking o f an elephant. To do this, Petitm engin instructed her subject to,
“think o f an elephant.” She then asked detailed questions o f her subject about her
ongoing experience o f thinking o f an elephant. Petitm engin asked her subject to “think o f
an elephant” num erous tim es during the interview so as to refresh her subject’s lived
experience o f thinking o f an elephant in the m om ent. In line w ith the phenom enological
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tradition, P etitm engin’s strategy was aimed at exploring her subjeet’s lived experienee ot
thinking o f an elephant— her subject’s actual experience in the m om ent— whieh is very
different from asking her subject to retrospect or provide a general speculation about her
thinking-about-an-elephant process.
The ultim ate goal o f phenom enological investigation, then, is to understand the
essences o f phenom ena o f experienee as they interact with/speak to/reveal the taken-forgranted context o f the life-world itself, beeause the core assum ption is that the
phenom ena and life-w orld are inseparable. Therefore the grand aim o f phenom enological
investigations is not simply to explicate individual phenom ena, but also to arrive at an
essential understanding o f the life-w orld itself.
There has been some application o f the phenom enologieal-psyehology approach
to the study o f adoleseent experienee (A lapaek, 1984, 1991; A lapaek & Fisher, 1987;
Cross & Stewart 1995). In an early phenom enologieal-psyehology investigation into
adoleseent experienee, A lapaek (1984) exam ined adoleseent first love and derived the
following essential characteristics o f the first love relationship: absoluteness, uniqueness,
perfection, togetherness, idealism, innocence, com m unication, em otional connection,
reciprocal involvem ent, orientation to a future, and consistency w ith o n e’s roots.
M ore recently, A lapaek (1991) phenom enologieally explored the adolescent first
kiss to reveal a rich and detailed set o f experienees explicating the anticipation o f the first
kiss, m om ents leading up to the first kiss, the kiss itself, the m om ent o f disengagement,
and the afterm ath o f the first kiss. A lapaek was surprised to find that his subjects’
experiences o f their first kisses often did not include an experiential com ponent o f the
actual kiss itself. Instead, “other them es” appeared to eclipse the experience o f the kiss
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itself, including; preoccupation with the perform ing self (worries o f ‘b a d ’ breath),
prom inence o f bodily sensations (parched lips, butterflies, rubbery knees), and
hyperaw areness o f context (“It was as though the physical space betw een us was alive”
(p.56).
The phenom enological method has been applied to the investigation o f the lifeworld o f gifted students. Cross and Stewart (1995) conducted phenom enological
interview s with 24 gifted adolescents in rural high schools to understand the experience
o f being a gifted student in a rural setting. Interview s lasting 40 to 90 m inutes were
conducted, recorded, and transcribed, and the resultant data were analyzed for significant
statem ents, them atic units, and m ajor themes. Results indicated that m ajor themes
characterizing rural school experience for gifted students clustered around
com m unity/fam ily, personal development, and time. These them es involved complex,
varied, and detailed aspects o f subjects’ experiences; for exam ple, gifted students in rural
settings described the com plexities o f being “visible” to peers, teachers, and families.
A lthough the phenom enologieal-psyehology approach has not been exhaustively
applied to the study o f adolescents, it contributes to the present study in two main ways.
First, these investigations provide evidence that adolescents can participate in detailed
investigations o f their own lived experience. Second, the phenom enological approach to
investigating psychological phenom ena via bracketing presuppositions, seeking to
understand the essential eharaeteristies o f phenom ena, and exploring lived experiences,
yields data that are rich, detailed, and idiographie. Phenom enologieal-psyehology
investigations are deeply hum an-eentered and seek to reveal that w hich is most personal:
lived inner experience.
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Com paring D E S to Other M ethods
We have review ed the m ethods and contributions o f four ways o f exploring the
actual lives and experiences o f adolescence— DES, experience sam pling m ethods, think
aloud paradigm s, and phenom enological approaches— unique ways o f exploring human
experience. The present study uses DES, so we now briefly review the fundamental
eharaeteristies o f experience sam pling methods, think aloud paradigm s, and
phenom enological approaches, and show how DES may be able to provide access to
aspects o f adolescent experience that have rem ained hidden.
Experience sam pling m ethods (i.e., ESM and EM A) use beepers to sample
subject’s experiences, either random ly or at set times, as they go about their daily lives in
their natural environm ents. W hen sam pled, subjects fill out questionnaires which ask
about location, activity, mood, or other broad factors. By doing so, experience sampling
methods provide broad eharaeterizations o f how, where, and with w hom people spend
their time, as well as on how they feel and w hat they think w hile in those situations.
These m ethods avoid the pitfalls o f retrospection by exam ining experience in the
moment.
Think aloud/protoeol analysis paradigm s seek to understand the details o f internal
cognitive and em otional processes as they occur. These paradigm s apply strict
investigatory rules (for exam ple, not allow ing subjects to discuss anything other than
their ongoing experience o f the process under investigation) so that the fine details o f
internal processes can be accessed and understood. Like experience sam pling methods,
think aloud paradigm s do not engage in retrospection; all investigation is conducted on
subjects’ processes as they occur in the m om ent. Furtherm ore, subjects’ reports are
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recorded verbatim so that details are not missed. Unlike the broad characterizations o f the
experience sampling method, think aloud characterizations are detailed.
Phenom enological approaches to investigating experience use qualitative
interview s to derive characterizations o f lived experiences. Investigators attempt to
bracket presuppositions and seek to understand the essential characteristics o f
psychological phenom ena. Furtherm ore, characterizations derived from
phenom enological studies are detailed. Flowever, since the goal o f phenom enological
investigation is to understand essential aspects o f phenom ena, the eharaeterizations
represent the details found to be com mon across subjects.
DES shares with these three approaches the overarching goal o f accurately
accessing experience, but DES specifically is designed to access, explore, and describe
inner experience. In order to do so, DES incorporates the core traits o f each o f these
m ethodologies but also differs from these m ethods in im portant w ays, which are
described below.
DES is a proponent o f ecological validity, or understanding people within their
natural contexts. Like experience sampling m ethods, DES uses a beeper to sample
subjects in their natural environm ents. Flowever, unlike some experience sampling
m ethods (EM A, for instance) DES always adheres to random sam pling to avoid biases.
A dditionally, because DES is interested in exploring the detailed characteristics o f inner
experience, it does not use standardized questionnaires with subjects, as do experience
sam pling methods. Instead, DES derives its data through an expositional interview in
w hich subjects explicate the characteristics o f their inner experience at given moments.
Thus experience sam pling data differ drastically from DES data; experience sampling
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protocols are questionnaire based, and thus not much different than the typical general
and often inaccurate self-report data (i.e., “ Right now, I ’m feeling,” A. Sad, B. Happy, C.
Angry, D. Frightened).
DES is sim ilar to think aloud m ethods in its interest in the details o f people’s
actual inner experience. DES shares with think aloud methods the use o f verbal narrative
as the prim ary source o f data from subjects, and DES adheres to strict rules in its
interview ing procedure to ensure high fidelity and accurate inform ation from subjects.
H owever, DBS differs from think aloud paradigm s in that DBS sam ples single mom ents,
w hereas think aloud paradigm s explore w hole/entire events (i.e., w hat it’s like to multiply
24*36). Second, DBS uses random sam pling in subjects’ natural environm ent, whereas
think aloud paradigm s occur in the laboratory under controlled experim ental conditions.
A nd third, DBS explores inner experience, which includes thoughts, feelings, sensations
or any other inner experience a subject is aware of, whereas think aloud paradigm s
concentrate on cognitive and some em otional processes.
DBS is significantly influenced by phenom enological thinking and practice; in
fact, the m ethod can be characterized as a phenom enological approach. Both DBS and
phenom enological investigations use in-depth qualitative interview s to access the
eharaeteristies o f subjects’ experiences exactly as those experiences occur. DBS also
takes to heart the practice o f bracketing presuppositions while investigating phenom ena.
However, DBS differs from phenom enological approaches in three ways. First, DBS
explores random ly sam pled experiences w hereas phenom enological approaches explore a
them e or a topic (learning, apples, or thinking about elephants, for exam ple). Second,
DBS defines the exploration tem porally (i.e., m om ent o f the beep) whereas
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phenom enological investigations do not. Third, DES limits its exploration to the
phenom enon only, whereas phenom enological approaches try to derive the “essence” o f a
phenom enon. DES aims to explore the actual phenom ena o f inner experience at random
m om ents, w hereas phenom enological psychology aims to derive the essential factors
com prising a general phenom enon based on com m on experiences across people.
As m entioned in the introduction, only one DES study has been devoted to the
study o f adolescent inner experience (M onson, 1989). M onson used DES to sample the
inner experience o f five adolescents between the ages o f 12 and 14. H er sam ple varied
w idely with respect to learning ability: her four female subjects included a gifted student,
a below -average student, a slow learner, and an above average student, and her one male
subject was a learning disabled student.
W ith respect to differences in learning abilities among her subjects, M onson
found that her gifted student subject revealed greater differentiation in her inner
experience, and was able to report her inner experience with greater clarity than her slowleam er subject. In her analysis o f this found difference, M onson (1989) stated:
Q uestions that cannot be answered, but that one m ust w onder about as more
young people are studied are: Is intelligence related to the m ore differentiated
perception o f sensory processes? Is high intelligence related to the actual
production o f m ore differentiated processes? That is, does W endy [the gifted
student] actually have m ore going on in her inner experience and is accurately
reporting it w hereas A nita [slow learning student] has less going on and is
accurately reporting that? O r perhaps the difference betw een the two subjects lies
in the ability to describe inner experience, a language ability that may not
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necessarily be related to intelligenee at all. As was noted above, this question
eannot be answered because we are contrasting only individuals, not large groups
o f subjects, (p. 199)
O verall, M onson found that her sample o f adolescents experienced the same
eharaeteristies o f inner experience as those reported by adults during DES, nam ely inner
speech, inner seeing, sensory awareness, unsym bolized thinking, and feelings. However,
M onson did observe a peculiarity regarding visual im agery in her adolescent subjects as
com pared to prior reports o f im agery from adult DES subjects. Specifically, M onson’s
subjects often reported being in a process o f imaging or form ing im ages at the mom ent o f
the beep, rather than simply experiencing fully form ed im ages, as was com monly the
ease with adults. As a result, M onson suggested that “the form ing and fading o f images
may be a developm ental process” (p.204) and advocated further research on this topic.
Though other methods o f exploring experience have yielded valuable data on
aspects o f adolescent experience, they have not specifically explored the characteristics
o f adolescents’ inner experience. Thus the present study aim s to use DES to investigate
adolescent inner experience in a second attem pt at basic science research into this
population.
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CHAPTER 3

M ETHOD
Subjects
Six adolescents betw een the ages o f 11 and 14 years old participated in the
present study. Three subjects were female, aged 11, 12 and 13, and three subjects were
male, aged 12, 13, and 14. Four subjects were Caucasian, one fem ale subject was h alf
Caucasian and h alf A frican A m erican, and one female subject was Latina. All six
subjects were recruited via word-of-m outh; four subjects hailed from one o f the
investigator’s neighborhoods, one subject was a colleague’s niece, and one subject was
another colleague’s younger brother. Subjects were recruited and participated in the
present study one at a tim e, beginning in late 2006 and ending in early 2007. Five
subjects participated during the spring sem ester o f their school year, and one subject
participated during her sum m er break. As all subjects w ere m inors, parents or legal
guardians w ere fully inform ed about the study and eosigned the inform ed consent
paperw ork.

Overview
Each subject m et with two DES investigators, the author o f this study and her
advisor, approxim ately six times in a setting convenient to the subject. The purpose o f the
first m eeting was to explain the DES procedure to the subject and her parents/guardians.
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to com plete inform ed consent/assent paperw ork, and to answ er questions pertaining to
the study. The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth meetings w ere one hour expositional
interviews in which the DES investigators interview ed the subject about her samples.
Five subjects elected to come to the DES lab located on the U NLV cam pus, and one
subject agreed to have DES investigators travel to her home for m eetings. All subjects
consented to having expositional interview m eetings video recorded. Five subjects
com pleted sam pling within one m onth and one subject com pleted sam pling over a period
o f two months.

M eeting 1: Orientation
D uring the first meeting, investigators introduced the DES procedure to the
subject and her parents/guardians, and then explained the operation o f the DES beeper
and trained the subject in its proper use. The subject’s main task was to collect random
samples o f her inner experience and then to discuss those sam ples with the investigators.
To aid in the collection o f samples, the subject w ould w ear a random beeper while going
about regular daily activities in her natural environm ents. The beeper was a shirt-poeket
sized apparatus with an on/off/volum e dial, a reset button, and an earphone jack. A
beeper was issued to the subject w ith an earphone that attached to the beeper w ith a wire,
sim ilar to the way a headset plugs into a cell phone. The subject w ould w ear the beeper
and collect her sam ples within 24 hours o f the upcom ing expositional interview to have
“fresh beeps” for that interview. W hen the beeper sounded, the subject was to jo t down in
a small spiral-bound notebook (provided by investigators) w hatever she was aware o f at
that moment. That awareness m ight be some form o f thinking, feeling, or sensing, or

49

anything else the subjeet was eonseiously aware o f within or around h erself at the
m om ent o f the beep. The subjeet’s sampling notes eould be o f anything in any format that
w ould aid the subjeet in discussing her samples o f inner experience during the
expositional interview. These notes were purely for the subjeet’s use and know ledge and
therefore were regarded as the subjeet’s private property; investigators would not collect
the notes at any point in the study.
A dditionally, the investigators explained exactly w hat was m eant by “the mom ent
o f the beep.” The subjeet’s task would be to capture her inner experience as it was
oeeuri'ing the m icrosecond before the beep interrupted her. This was an important
concept to convey, as the purpose o f the study was to explore the subjeet’s naturally
unfolding inner experience, not the subjeet’s inner experience in reaction to the beep.
Therefore the beep was best viewed as a cueing tool to help the subjeet collect random
sam ples o f her inner experience, not as a m anipulator o f her inner experience. The subjeet
was inform ed that that explanation should be regarded as only the first, rough
approxim ation to the m om ent-of-the-beep concept, as prior experience has shown that
subjects require iterative practice in the application o f this concept.
Each sam pling day, the subjeet was to collect five sam ples, w hich would require
w earing the beeper for about three hours. W ithin 24 hours o f collecting samples, the
subject w ould m eet for one hour w ith DES investigators to discuss those samples. This
process o f collecting samples and m eeting to discuss them w ould happen five times, on
five different days. A ltogether, across five occasions, the subject and investigators would
explore approxim ately 25 sampled inner experiences together (see H urlburt & Heavey,
2006, for details o f this procedure).
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Finally, inform ed parental consent and youth assent paperw ork was com pleted, a
beeper was issued to the subjeet, and investigators answered any rem aining questions
about the DES procedure. A tim e and date for the first expositional interview was set and
the orientation m eeting was adjourned.

M eetings 2-6: Expositional Interviews
M eetings two through six w ere one hour “expositional interview s” in which the
subject and the two investigators discussed the subjeet’s recently collected samples o f
inner experience. These expositional interview s, at heart, were conversations in the
service o f discovering the phenom enology o f the subject’s inner experience during her
sampled mom ents. The expositional interview s have no set format, but the general
procedure was this: The subjeet consulted her notes and talked about the beeped
experience. That talk w as typically an unstructured com bination o f (a) reports about
background and/or context o f the experience, (b) reports about the situation (where she
was, who was there, etc.), (c) reports about the activity (w hat she was doing, etc.), (d)
reports about the experience that oeeurred before the beep, (e) reports about the
experience that oeeurred after the m om ent o f the beep, and (f) reports about the
experience that was ongoing at the m om ent o f the beep. Furtherm ore, all these reports
were a com bination o f faithful accounts and distorted/m isleading/overlooking/ineom plete
accounts. The task o f the investigator w as to help the subjeet zero in on the faithful
accounting o f (D and to filter away all the other talk. That was a gradual process that we
have called iterative, taking place over several expositional interview s, so that as the
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sequence o f sam pling/interviewing progresses, the talk becam e m ore and m ore purely
faithful (f).
Expositional Interview I (M eeting 2)
The first expositional interview was expected to be a challenging m eeting for the
subjeet and the investigators, and the subjeet was inform ed to anticipate difficulties.
There are typically three kinds o f challenges.
The first kind o f challenge is about w hat counts as inner experience. Subjects
typically are not skillful at identifying their own inner experience, and they don’t have a
good understanding o f w hat might count w ithin the investigators’ definition o f inner
experience, and therefore need continuing, ongoing practice and support.
The first interview therefore involved asking the subjeet to report about
som ething that she is not very skilled at doing: eapturing/notieing/apprehending her inner
experience. The investigators asked for a level o f detail that m ost subjects found initially
surprising. The investigators understood that, and expected to hear rem arks such as, “I
didn’t know you w ere going to ask me about that,” that being the phenom enological
details o f their inner experience. The investigators’ task was to be supportive o f the
subjeet’s (mostly failed) attempts during the struggle to identify her inner experience and
at the sam e time repeatedly to continue to redirect the subject tow ard their inner
experience. The subject was reassured that m ost subjects find the first day difficult in this
way; that some subjects (but not all) find that things becom e easier on subsequent
sam pling and interview days as their skills improve.
The subjeet was assured that this m ethod o f training is som ew hat “trial-by-fire” in
the sense that the investigators had declined, at the outset, to tell the subjects w hat they
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were to look for, but now the subjects are being asked to describe that in detail. Subjects
were told that that m ight not seem fair, but that that is the only way to allow subjects to
encounter their own inner experience for them selves, as they im m ediately apprehend it.
O therw ise, the investigators m ight have influenced the subject to look for aspects o f
experience that the subject h erself does not experience. That is, the investigators
explained to the subjeet, in nontechnical terms, that the bracketing o f presuppositions
requires that the investigation begins slowing, haltingly, frustratingly, tentatively; and
that w hile that m ight be som ew hat unpleasant, it is typically transient as both subjeet and
investigators becom e m ore skilled at the discourse about the subjeet’s experience.
The second challenge typical o f the first expositional interview has to do with
language. Together, the subjeet and the investigators have to begin the struggle to
establish a com m unity language that is both attuned to and expressive o f the subject’s
inner experience, and that both subjeet and investigator really understand. Therefore,
each subjeet was encouraged to struggle to find the right w ords; the investigators
struggled to ensure that they did not take for granted that they understood w hat the
subjeet was saying by questioning and clarifying all the details o f the subject’s language.
That consistent attention to detail helped the subjeet clarify this language, which
eventually becam e incorporated into the lexicon o f the trialeetie.
Finally, the third challenge during the first expositional interview is staying
faithful to the phenom ena o f inner experience. The investigators m odeled the bracketing
o f presuppositions (that is, they expressed interest solely in the phenom ena and no
interest in narrative or interpretations) while the subject dealt with the discom fort o f
having many things she said about her samples be bracketed out because they were not
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descriptions o f the phenom ena them selves. Thus the investigators consistently worked to
m aintain a focus on the subject’s inner experience without indulging the subject’s
tendencies to speak in generalities, to m ake deductions about what her experience “must
have been like,” or to make causational inferences (“because o f X ”).
Thus, during the first expositional interview, the investigators trained the subject
to encounter her inner experience by asking detailed questions about the subjeet’s inner
experience, even when the subject could not answ er those questions. The investigators
resisted any urges to “rescue” the subject from her discom fort, thus allow ing the subject
to learn to apprehend her own inner experience. By struggling through the first
expositional interview, the subjeet achieved an experientially based understanding o f how
to apprehend her own inner experience, how to talk about that experience, and how to
stay faithful to that experience. Those are skills that need to be practiced, but the first
steps have been taken.
E xpositional Interview s 2-5 (M eetings 3-6)
By the second expositional interview the subject was typically markedly
im proved at identifying and discussing her inner experience at a finer level o f detail and
w ith greater certainty than during the first expositional interview . The investigators
continued, as in the first expositional interview, to work to redirect the subjeet to her
experience at the m om ent o f the beep, but the am ount o f that effort generally lessened as
the subjeet acquired the capacity to redirect herself. Also, building on the seeds planted
during the first expositional interview, a language specific to the su b jeet’s inner
experience began to grow organically over the course o f the interview s. This language
w as em ergent along with the subjeet’s inner experience, and that language was
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continually m irrored and refined in the interviews. As a general rule, we adopted the
vocabulary, term inology, and m anner that was natural to the subjeet, although often that
becam e refined as discussion o f fine points evolved.
Thus the second through fifth expositional interviews w ere m uch sm oother than
the first expositional interview. At this stage o f the process, the challenges shifted from
establishing ground rules and im plem enting new skills to exploring the fine-grained
details, nuances, and exaetly-as-it-w as-for-her o f the subjeet’s sam pled inner experience.
The m ain continuing challenge during expositional interviews tw o through five was
bracketing presuppositions and staying faithful to the phenom ena under investigation.
Both the subjeet and the investigators worked arduously to bracket presuppositions
during this phase. The tem ptations to interpret, to import, to assum e, are subtle, and the
tendency to “think you know w hat’s going on” is insidious, particularly after you “get to
know ” a subjeet and develop a relationship with her. The presence o f tw o investigators,
both o f w hom w ere quite different people with different interests, and so on, but with a
com m on aim o f faithful apprehension/description, aided the bracketing, as did the review
o f video betw een interviews.
D ebriefing
A fter the final expositional interview, each subjeet was given a chance to ask any
questions she had about the present study or DES. M ost subjects reported that they had
found the experience interesting. A fter debriefing, subjects w ere presented with a $30 gift
card.
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D ata
The aim here was to collect random ly sampled, raw experiences and then see
what those sampled experiences had to tell us about the characteristics o f adolescent
inner experience. (See Appendix A for “raw data” o f all samples across subjects).
Collecting the D ata
The prim ary unit o f data collected in this study is what we refer to as “a sample o f
inner experience.” To review, each time a subject in our study was random ly “beeped,”
she jo tted down notes in a notebook about her inner experience at that moment. D uring
the expositional interview, investigators asked the subject detailed questions about her
inner experience at each mom ent, one at a tim e, in chronological order. In this section we
describe how we handled this data.
D uring expositional interviews, both investigators took careful notes about the
specific characteristics, details, idiosyncrasies, and nuances o f the subjeet’s lived inner
experience at each sample. A fter the interview, the subject’s inner experience at each
sample was then described in written narrative form incorporating the particular language
that had em erged during the expositional interview s to describe the subject’s inner
experience (for exam ple, one subject described thoughts as “passing through” his head;
that language was used in the written descriptions, as it perfectly expressed his
experience o f the phenom enon). The object o f these descriptions was to capture as
faithfully as possible and with as high fidelity as possible the inner experience that was
ongoing at each beep. The interview video recordings were consulted about details o f the
discussion in the preparation o f these w ritten descriptions; these w ritten narratives were
written typically w ith a few days o f each interview and before the next interview took
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place. A t the tim e these descriptions were written, the investigators had no way of
know ing what, if any, details o f the experience would be deem ed im portant in the
subsequent extraction o f salient eharaeteristies; therefore, the descriptions sought to
capture as faithfully as possible everything that m ight later be deem ed salient.

Apprehension o f Salient Characteristics— Idiographie
A fter a subject com pleted the sam pling process and each sam ple o f inner
experience had been explored and understood to the best o f the subject’s and the
investigators abilities, the investigators considered all o f the subject’s sam ples o f inner
experience together as a whole to see what salient patterns, forms, and phenom ena
em erged across samples. Again, the central data w ere the experiences them selves, only
now viewed collectively.
W e im plem ented the following core characteristics o f DES in an attem pt to cleave
our idiographie analysis faithfully to subjects’ inner experiences:
(1) W e explored one subject’s samples o f inner experience at a tim e, independent
o f any other subjeet’s inner experience, past, present, or future.
(2) W e assum ed the phenom enological attitude and bracketed all presuppositions
about the subjeet in particular and inner experience in general, regardless o f w hether
those presuppositions cam e from personal characteristics o f the subject (her
neighborhood, friends, m anner o f dress, parentage, etc.), personal characteristics o f the
investigators, characteristics o f adolescents that are “com m only understood” (raging
horm ones, etc.), characteristics reported in the literature, or presuppositions that came
from any other source. A dditionally, the random ness o f the sam ples o f inner experience
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under investigation aided in the bracketing o f presuppositions in that neither the subjeet
nor the investigators had any eontrol/ehoiee/influenee over which m om ents o f inner
experience to investigate. The data exam ined in this study were simply random mom ents
o f inner experience, chosen by the beeper without regard for the presuppositions o f either
the subjeet o f the investigators.
(3) Both independently and together, the two investigators im m ersed themselves
in all o f the particular subjeet’s sam ples o f experience. That im m ersion was aided by the
written descriptions o f the subjeet’s individual samples o f inner experience (which were
w ritten to be as faithful as possible to the original experiences), but was explicitly not
about the w ritten descriptions. The w ritten descriptions aimed us back at the original
experiences, helped us to recall the original experiences, but the original experiences
them selves w ere understood to be the proper basic data o f the investigation. For example,
if im m ersion in all sam ples raised a question about sample #12, som ething that was not
im m ediately apparent in the w ritten description o f #12, then we returned to the video
recording o f sample #12 to clarify.
(4) D uring this im mersion, investigators em barked on a delicate yet
fundam entally critical aspect o f the idiographie undertaking: the apprehension o f salient
characteristics. W e characterize this part o f the m ethod as delicate because it required a
seem ingly paradoxical com bination o f fierce bracketing o f presuppositions and refined
perception. That is, we tried to glim pse the subject’s experiences from the inside, beneath
the veils o f self-presentation, self-m anagem ent, self-deception, and self-control,
undistorted by our ow n predispositions, self-protectionism , greed, desire. W e tried to
wrap our arms around all o f the subjeet’s sampled inner experiences and lightly hold

58

them all at onee, to see the forms and patterns unique to the subject’s private experience.
W e tried to grasp those forms and patterns o f m anifestation as they idiosyneratically
eharacterize o f the subject’s experience— th at’s w hat we eall the idiographie view.
Thus, the apprehension o f salient characteristics involved, (a) im mersion in all o f
the subject’s samples o f inner experience, (b) fiercely bracketing all presuppositions
about w hat we m ight or should see, (c) applying our very best observational and pattern
recognition skills to the collection o f phenom ena, which lead to (d) the apprehension of
characteristics, patterns, trends, and idiosyncrasies in the subjeet’s inner experience.
Some o f the apprehended salient characteristics were fam iliar to us, for example, the
phenom ena o f inner speech or sensory aw areness, w hich are frequently found phenom ena
o f inner experience. It should be noted, how ever, that we w ere not explicitly looking for
frequently found phenom ena, as that would be conducting our analysis based on the
presupposition that we should find those phenom ena. Instead, our attitude was, if those
particular phenom ena arose, we should recognize them for w hat they are. On the other
hand, m any o f the apprehended salient characteristics that em erged across the subject’s
sam ples o f inner experience were frequent at all. O ur jo b sim ply and straightforwardly
was to apprehend those phenom ena.
There was no form ula for this task, but at the same tim e it was not unconstrained.
It was rather like Lewis and C lark’s investigating uncharted territory: certain features
stood out (m ountains, rivers, native peoples, w ildlife) and got chronicled. H ad Smith and
Jones investigated the same territory at the same tim e as Lew is and Clark, they would
doubtless have reported many o f the same features, but not all: Smith and Jones’
sensitivities are different from Lewis and C lark’s, and therefore would be interested in
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som ew hat different things. However, both teams would have ehronieled the main features
o f the rivers, the m ountains, and the natives. The same logie applies to our apprehension
o f salient eharaeteristies. We attem pted to be open to any kind o f eharaeteristie, and to
apprehend and then write about those that emerged as salient. Furtherm ore, we worked
hard at ensuring that those saliences were indeed eharaeteristie o f the subjects’
experience and were not exported from our own predilections— that is, we w orked hard at
bracketing our own and our subjects’ presuppositions.
In a sense, all o f the pains taken to im plem ent the DES m ethod lead us to this act
o f apprehending w hat is there to be seen about a person’s experience. W e took great
pains to train the subject to use the beeper to “capture” random sam ples o f her inner
experience. N ext, we w orked with our subjeet to develop the language needed to be able
to describe and discuss her inner experience with fidelity (and accuracy). We worked
hard in the expositional interviews to understand/apprehend/glean every possible detail
about the subjeet’s actual lived inner experience during those sam pled m om ents, and then
we w orked hard to write faithful descriptions o f those inner experience samples. Finally,
we w orked to behold all o f the subjeet’s samples o f inner experience at onee, and,
because o f our hard w ork and discipline throughout the process, we are able to glimpse
the forms and patterns o f the subjeet’s inner experience. This glim pse is w hat we eall the
apprehension o f salient characteristics and it allows us a deeper view o f how the subjeet
actually experiences.
(5)

As part o f this im mersion, the experiences were also coded, w here

appropriate, according to the DES eodebook developed by H urlburt and H eavey (1999).
Like the w ritten descriptions them selves, these codings were m eant to aim us at the
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original experiences, and were not m eant to be the end result o f the study. However, the
codings were useful tools in that they helped to us see broad patterns and trends across
samples.
(6)

Once these salient characteristics were identified w ithin a subjeet, we wrote an

idiographie description o f that subject’s experiences. This description was passed back
and forth between investigators, each o f whom edited, until a satisfactory description was
obtained. On occasion, this writing process would bum p us back to earlier steps to rethink
the salient characteristic(s) and our descriptions o f these characteristics (requiring us to
return to all 25 sam ples and ensure that the new revision still fit); furtherm ore, on
occasion it required returning to the original video recordings to ensure that the salient
characteristic descriptions faithfully represented the original experiences, as best as we
could tell.

Apprehension o f Salient Characteristics— Across Subjects
Finally, after all subjects had com pleted sam pling, all sam ples o f inner experience
across all subjects w ere exam ined collectively for across-subject analysis. This procedure
had approxim ately the sam e aspirations as w ere described above, but the aim here was to
apprehend the salient characteristics and patterns that.em erged across all subjects’
samples.
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CHAPTER 4

ROADM AP TO RESULTS
This chapter explains how the results o f this study are organized and presented
throughout the rem ainder o f this thesis. As described in detail in M ethods (C hapter 3),
DES considers its data on two levels: (1) idiographically, or per individual subject, and
(2) collectively, or across all subjects. M irroring these tw o levels o f analysis, Chapters 5
through 10 are idiographie descriptions o f each individual subject’s inner experience as
discovered by DES, and Chapter 11 describes the patterns and salient characteristics o f
inner experience discovered across all six subjects. W e outline the structure o f these
chapters here.

Idiographie Chapters
The aim o f idiographie analysis is to com e to understand as thoroughly as
possible the characteristics o f one particular subject’s inner experience. DES perform s an
idiographie analysis by considering all o f an individual subject’s sam ples o f inner
experience and then describing the salient characteristics and patterns that em erge across
those samples.
Six adolescent subjects participated in the present study and therefore the
investigators conducted six separate idiographie analyses, w hich are presented in
Chapters 5 through 10. Each chapter is devoted to idiographie analysis o f a single
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subject: Chapter 5 features FM, a 12 year-old Caucasian male; C hapter 6 features RD, a
13 year-old Caucasian male; Chapter 7 features BC, a 12 year-old Caucasian female;
C hapter 8 features AV, an 11 year-old Latina female; Chapter 9 features JT, a 14 year-old
Caucasian male; and Chapter 10 features JW, a 13 year-old Caucasian and African
A m erican female. The chapters are presented chronologically; that is, FM (Chapter 5)
was the first subject to participate in this study, RD (Chapter 6) was the second, and so
on.
Each idiographie chapter begins with a summary o f the subjeet’s discovered
salient characteristics and then opens up into a detailed exposition o f those salient
characteristics and other idiosyncratic aspects o f inner experience discovered within the
subjeet’s samples. The chapters are divided into sections based on the particular salient
eharaeteristies that em erged across the subject’s samples. For exam ple, in F M ’s Chapter
5, the sections are: sensory aw areness, inner speech, unsym bolized thinking, worded
thinking, feelings, inner seeing, organizing perceptual stimuli, and meta-aw areness. The
presence o f each section reflects the presence o f that particular characteristic in FM ’s
inner experience; furtherm ore, the m ost salient, or frequently occurring, characteristics
are discussed first and the less salient characteristics are discussed last. The section in
F M ’s Chapter 5 will be different from the sections in R D ’s C hapter 6, as F M ’s inner
experience is different from R D ’s inner experience. Thus the chapters are structured
sim ilarly, but not identically.
A dditionally, each idiographie chapter ends with a table delineating the frequency
o f characteristics o f inner experience discovered across the subject’s samples. These
tables are m eant to serve as heuristic visual aids only and should not be regarded as the
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centra] results o f this study. The central results are the subjeet’s inner experiences
them selves. The narrative descriptions are faithful attem pts to translate those lived
experiences into words, and the idiographie narratives attem pt to “lift” and illum inate the
salient characteristics and patterns o f inner experience. Thus the frequency counts are the
grossest representation o f our data in that the richness o f lived inner experience has been
reduced to categories and then into simple numbers. W ith that caveat in m ind, however,
the frequency counts are useful in that they enable an “at-a-glance” understanding o f the
broad tendencies across a subject’s inner experience. The tables illustrate two aspects o f
frequency; the num ber o f samples in w hich a eharaeteristie occurs (there m ay be two or
m ore different characteristics per sample), and the num ber o f instances o f a eharaeteristie
(there may be two or m ore instances o f one eharaeteristie in a sample).

Across Subjects Chapter
A fter the idiographie analyses, DES investigators conducted a collective analysis
in which all sam ples o f inner experience across all subjects were considered. The
collective analysis procedure is sim ilar to the idiographie analysis procedure in that the
aim is to apprehend the salient characteristics and patterns o f inner experience, only this
time across all subjects.
In the present study, six adolescent subjects collected a total o f 161 sam ples o f
inner experience (including samples from first sam pling days). C hapter 11 presents and
discusses the salient eharaeteristies that em erged across these sam ples in five main
sections. The first section considers the results across subjects in term s o f the five main
eharaeteristies o f inner experience in order o f frequency. The second section discusses
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other frequently occurring characteristics, while the third section discusses less frequently
oecurring eharaeteristies discovered across all subjects. The fourth section addresses
variations in the com plexity o f inner experience across subjects, and the fifth section is a
discussion o f nascent inner experience. The chapter concludes with a discussion o f the
lim itations o f this study and directions for future research.
The across subjects results and discussion chapter also features a table delineating
the frequency o f characteristics across subjects. This table, like the tables featured in the
idiographie chapters, is m eant to serve as a visual aid only. As the reader will discover,
the m ost striking findings in the present study cannot be reduced to m ere frequency
counts.
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C H APTER 5

“FM ”
FM was a 12 year-old m ale who sampled with us in D ecem ber 2006. He collected
29 samples over five separate days and participated in an expositional interview within
24 hours o f each sam pling day. Sensory awareness was the m ost frequently occurring
eharaeteristie discovered in F M ’s inner experience; it oeeurred in 12 sam ples, or in 41%
o f his 29 samples. A dditionally, inner speech oeeurred in seven o f his samples (24%),
unsym bolized thinking occurred in six samples (21% ), feelings occurred in two samples
(7%), and inner seeing (aka images) oeeurred in tw o sam ples (7% ). In three samples
(10% ), FM experienced his attention being pulled away from one experience toward
listening to a sound (e.g., background conversation, teacher talking, TV). He also
experienced w orded thinking in one sample (3%) and m eta-aw areness in one sample
(3%).

Idiographie D escription o f F M ’s Inner E xperience
Sensory Aw areness
Sensory aw areness occurred m ost frequently across F M ’s samples. In 12 o f 29
sam ples, or 41% o f the time, FM was attending to sensory aspects o f his experience,
including color, form, sound, and physical sensation. For exam ple, at beep 3.5 FM had
been looking up at a string o f Christm as bulbs on the ceiling, noticing the different
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colors. A t the m om ent o f the beep he was looking at one specific red bulb, noticing that it
appeared shinier than the other bulbs. He was drawn to its redness and shininess, but was
unable to say w hether he was more drawn to the redness or the shininess; he was drawn
to both in that mom ent. F M ’s inner experience was purely sensory in that he was
engrossed in the sensory aspects (redness and shininess) o f the bulb and not aware o f
anything else at that mom ent.
FM was paying attention to color in m ore than h alf o f his sensory aw areness
experiences; seven o f his 12 sensory aw areness samples featured color aw areness. For
exam ple, at Beep 4.3 he was staring at a little green light on the pow er button o f his DVD
player, specifically noticing its yellow ish-green color. FM was clear that the color, not
another sensory aspect such as the glow ingness or tiny size o f the light, w as capturing his
aw areness at that m om ent. Similarly, at beep 4.5 FM was eating cereal, noticing the
bright lem on-yellow ness o f the Pops in his bowl. Nearly all o f his attention was on the
lemon yellow color, w hile a sm aller portion o f his awareness was on his saying to him self
in his head with surprise, “W ow, th ey ’re yellow !” A nother exam ple occurred at Beep 5.3:
FM was looking at his phone, specifically staring at the blue color on part o f the phone.
M ost o f his attention was focused on the blue color but he was thinking in words to
him self, m atter-of-factly, “The edge o f my phone is blue.”
F M ’s sensory aw areness experiences sometimes involved attention to form. On
one occasion, at the m om ent o f Beep 4.2, FM was noticing his little bro th er’s cowlick,
specifically the circulam ess o f it. On another occasion, at beep 4.6, FM w as aware o f a
blend o f color and form. H e was looking at a tuft o f fur on his cat’s chin. At the m om ent
o f the beep he was focused m ainly on the w hiteness, but som ehow he w as also noticing
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the goatee-like shape o f the tuft. This sensory awareness “blend” also seemed to occur at
beep 3.5 described above in which FM was noticing both the redness and the shininess o f
the red Christm as bulb.
FM experienced body-based sensory awareness in four o f the 12 sensory
aw areness samples. For example, at beep 2.3 he was aware o f the soft step o f his right
foot on the ground as he walked to class. At beep 4.4 FM had a headache and he
experienced the pain, describing m etaphorically as the sound o f a fire alarm ringing in his
head. A t the same time FM was holding his head, feeling the sensation on the pads o f his
fingertips as they pressed into his tem ples. Here FM experienced two distinct body-based
sensory aw areness experiences at the same time: first, he felt directly the quality o f the
pain in his head (like a fire alarm), and second, he felt the sensation on his fingertips as
they pressed into his temples.
Inner Speech
FM experienced inner speech in seven o f his 29 samples (24%). He was skilled at
identifying his exact innerly spoken w ord(s) at the m om ent o f the beep, and he could
m im ic the tone o f his inner speaking. The content o f F M ’s inner speech always was a
type o f com m entary related to w hat he was doing or experiencing at the m om ent. For
exam ple, at beep 2.4 FM softly m uttered to him self in his head, “W ow, this is boring” as
the teacher droned on about positive and negative num bers. A t beep 3.6 FM said to
him self in his head with relief, “Phew !” after finishing a m oving jo b w ith his brother. At
beep 4.5 FM com m ented to him self in his head with surprise, “W ow, th e y ’re yellow !”
w hile looking at the bright yellow color o f his cereal. At beep 4.6 FM said to him self in
his head with endearm ent, “Aw, h e ’s so cute,” while looking at his cat. A nd at 5.3 FM
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said to h im self in his head m atter-of-factly, “The edge o f my phone is blue.” Overall,
F M ’s inner speech was clear and straightforward.
U nsym holized Thinking
U nsym bolized thinking occurred in six o f F M ’s 29 sam ples (21% ). For example,
at beep 1.1 he was thinking something like. W hat should I get to eat?, but the thought was
not sym bolically represented in any way. At beeps 1.4 and 1.6 FM was w ondering when
the beeper w ould sound, but his w ondering was not in w ords, im ages, or represented in
any other sym bolic form. A t beep 2.2 FM experienced an unsym bolized thought process
about reaching around the back o f the com puter to turn it on so that he could play a game,
but the thought was not pictured and did not involve words. At beep 2.3 FM was thinking
about having to get to class, but he did not experience any w ords or images along with
that thought process. A nd at beep 2.6 FM was thinking to him self that he had been
planning to play football but that the DES m eeting he was attending instead was more
im portant. A gain, this thought was clear but it did not involve w ords, im ages, or any
other form o f sym bolic representation. Notably, all o f F M ’s instances o f unsym bolized
thinking occurred w ithin his first two sam pling days. M ost adult D ES subjects take a few
days to be able to identify and talk about unsym bolized thinking; it is a difficult form o f
inner experience to apprehend because the experience is not sym bolically represented.
Because FM did not experience unsym bolized thinking in his later samples, we have
reason to suspect that these early samples may not have captured instances o f
unsym bolized thinking but instead instances o f FM not clearly apprehending his inner
experience. O ther interpretations are possible.
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Worded Thinking
W orded thinking, which is sim ilar in some ways to inner speech and
unsymbolized thinking, occurred once (3%) across F M ’s samples. At beep 3.1 he was
eating cereal with his little brother. A, when A spilled some o f his m ilk and cereal. As
FM reached for a napkin for A, he thought to him self, “A needs to clean up that m ess.”
F M ’s thought involved those exact words, and all o f those words w ere sim ultaneously
present in his inner experience, yet the words were not innerly spoken, heard, or seen.
Feelings
Feelings w ere infrequent across F M ’s samples; tw o o f his sam ples (7% ) involved
feeling experiences but only one o f these (Beep 3.3) was a true feeling experience. At
Beep 3.3 FM was at his m om ’s house, looking around at how she had set things up.
(FM ’s m om and dad had just separated and his m other had m oved into a new house,
which FM was visiting for the first time.) At the m om ent o f the beep FM was saying to
him self out loud in a lowered, alm ost breathless, voice, “I need to go talk to my M om ,”
and at the same tim e was feeling sad. The sad feeling was som ehow know n to be located
in his mind, but he could say no m ore about it.
F M ’s second feeling experience occurred at beep 1.2. A lthough not a true feeling,
like the one in beep 3.3 above, F M ’s inner experience at beep 1.2 was feeling-related. FM
was in his room w atching the TV show, Am erican Dad. O n the show, R oger, an alien,
squirted reproductive fluid into the potato salad as a m ayonnaise substitute.
Unknowingly, the Am erican D a d fam ily ate the potato salad, and FM found this funny.
At the m om ent o f beep 1.2 FM was com pletely absorbed in the TV show w hile somehow
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reacting to the show ’s humor. He was not directly feeling funny-ness/laughter/joy/belly
heat/etc., but he was experiencing some ongoing hum or in reaction to the funny show.
Both samples involving feeling revealed F M ’s com m itm ent to reporting his inner
experience with fidelity, no m atter how difficult the subject m atter. He bravely discussed
his experience o f sadness regarding his p aren ts’ recent separation, and he also risked
discussing possibly em barrassing subject m atter (reproductive fluid) with the
interviewers.
Inner Seeing
F M ’s inner experience involved inner seeing (aka im ages), though only twice
(7% ) across all samples. Both image experiences were vivid and detailed. First, at Beep
1.6 FM was picturing the car accident his teacher was describing. In his head, he saw a
white car stopped at a stoplight with a van ju st about to hit it from behind. It was a
m oving image and FM could see several cross traffic cars going through the intersection
as if view ed from the back. FM didn’t know the color o f his teach er’s car, or what kind o f
vehicle had hit her, but in his inner seeing o f the accident those details were clear: she
was driving a white car and a van hit her from behind.
F M ’s second inner seeing experience, which occurred at beep 3.4, was m arkedly
different from the m oving image o f his teacher’s car accident in that it involved an image
o f a word. W ord im ages are fairly uncom m on forms o f inner experiences across subjects.
In this instance, F M ’s older brother had ju st said out loud, “L e t’s go eat.” At the m om ent
o f the beep FM saw “eat” printed in big, bold, low er case orange letters against a black
background. He saw “eat” clearly, straight on, from the front. W hen first describing this
sam ple, FM reported that his mind was “ stuck on the w ord eat.” W hen asked w hat he
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m eant by “ stuck on,” FM described the low ercase, bold, orange lettering against a black
background and as he did so, his face erupted in a series o f small yet im possible-to-hold
back smiles, w hich we interpreted to indicate that he was now actually telling us what
was in his experience— that “stuck on” had been a rather broad, general description; the
seeing the im age was the direct, actually occurring-at-the-m om ent-of-the-beep
experience. The qualitative difference in his dem eanor/expression between his initial
description o f his experience (“ ...m y mind w as stuck on the w ord ‘eat’. .. ”) and his
telling us o f the exact details o f his experience (“ .. .1 saw the words in letters.. .they were
o ran g e.. . ”) was striking; in the form er he was passively delivering inform ation to us but
in the latter he seemed to be enlivened from the inside out, connected to his experience,
open, joyful, and clear. W e take this qualitative difference in his reporting to mean that
FM was telling us about his actual inner experience— and liking it.
O rganizing Perceptual Stim uli
Five o f F M ’s samples m ay illustrate FM facing an inner experience
developm ental challenge; organizing perceptual stimuli. W hile it is com mon for adults to
have m ore than one form o f inner experience in a sampled m om ent, it is not com m on for
adults to describe those sim ultaneous inner experiences as interfering or com peting with
one another. Three (3% ) o f F M ’s sam ples involved his attention being pulled away from
one inner experience tow ard hearing/listening in/trying to m ake out a sound— essentially
one inner experience com peting with another unrelated inner experience. For exam ple, at
beep 1.5 FM w as in the act o f taking some papers from his teacher but at the same time
he could hear kids talking in the background and he was trying to m ake out w hat they
w ere saying. He later deduced that the kids were w ondering what he had in his ear (the
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earpiece to the DES beeper). At beep 1.6 FM ’s teacher was talking about her recent car
accident. A t the m om ent o f the beep FM was trying to pay attention to w hat she was
saying, but his image o f the car accident was forefront in his inner experience, inhibiting
his ability to listen to what the teacher was saying. A nd at beep 2.5 FM was in his 6"^
period class w atching The Grinch. At the m om ent o f the beep he was w atching and
listening to the movie, but he also heard the sound o f the guy next to him playing with a
skateboard. FM experienced the sound o f the skateboard pulling his attention away from
the film. FM may experience his attention being “pulled aw ay” by sound as a result o f
not yet being able to organize his inner experience, or focus on one them e in his inner
experience.
Two other samples feature FM having two sim ultaneous but distinct inner
experiences: A t beep 4.6. FM was finishing innerly saying, “A w, h e ’s so cute” and
sim ultaneously beginning a sensory aw areness experience o f staring at the white goatee
like tuft o f fur on his cat’s chin. Similarly, at beep 5.2 FM experienced two overlapping
and unrelated sensory awareness experiences: he heard the person he was talking to say
the sound “-ey” (as in “m oney”) and also, in the background, he heard the “clunk, clunk”
sound o f the car’s driver changing gears.

D iscussion
FM was a m otivated and diligent subject. He was eager to participate in DES
from the m om ent he heard about the study and he organized the initial m eeting between
investigators and his father to discuss his participation. He kept track o f his expositional
interview appointm ents him self, and was always prepared for those interview s with fresh
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samples. F M ’s initiative and discipline was noteworthy not only for his age (12 years old)
but also in light o f his fam ily/hom e situation. F M ’s parents were separating at the time o f
his sam pling and his hom e life was in disairay. He appeared to be enduring a lot o f stress,
but he was stoic about his personal life and he remained unw avering in his com m itm ent
to the study. W e speculate that DES may have given FM a break from the stresses o f his
home life. A lthough he did not explicitly express that, he did express his delight in
discovering his sensory awareness, which he thought was “very cool.”

Table 1
N um ber o f samples = 29
Characteristic
Frequency^
Total instances*’
Feelings
2(7% )
2(7% )
Inner Seeing
2(7% )
2(7% )
Inner Speech
7 (24%)
7 (24%)
Just D oing/W atehing/Talking
2(7% )
2(7% )
Listening Process
3 (10%)
3 (10%)
M eta A wareness
1 (3%)
1 (3%)
Perceptual A wareness
3 (10%)
3 (10%)
Sensory A w areness
12 (41%)
14 (48%)
Speaking Aloud to S elf
1 (3%)
1 (3%)
U nsym bolized Thinking
6(21% )
6(21% )
W orded Thinking
1 (3%)
1 (3%)
Total characteristics^
38
40
Characteristics per sample^
1.31
1.38
‘‘ Number of samples in which characteristic occurs (there may be two or more different
characteristics per sample)
Number of instances of a characteristic (there may be two or more instances of one
characteristic in a sample)
Total characteristics excludes the DES category “just doing” (just doing is not actually a
“characteristic” of inner experience, so it is not included in the total characteristics count)
Characteristics per sample is calculated by dividing total characteristics (excluding just doing)
by the number of samples, which yields a statistic describing the average
richness/fullness/complexity of FM’s inner experience across samples.
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CH A PTER 6

“R D ”
RD was a 13 year-old m ale who sampled in D ecem ber 2006. D uring this tim e he
collected 34 samples over six separate days and participated in an expositional inteiwiew
after each sam pling day. R D ’s inner experience is best characterized as “thinking.” As
shown in Table 2, 23 o f his 34 samples (68% ) involved inner speech and nine samples
(27% ) involved unsym bolized thinking, for a total o f 32 sam ples (94% ) that involved the
experience o f thinking. In 17 o f 32 thinking sam ples (53% o f his thinking samples), RD
used idiosyncratic term inology to describe his inner speech and unsym bolized thoughts,
including descriptors such as “solid,” “light,” “passing through,” and “com ing up” ; we
will discuss those term s below. RD also experienced perceptual aw areness in 12 o f his 34
sam ples (35% ), sensory aw areness in tw o o f his sam ples (6% ), and m eta-awareness in
two sam ples (6%). RD experienced feeling in only two sam ples (6%), but eight o f his
sam ples (24% ) involved tangential feeling (for exam ple, inner speech in an angry tone).

Idiographic D escription o f R D ’s Inner Experience
Inner Speech
Inner speech was R D ’s dom inant form o f inner experience. Tw enty-three o f 34
sam ples (68% ) involved his com m enting, expressing, w ondering, or otherwise
experiencing the thinking o f some particular thought to h im self inside his head using
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specific words in his own voice. In 11 o f these 23 inner speech sam ples (48% ), inner
speech was the sole form o f R D ’s inner experience. In the other 12 o f these 23 samples
(52%), inner speech occurred along with another eharaeteristie o f inner experience, but
even within these samples, inner speech was the dom inant form o f his experience.
R D ’s inner speech was crystal clear and readily apparent to him — he knew
exactly what he was saying as well as exactly how he was saying it to him self. For
exam ple, at beep 2.4 RD w as saying to him self, very slowly, the cadence dripping with
m ind-num bing boredom , “W hat — should — I — do?” As RD continued to improve
at the sam pling task, his aw areness o f the eharaeteristies o f his inner speech becam e more
and m ore refined. For exam ple, when describing beep 4.1 RD conveyed very fine details
o f his m using to h im self in his head, “I w onder what this tastes like?” He said these
words a little dram atically, with a slight accent on the w ord “taste;” his inner speaking
sounded stylized and melodic, yet was low and quiet, definitely spoken to him self, for
himself.
U nsymbolized Thinking
In addition to inner speech, RD frequently experienced another type o f thinking:
unsym bolized thinking. In nine o f 34 samples (27% ), RD was thinking a specific thought
but that thought was not represented in words, images, or any other type o f symbols.
Beep 3.6 illustrates one o f R D ’s pure unsym bolized thoughts: His friend was dancing and
RD was thinking a w ordless thought that conveyed som ething like. What on earth is she
doing? No w ords were spoken, heard, pictured, or otherw ise know n, yet the thought itself
was clear. Sim ilarly, at beep 6.4 RD was thinking a definite thought: The Saints c a n ’t
win, dude. They c a n ’t. RD recognized that it was a disappointing thought (he badly
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w anted the Eagles to win), but despite know ing this, the thought was not represented
sym bolically to him in any way. In each o f these samples, RD was very clear that his
thoughts conveyed specific m eanings but that his experience o f each o f these thoughts
was distinctly different from his thoughts involving words (i.e., thinking experiences
involving inner speech).
Idiosyncratic Thinking Terminology
In 17 o f R D ’s 32 “thinking” samples (that is, 53% o f his inner speech and
unsym bolized thoughts together), he used idiosyncratic term inology to describe his
experiences. Specifically, R D ’s term inology described tw o distinct yet related
eharaeteristies o f his thinking experiences; density and m ovem ent. In the sections that
follow we first discuss R D ’s descriptions o f thought density (his term s w ere “solid,”
“m edium ,” and “light”). RD characterized all 17 o f these thinking samples in terms o f
density. N ext we discuss his descriptions o f thought m ovem ent (his term s were “passing
through” and “com ing u p ”). He characterized eight o f these 17 thinking samples as
m oving in some way. Finally, we discuss R D ’s descriptions o f how thought density and
thought m ovem ent are related in his thinking experiences.
RD characterized 17 o f his thinking sam ples in term s o f density, that is as “solid,”
“m edium ,” or “light.” A ccording to RD, a solid thought captured 100% o f his attention
and concentration, and seemed to be located deep w ithin his head. W hen having a solid
thought, RD was so deeply focused within h im self that, he said, a person would have to
physically grab and shake him to get his attention. RD described three instances o f solid
thoughts in total.
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One exam ple oeeurred at beep 2.1: RD was in the act o f bow ling, in the windup
(arm swinging backw ard) before the release o f the ball. At the m om ent o f the beep he
was deeply focused on one solid thought: 1 have to get a strike. Though the m eaning o f
his thought was unam biguously clear to him, the thought was not com posed o f specific
words; its m eaning could have been rendered hy 1 gotta get a stike, or 1 need a strike, or
please let me get a strike', thus this was an unsym bolized thought. RD characterized this
thought as solid because he was locked into this thinking to the exclusion o f all other
possibilities. He w as com pletely absorbed in it, and it occupied his entire aw areness in a
thorough, steady, extended in time way. N othing else could penetrate his aw areness at
that m om ent.
At the other end o f the spectrum , a light thought involved little if any o f R D ’s
attention, focus, and concentration. A light thought could be absolutely apparent to RD,
but it did not require him to be deeply focused or to becom e im penetrable to external
stimuli. A dditionally, RD experienced light thoughts on the outer surface o f his mind as
opposed to deep w ithin his head. He experienced eight light thoughts in total. For
exam ple at beep 2.2, RD was doing a trick on his skateboard and experiencing a light
unsym bolized thought: I gotta land this trick; please, let m e land this trick. The thought
was close to the surface o f his m ind and while thinking it RD rem ained quite permeable
to external stimuli.
RD also had five m edium thoughts and one light-m edium thought. He deemed
these thoughts “m edium ” apparently because he experienced them as being somewhere
betw een “solid” and “light.” For exam ple, at beep 3.2 RD w as angrily saying to him self
in his head, “ Stupid eat, get aw ay!” RD explained that this w as a m edium thought
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because while it was not a focused, concentrated thought, it was substantially more than a
light and fleeting thought. He was partially absorbed in the thought. Similarly, at beep 4.3
RD was wondering to him self, H ow do I look? He described his experience as a medium
thought, because it was lighter than “solid” but solider than “light.”
In eight samples, RD described the m ovem ent o f his thoughts: they moved
through his head in different ways, either “passing through” (5) or “com ing up” (3).
A ccording to RD, thoughts that passed through started som ewhere outside his head,
floated though his head (often from left to right), and then passed out o f his head. For
exam ple, at beep 4.4 RD was quietly exclaim ing to him self in his head, “Oh crap, that
really does sm ell!” The thought ju st passed through, not requiring a lot o f concentration.
Furtherm ore, the thought did not lodge in his head to be focused on, or attended to for
any longer than the one to two seconds it took to pass through.
On the other hand, RD experienced a thought as “com ing up” when it originated
deep within his head and m oved forw ard tow ard the surface o f his head. For example, at
beep 6.5 RD was thinking to him self, 21 to 20. It was an unsym bolized thought that came
up from the depths o f his mind tow ard the surface. A t the m om ent o f the beep, the
thought was closer to the surface, but still com ing up from the inside tow ard the outside.
It appeared that the density o f R D ’s thoughts (“solid,” “m edium ,” and “light”)
was related to the m ovem ent o f his thoughts (“passing through” or “com ing up”). RD
believed (as a self-characterization that was corroborated by sam ples) that “com ing up”
thoughts originated deep w ithin his head and were originally experienced to be solid.
(Recall that when RD was engaged in a solid thought he was deeply focused, almost
entranced, and it would be hard to get through to him .) As that solid thought came up, it
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became increasingly lighter. The com ing up process seemed to take a second or two.
Furtherm ore, RD believed he could “grab” the thought anywhere along this com ing up
process and suspend the becom ing-lighter o f the thought; the longer he w aited to grab it,
the lighter it would have become. Beep 5.3 illustrated this grabbing o f a “com ing up”
thought: RD was saying to him self in his head, in a quiet yet surprised voice, “Wow,
those are nice shoes.” It was light thought, but it had started o ff as a solid thought deep
inside his head, and then came up through his mind getting progressively lighter the
closer it got to the surface. As this thought made it’s way up from the depths o f his mind
to the surface it transform ed into a m edium thought, and then into a light thought— at
which point he grabbed it. Thus this thought originated from w ithin the depths o f his
mind and floated forward, apparently changing density along the way.
RD believed (although this was neither corroborated nor disconfirm ed by
sam ples) that the density o f “passing through” thoughts changed in the opposite
direction: thoughts that originated outside his head were originally light, and as they
passed through they became more and more solid. H owever, none o f the five passingthrough thoughts that actually appeared in his sample showed this solidifying tendency:
all the sam pled thoughts that passed through were characterized as being light. For
exam ple, at beep 2.2 the unsym bolized thought, I gotta land this trick, is a light thought
floating though his otherw ise open mind. Again at beep 5.6 he is saying to him self in his
head, “I d o n ’t w ant to w atch this, it looks scary,” and that inner speech is a light thought
that ju st passes through.
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Feelings
W e now turn to diseuss R D ’s em otion. In eight o f R D ’s 23 inner speaking
sam ples (35% ), RD recognized his voice as being em otional such as angry, excited, sad,
or happy. Strikingly, in all but one o f these samples, he did not experience any feeling,
even though his voice had an em otional sound, tone, and speed. For example, at beep 3.1
RD was saying to h im self in his head, in a pissed o ff voice, “W hy did he kick me in my
sore knee?” His inner speech was angry and rapid, yet he was not feeling pissed off.
Im m ediately after the beep, RD recognized that his voice was pissed off, and he
acknow ledged that his pissed-off tone o f voice reflected that som ehow he was pissed off.
H owever, at the m om ent o f the beep RD was not experiencing being pissed off, not
experiencing tenseness in his body, seeing red, or any other aspect o f experience that
m ight be indicative o f anger. Beep 5.2 illustrates a sim ilar set o f characteristics: R D ’s
m om was showing him some DVDs she brought home. At the m om ent o f the beep he
was exclaim ing to h im self in his head, “Oh crap! Y ou got R o c k y ll” His voice contained a
mix o f delighted surprise and excitem ent, but he did not experience that delight, surprise,
or excitem ent directly in the moment.
R D ’s inner-speech-w ith-feeling-tone-but-no-feeling-experiences may reflect his
developing capacity to experience feelings fully and directly. These instances may
reflect, we speculate, an adolescent condition in which a nascent feeling exists in the
body but is not fully form ed enough to m anifest as its own inner experience. Perhaps the
best RD can do in his stage o f developm ent is to express his nascent feelings through
inner speech, which is his prim ary— and m ost w ell-developed— form o f inner experience.
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Though RD frequently (in 8 o f his 34 samples) expressed em otions in his inner
speaking tone, he experienced emotion as a distinct inner experience only twice in 34
samples (6%). H ere are those two exam ples o f experienced feeling. A t beep 5.1 RD was
saying to h im self in his head, “Aw, m a n ... .dude, that really sucks,” and was feeling sorry
for his friend, J, who had ju st fallen and appeared to be hurt. The tone o f his voice was
sym pathetic; it had a feeling-bad-for-J sound to it. M ost o f his aw areness (about 70%)
was on this inner speech itself, but the rest (about 30% ) was on actually feeling sorry for
J. The sorry feeling seem ed natural to RD, his natural response to seeing someone get
hurt. It was sim ilar to a sad feeling, but not exactly the same. He felt it on the inside
surface o f his chest and in his head, but not in any other part o f his body. In beep 6.6
R D ’s feeling experience was less differentiated but still an entity distinct from his tone o f
voice. At the m om ent o f the beep he was exclaim ing out loud w ith frustration, “How
could they lose?” after the Eagles lost the game he had been w atching on TV. RD felt a
tiny bit o f disappointm ent, and though he was not aw are o f how the disappointed feeling
m anifested in his inner experience, he experienced the disappointm ent as separate and
distinct from his speech. These samples suggest that RD may be ju st beginning to have
feeling experiences, and that somehow his inner and outer speech m ay be assisting this
developing capacity.
Open Space
RD had two sam ples (6% ) in which he experienced “open space” in his mind.
Both instances occurred along w ith “light” thought m oving through his head. For
exam ple, at beep 2.2 roughly h a lf o f his awareness w as devoted to a “light” thought
floating through, and about a quarter o f his aw areness w as devoted to cheeking the
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position o f the skateboard and visually confirm ing that his stance was okay to
SLiceessfully execute the triek. The rem aining quarter o f his awareness was ju st open. H e
was not m eta-aw are o f being mentally open but a portion o f his mind was simply “free o f
thoughts.” R D ’s second mention o f this phenom enon oeeurred at beep 6.5: RD was
thinking to him self, 21 to 20. There w ere no specific words even though the concept was
perfectly clear. It was a light thought that came up from inside his head. A lthough it was
the only thing in his aw areness at the m om ent o f the beep, only about 50% o f his
awareness was dedicated to the unsym bolized thought. The other 50% seem ed to be
space for som ething else, but at the m om ent there was nothing else there.
Perceptual A w areness
Perceptual aw areness occurred in 12 o f R D ’s 34 sam ples (35%). R D ’s perceptual
aw arenesses always occurred along with a more dom inant inner speech or an
unsym bolized thinking experience. For example, at beep 2.5 RD was looking at his
skateboard, w hich was flipped on its side. He had j ust sent the front right wheel spinning,
and was unsym bolizedly wondering. H ow fa s t can 1 go? At the same time, he was
hearing the wheel spin; this hearing was part o f his onging aw areness, so we call it
perceptual aw areness. Similarly, at beep 3.4 RD com m ented on a pretty girl w alking by.
He said to him self in his head, “Oh snap! S he’s hot!” Sim ultaneously, he was tracking the
girl with his eyes, but not focused on any specific part o f her. These instances illustrate
R D ’s characteristic propensity to perceive sounds and sights in his inner experience, but
not to be explicitly drawn into the perceptual stimuli, as is eharaeteristie in sensory
awareness.
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Sensory Awareness
RD had sensory awareness in two o f his 34 samples (6%), both body based. At
beep 4.2 RD was in a hurry, and his body felt a little jittery and anxious as he rushed to
get ready. At beep 6.3 he was standing up, yelling at the TV screen while w atching a
game, and he was aware o f his w eight in his feet and how that felt different than how his
body felt when sitting a m om ent before.

D iscussion
Overall RD showed sophistication in his ability to do the DES tasks. He was able
to capture, report, and discuss the phenom ena, features, and characteristics o f his inner
experience clearly, and very quickly to identify and discuss hard-to-know -and-explain
experiences like unsym bolized thinking. Eor exam ple, RD was able to discrim inate
betw een aw areness vs. m eta-aw areness, a discrim ination that is exceedingly difficult to
m ake for many subjects. At Beep 6.2 RD was observing h im self w atching the football
gam e on TV. He confidently understood that to be very different from m erely watching
the game; in this ease he was actually aw are o f h im self w atching the game. Furtherm ore
RD was com m itted to uncovering and telling the truth— exactly as it was for him— about
his experience. On more than one occasion he risked his own em barrassm ent to reveal the
details o f his inner experience. For exam ple, at beep 3.3 RD w as on his bed, arms folded
behind his head, arms, head, and upper body pulsing to music. RD was singing/ehanting
along in his head to the song on the radio, “1-like-big-butts...” M ost o f his aw areness
(75% ) w as on his singing in his head while the rest (25% ) was on listening to the song. It
was quite em barrassing for RD to say he was singing about butts; he had to fight down
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the urge to avoid telling us about this. But he went forward anyw ay, despite his
em barrassm ent, to tell us about his inner experience.
Finally, RD seemed to grasp the im portance o f adhering to the m om ent o f the
beep and to rem ain faithful to that, even to the point o f telling the investigators on more
than one occasion, “But that doesn’t really m atter because it was after the beep.” Fie
appeared to surprise even him self regarding some aspects o f his inner experience, for
exam ple, his discovery that many o f his thoughts “float through” his mind. D espite the
strangeness/absurdity/foreignness (to him) o f this type o f unexplainable and heretofore
unknow n aspect o f his very own inner experience, he bravely stood behind it.

Table 2

Characteristic
Feelings
Inner Speech
M eta A w areness
Open
Perceptual A w areness
Sensory A w areness
U nsym bolized Thinking
Total characteristics
Characteristics per sam ple‘s

N um ber o f samples = 34
Frequency”
2(6% )
23 (68%)
2(6% )
2(6% )
12 (35%)
2(6% )
9 (27%)
52
1.53

Total instances*’
2(6% )
23 (68%)
2(6% )
2(6% )
12 (35%)
2(6% )
9 (27%)
52
1.53

“ Number o f samples in which characteristic occurs (there may be two or more different
characteristics per sample)
*’ Number o f instances o f a characteristic (there may be two or more instances o f one
characteristic in a sample)
Characteristics per sample is calculated by dividing total characteristics by the number o f
samples, which yields a statistic describing the average richness/fullness/com plexity o f R D ’s
inner experience across samples.
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CH A PTER 7

“BC ”
BC was a 12 year-old female who sampled in February and M arch o f 2007. She
sampled on five separate occasions, collecting a total o f 22 samples. BC had difficulty
m astering the sam pling task and because o f this her first three sam ples were elim inated
due to task errors. Thus 19 samples are included in our discussion and analysis o f B C ’s
inner experience. Fifteen o f these 19 sam ples (79% ) contained little o f what we usually
call inner experience. In 11 o f the 19 sam ples (58% ) BC reported that she was ju st doing
things (listening, talking, watching, cleaning, etc.) w ithout any inner experience. In three
o f her sam ples (16% ) BC was doing nothing and having no inner experience at all, and in
one sample (5% ) she thought she had some inner experience but she did not know what it
was. H ow ever, four o f B C ’s samples (21% ) did feature inner experience: tw o samples
(11% ) involved perceptual awareness, one sample (5% ) involved sensory awareness, and
one sample involved inner seeing (5%), though this occurred a few seconds after the
m om ent o f the beep. W e elected to include this exam ple o f inner seeing in our
consideration o f BC, even though it occurred after the beep and w ould therefore typically
be excluded, because it provided us with additional inform ation about the
existence/state/frequency o f her inner experience itself and her ability to describe
experience.
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Sam pling with BC was rem arkably different from our experiences with other
subjects in this study. She had prolonged difficulty m astering the sam pling task, and she
appeared to have very little inner experience overall. Thus, unlike previous and
subsequent idiographic chapters, the present chapter is structured as chronological
narrative rather than an inner-experience-by-characteristic analysis.

D ay-By-D ay A ccount o fB C ’s In n er E xperience
DES subjects often struggle to note and talk about their inner experience during
the first few sam pling occasions but with practice they becom e increasingly skilled at
doing so. Initially, BC appeared to struggle with the sam pling task as m ost subjects do:
she was visibly surprised by the detailed interview questions, she could not locate the
exact m om ent o f the beep, and she could not identify her inner experience, and she
resorted to describing outer events instead. D espite this struggle, BC appeared to have
one sam ple involving inner seeing (aka image) on the first day o f sampling. A t beep 1.5
B C ’s brother was talking to her about playing basketball. BC w as not sure w hat was in
her experience at the m om ent o f the beep— maybe nothing. A fter the beep, however, BC
described having an image o f herself and her brother playing one-on-one on a basketball
court. In the im age BC had the basketball and was standing in front o f her brother, who
was gesturing in frustration because BC won. Though she knew it was a basketball court,
she did not see the basketball hoops or any other distinctive features o f the court in her
image. The im age was still (i.e., not m oving) and appeared in black and w hite. Despite
this exposition, it w as not possible to establish w hether BC actually experienced an image
at the m om ent o f the beep; she m ay have been experiencing an im age at the time o f the
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expositional interview and describing that as it unfolded. In some ways, her report was
typical o f descriptions o f images m inner experience as discovered by DES, but it
occurred on B C ’s first day o f sam pling and may have been substantially shaped by our
training-aim ed questions, so there are many good reasons to doubt w hether there was any
image present w hatsoever.
By the end o f D ay 2 BC decidedly was not reporting her inner experience as most
subjects do. Instead, she com m unicated to us with increasing frequency and confidence
that she was ju st doing things, without any corresponding inner experience. Beep 2.5
illustrates this: BC was scrubbing the counter closest to the stove. At the m om ent o f the
beep there was nothing in her awareness. She had finished doing the dishes— specifically,
finished washing the last knife— and had begun to wipe down the counters. It was a fact
o f her universe at the m om ent o f the beep that she was scrubbing the counter hard, but
she was not aw are o f that, or o f anything else at that mom ent. In this sam ple BC was
confident in describing the details o f her outer experience; she reported the sequence o f
events without hesitation and she could accurately pinpoint her activity at the m om ent o f
the beep (scrubbing the counter closest to the stove). Yet there was nothing in her inner
experience at the m om ent.
There was, how ever, some inkling o f inner experience on Day 2 when BC was
able to describe two instances in which she may have been experiencing perceptual
awareness. A t beep 2.1 she was looking at the leaves on a tree in her front yard, though
she was not focused, draw n in, or “into” the leaves in any sensorial w ay— she ju st
happened to have her eyes pointed at the leaves at that m om ent. It is difficult for us to be
confident about the accuracy o f this description. For exam ple, we couldn’t (or at least
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didn’t) distinguish unequivocally between “looking at the leaves” as m eaning that she
was interested in the leaf-ness o f her perception or as m eaning that she was looking at the
top h a lf o f the tree (the part where the leaves were as opposed to the trunk).
Similarly, at beep 2.3 BC was perceptually aware o f pain in her front tooth, but
she was not aware o f the pain in any deeper way than know ing it was there at the
m om ent. In both o f these instances, BC had trouble discrim inating w hether these
perceptual aw arenesses were ju st facts o f the universe or actually present in her
experience in some way. We elected to call these experiences perceptual aw arenesses
because there seemed to be som ething m ore than nothing at all.
On Day 3 we decided to alter the protocol format. Instead o f B C ’s collecting
beeps and then com ing to the lab for the interview, we w aited outside her house while she
sampled so that we could interview her directly after each beep. The idea w as to
elim inate retrospection. It was possible that B C ’s difficulty stem m ed from the w riting or
the rem em bering, not the lack o f experience itself; we sought to m inim ize that by
elim inating the w riting and shortening the rem em bering to its limit. H ow ever, even with
the change in format, BC did not report much inner experience at the m om ent o f the
beep. For exam ple, at beep 3.1 BC w as talking to her cat, telling him how handsom e he
was. At the m om ent o f the beep she had paused and was ju st w aiting, with no inner
experience. At beep 3.2 BC was w alking hom e from next door, ju st passing her mailbox
at the m om ent o f the beep, with no inner experience. In both instances BC described
outer events w ith detail (talking to her cat, passing her m ailbox) but denied the presence
o f inner events.
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B C ’s increasing reports o f “nothing” in her inner experience led us to w onder
w hether, A) she did have inner experience but was incapable, for w hatever reason(s)
(e.g., developm ental stage, cognitive deficit, chaotic environm ent), o f capturing and
reporting said inner experience, or B) she simply did not have inner experience at those
sam pled m om ents. A clue to this question arrived at the end o f the third sam pling day. At
beep 3.4 BC was w atching Halle Berry on TV. A t the m om ent o f the beep, she was
paying attention to the way Halle Berry was speaking, that is, w ith an accent that BC
recognized as unusual. W hen describing her inner experience, BC was
uncharacteristically clear, precise, and confident that her attention was focused on the
sound o f H alle B erry ’s speaking, not H alle B erry’s white dress or the O scar statuettes
that w ere also on the screen at the same time. BC was also uneharaeteristically
enthusiastic during the interview about this beep. She was anim ated and energetic, and
defended the fact that she was listening to H alle B erry’s accent at the m om ent o f the
beep, not looking at her dress or the Oscar statuette or anything else. This w as a m arkedly
different sample from any other encountered over three full days o f sam pling with BC.
As a result o f the H alle B erry sample, a few possibilities oeeurred to us: A)
perhaps it had taken BC a little longer than the average subject to m aster the sam pling
task and now that she had done it once, she w ould describe m ore inner experience, or B)
perhaps BC d id n ’t have m uch inner experience, but once and a w hile she did, and when
she did she could report it clearly and confidently.
On D ay 4 w e continued the w ait-outside-B C ’s-house-and-interview -im m ediatelyafter-the-beep procedure. BC collected three samples, each finding nothing in her inner
experience. For exam ple, at beep 4.1BC was spending tim e w ith her fam ily at home. The
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music was playing loud and everyone was dancing. A t the m om ent o f the beep BC had
stopped dancing and was watching everyone else, laughing at the way they were dancing,
but she was not aware o f anything at the m om ent o f the beep. A t beep 4.2 she was
w alking next door to her sister’s house, holding her little brother in her arms. At the
mom ent o f that beep she was ju st walking; there was nothing in her inner experience.
And at beep 4.3 BC was watching the end o f the m ovie. The L and B efore Time, on TV.
Again, she was not aware o f any inner experience. BC requested that w e end sampling
early that day after ju st three samples, as she was bored and irritated with the procedure.
O verall, Day 5 sampling also yielded very little inner experience, although there
were a few instances in w hich we speculated that BC m ight be experiencing inchoate and
incipient forms o f inner experience. A t beep 5.2 BC was hitting her friend in the face
with her right hand. A lthough BC m aintained that she did not have any inner experience
at that m om ent, we w ondered if this sample m ight indicate the presence o f an inchoate
feeling. That is, perhaps BC was feeling som ething that caused her to hit her friend in the
face, but that feeling was so undeveloped that she could not identify it directly. At beep
5.3 BC was picking out a m ovie to take to her friend’s house. A t the m om ent o f the beep
BC was saying out loud to her friend, “Do you w ant the Winnie the Pooh or the Tigger
m ovie?” BC was quite sure that there was som ething in her aw areness at the mom ent o f
the beep but she was unable to identify it. This sam ple lead us to speculate whether, (a)
B C ’s inner experience was only partially form ed and thus not identifiable; (b) BC had
had a fully form ed inner experience but her recall was inadequate; or (c) some other
possibility.

91

In the spirit o f discovery, m id-way through sampling D ay 5 we relaxed the DES
procedure and rem inded BC o f her inner experience o f attending to Halle B erry ’s accent
a few days back (Sam ple 3.4) and asked her if she had any inner experience sim ilar to
that in any o f her m ore recent samples. BC enthusiastically recalled her experience at the
Halle Berry beep, but m aintained that none o f her samples since included inner
experience.

D iscussion
One potential explanation for B C ’s reporting no inner experience is that she does
not have the capabilities to capture and/or describe it even though she has it. A nother
possibility is that BC does not have inner experience very often, and that her inner
experience occurs only interm ittently. F our o f B C ’s samples (21% ) suggest that her inner
experience occurs in fits and starts rather than continuously. Im m ediately preceding beep
2.4, BC had taken an aspirin for her tooth pain, but at the exact m om ent o f the beep
nothing was in her aw areness. In her description o f her experience, she suggested that the
aspirin taking had som ehow factored into her inner experience, but now , after that was
done, she was left w ith nothing in her inner experience until the next stim ulus cam e
along. Similarly, at beep 2.6 B C ’s m om had ju st finished m using aloud about how long it
w ould take the researcher to get to their house. BC had heard and com prehended w hat her
m other said, but at the m om ent o f the beep she had m oved on from it. BC explained that
her attention had not yet landed on som ething new, so she was not aware o f anything at
the m om ent o f the beep. A t beep 3.1 BC was in the m iddle o f a “conversation” with her
cat, telling him how handsom e he was. To the best o f her know ledge, at the m om ent o f
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the beep she was “w aiting” for her to meow back in reply. She was engaged in the ju st
doing o f the conversation, but she was also seem ingly “in-between” experiences. Finally,
at beep 3.3 BC was w riting her sister a letter. At the m om ent o f the beep she had stopped
w riting and was paused, waiting to see what to write next. At that m om ent there was
nothing in her inner experience yet she was w aiting for something to com e next. This
sample suggests that B C ’s inner experience com es in fits and starts and that she must
wait for it, so that she can act on it. It is very possible that these sam ples illustrate w hat it
is like for a young person who does not yet have w ell-developed, ongoing inner
experience.
Though it is difficult to interpret the m eaning o f B C ’s characteristic pattern o f
nothing in inner experience, it is interesting to note that over the course o f sampling she
becam e an unenthusiastic participant in DES. She w as initially excited by the prospect o f
sampling, but alm ost im m ediately seem ed bored by the task. D uring the initial few
interview s, BC yaw ned profusely and fidgeted in her chair. By the third sampling day she
began m aking excuses to end early and w anted to know how m any m ore tim es she “had
to do this.” On the final day o f sam pling BC reported that she found D ES to be “w eird”
and “boring.” The w eirdness seem ed to be in response to our real-tim e samplinginterview format, and the boring w as simply a reflection that she did not enjoy the task,
which is fairly unusual. However, in light o f our speculations that she m ay not be able to
do the task or that she may not have m uch inner experience it m akes sense that a person
w ould be bored by repeatedly trying to do som ething they cannot do.
Overall, our best understanding o f these interview s is that BC had no inner
experience at m ost o f her samples. Only one o f B C ’s samples (beep 3.4, the Halle Berry
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sam ple) revealed inner experience sim ilar to that reported by other subjects. In four
others, there m ay or may not have been some kind o f rudim entary inner experience.

Table 3

Characteristic
Incipient Inner Experience
Inner Seeing
Just D oing/W atching/Talking
N o Inner Experience
Perceptual A w areness
Sensory A w areness
Total characteristics'^
Characteristics per sample'*

N um ber o f samples = 1 9
Frequency'*
1(5 % )
1(5 % )
11 (58% )
3 (16% )
2 (1 P % )
1(5 % )
5
.26

Total instances**
1 (5 % )
1 (5 % )
11(58%4)
3 (16% )
2 (1 P % )
1 (5 % )
5
.26

Number o f samples in which characteristic occurs (there may be two or more different
characteristics per sample)
Number o f instances o f a characteristic (there may be two or more instances o f one
characteristic in a sample)
'' Total characteristics excludes the DES categories “just doing” and “no inner experience” (just
doing and no inner experience are not actually “characteristics” o f inner experience, so they are
not included in the total characteristics count)
Characteristics per sample is calculated by dividing total characteristics (excluding just doing
and no inner experience) by the number o f samples, which yields a statistic describing the
average richness/fullness/com plexity o f B C ’s inner experience across samples.
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CH A PTER 8

“AV”
AV was an 11 year-old fem ale who sampled with us in early April 2007. She
collected a total o f 25 samples on five separate days and met with us for five
corresponding expositional interviews. Inner speech was the m ost frequently occurring
characteristic o f inner experience across A V ’s samples, occurring in seven samples
(28%), as shown in Table 4. Sensory aw areness occurred in three samples (12% ) and
perceptual aw areness occurred in five sam ples (20%). In six sam ples (24% ), AV was just
doing various activities w ithout any separate inner experience. Tw o samples involved
unsym bolized thinking (8% ), and she had no samples involving inner seeing (aka
images). Rem arkably, none o f A V ’s samples featured feeling experiences directly,
despite the fact that one o f her classm ates unexpectedly had died the w eek before and in
casual conversation she had often reported feeling sad about this. H owever, feeling did
play a very im portant indirect role in eight o f A V ’s sam ples (32% ), being expressed as a
secondary characteristic o f other inner experiences and/or appearing as the content o f her
experiences.
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Idiographic Description o f A V ’s Inner Experience
Inner Speech
Inner speech was the most frequently occum ng characteristic discovered in A V ’s
samples. It appeared in seven o f her 25 sam ples (28%), and three o f these seven samples
(43%) featured straightforward inner speech. H er rem aining four inner speech samples
(57%) involved em otion, and thus are discussed in the Feelings section.
A V ’s very first sample o f inner experience, at beep 1.1, captured her inner speech.
She was w atching TV and a big bald m an in a tuxedo had ju st appeared on screen. AV
was looking at the m an’s head, noticing a small patch o f hair that apparently had missed
being shaven. At the m om ent o f the beep, AV was saying to h erself in her head in a
dram atic voice, “Oh my god, they cut his hair w ro n g ...! d o n ’t know why he w ent to those
p eo p le...” This was A V ’s first sample on her first sam pling day and though she was not
yet skilled enough to pinpoint her exact word(s) at the m om ent o f the beep, she was clear
that her experience was o f innerly speaking these exact w ords to herself. W ith practice
over time AV developed into a very accurate observer o f her inner speaking at the exact
m om ent o f the beep. By her fifth day o f sam pling AV had w as able to make fine-grained
discrim inations regarding her inner speaking in relation to the onset o f the beep. For
exam ple, at beep 5.3, A V was asking h erself in her head in her usual speaking voice,
“Should I sleep?” A t the exact m om ent o f the onset o f the beep she w as saying the word,
“I” and she continued innerly speaking, saying the word, “sleep?” as the beep was
sounding.
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F eelings
AV had a feeling experience in only one o f her 25 samples (4% ), although even in
this sam ple it was the sound o f the beep that triggered her to realize that she was feeling
sad. A t beep 1.4 AV was reading Bridge to Terabithia, specifically the part in which the
main character finds out that his best friend is dead. W hen AV heard the beep, she
noticed that she felt sad deep inside her eyes and that she was trying not to cry. She also
became aware that she som ehow was debating in her head about w hether or not to go
ahead and cry, because she did n ’t w ant her parents to notice her crying and becom e
worried. H owever, the feeling and the thinking were in her aw areness ju st after the
beep— apparently brought into awareness by the beep. A t the m om ent o f the beep (i.e.,
the last undisturbed m om ent before the beep) A V ’s inner experience was ju st reading.
A lthough beep 1.4 was A V ’s only “true” feeling sample, seven o f her 25 samples
(four inner speech, two speaking aloud to another, and one speaking aloud to self, or 28%
o f all sam ples) were em otionally toned. For exam ple, ju st before beep 1.5 AV had been
w ondering w hether to eat ice cream or cereal. The beep sounded as she was saying to
herself in her head, “I should eat both.” H er inner voice sounded sad; it was softly
lilting— like a sad little girl— yet AV did not feel sad at the m om ent. She had been sad all
day, crying o ff and on about her friend’s sudden death. But at the m om ent o f the beep,
she was not experiencing sadness despite the sad tone o f her voice. Sim ilarly, at beep 2.1
AV was w atching a TV show in which her favorite contestant was about to lose a
com petition. At the m om ent o f the beep AV was innerly saying to h erself in a sad tone,
“M elrose is going to lose.” In this sample AV was less descriptive about the tone o f her
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voice, but she was confident that it sounded sad while at the same tim e confident that she
was not actually feeling sad.
A nother exam ple o f A V ’s expressiveness-w ithout-actually-feeling occurred at
Beep 4.4: AV was having her blood drawn for the first time ever. H er eyes were squeezed
shut as the needle was ju st beginning to pierce the skin in the inside crease o f her right
arm. At the m om ent o f the beep AV was com m anding herself in a rapid, high-pitched,
dramatic squeaky little voiee, “I ’m not going to cry!” She felt the uncom fortable
sensation o f the needle entering her skin. Next, she quickly rem inded herself in her head
in her normal speaking voice, “R em em ber AV, d o n ’t put [squeeze] your hand too strong
because then it’s gonna hurt m ore.” This utterance cam e after the beep, ju st after the
more desperate-sounding, “I ’m not going to cry!” A t the m om ent o f this sample, AV
clearly was undergoing a stressful experience yet she did not directly experience any o f
the anxiety/panic/w orry/fear that was expressed in her little squeaky voice. Thus in these
two samples, as in the other five speaking samples that included em otional tone, AV did
not experience her feelings despite the fact that her inner speech expressed feelings.
Em otionality infiltrated many o f A V ’s speaking samples, som etim es expressively
in tone o f voice (as in 1.5, 2.1, and 4.4 above), and som etim es them atically in the content
o f what she was saying. Before beep 4.5, A V ’s younger brother had m essed up a
com puter gam e being played by her older brother, M arco. As the beep sounded, AV was
asking, “M arco, are you sad?” Them atically, this sam ple suggests that AV not only is in
the process o f developing her own feeling skills, but that she is also learning to recognize
feelings in others. This sample further illustrates the developm ental difficulty o f
acquiring the em otion-recognition skill. It is likely that M arco is not sad, but rather angry
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or frustrated at his younger brother. AV, however, is sad, the result o f her friend’s death.
She may well be unable, or at least unskilled, at differentiating ano th er’s feelings from
her own.
A nother striking exam ple o f how A V ’s speech them atically expressed feeling that
was not directly experienced occurred at beep 2.4. In this sam ple one o f A V ’s favorite
TV show characters died. AV had turned o ff the TV, gone into her room , turned o ff the
lights and lay down on her bed. She stared at the ceiling w hile repeating out loud to
herself, “I ’m sad. I ’m sad. I ’m sad. I ’m s a d ...” A t the m om ent o f the beep, AV was
saying the final, “I ’m sad” in the chain. Rem arkably, even though AV was saying she is
sad, she w as not actually feeling sad at that moment.
One way to understand this sample, and A V ’s preoccupation with sadness
throughout her samples, is that she’s telling h erself repeatedly “I ’m sad” because she
hasn’t yet acquired the ability to feel sadness directly; so “I ’m sad. I ’m sad” is a w ay o f
practicing organizing sadness, in the same way that repetitively building block tow ers is a
way o f practicing organizing fine m otor coordination. I f this is the case, it’s not merely a
disconnect betw een w hat one tells o neself and w hat is occurring; it is that there is only an
incipient, discoordinated, inexpert set o f occurrences that later (as an adult) will be
im m ediately, skillfully recognized as sadness. O f course it is also possible that A V ’s
repertoire o f inner experience does include experiencing differentiated feelings and that
our 25 sam ples sim ply did not capture it. I f this is the case, this sam ple, as well as the
other exam ples w e have given, may sim ply represent the frequency o f this disconnect in
A V ’s inner experience.
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AV was, apparently, able to feel sadness— she could do so ju st after beep 1.4 (the
Bridge to Terabithia sam ple)— or at least she was able to feel the com ponent parts o f
sadness (her eyes, etc.). But she apparently did not routinely feel sadness as it was
occurring. This leads us to speculate that sadness-recognizing is a skill that is learned
gradually, that is difficult, slow, aw kw ard at A V ’s stage, but that later m ight be quick and
facile. This sam ple also leads us to speculate. M ight DES be useful in helping adolescents
(and adults) learn to identify and experience their feelings (or other budding forms o f
inner experience) clearly? I f adolescence is indeed a time o f storm and stress, perhaps
one o f the reasons for this is that inner experience is not yet developed and/or not yet as
clearly experienced as it is in adulthood. I f DES could facilitate such development, m ight
that reduce some o f the apparent inner turm oil adolescents grapple with?
Sensory and P erceptual Aw areness
W e now turn our discussion tow ard A V ’s sensory and perceptual inner
experiences. Sensory aw areness occurred in three (12% ) o f A V ’s samples and perceptual
awareness occurred in five (20%) o f her sam ples, w hich suggests that these forms are
highly characteristic o f her inner experience. AV described four instances o f sensory
awareness across three samples, w hich m eans in one sam ple, beep 1.2, she experienced
two distinct yet sim ultaneous sensory aw arenesses. A t beep 1.2 AV was standing in the
grass in her yard while the sprinklers were on. At the m om ent o f the beep she was feeling
her right foot slowly becom e soaked by w ater seeping into her tennis shoe and through
her sock. At the sam e time she could feel the sensation o f w et grass clippings stuck to her
right ankle, partially lodged in her som ew hat w et sock. She w as com pletely focused on
these two sensations at the m om ent o f the beep.
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At beep 3.1 A V ’s sensory awareness was a visual experience. She was typing on
the com puter keyboard in the family room. A t the m om ent o f the beep she was looking at
the “D ” key, specifically staring at the size and shape o f letter “ D .” Prior to the beep, AV
had been typing steadily until she got to “D .” She paused as she noticed that this
particular letter “D ” was sm aller than the “ D” on her bro th er’s keyboard. H owever, at the
m om ent o f the beep she was no longer com paring “D ” keys; she w as sim ply engrossed in
the size and shape o f the “D .”
A V ’s beep 3.2 was a visual sensory awareness. AV opened a draw er to see if her
m issing wallet m ight be in there. The draw er was filled with a tangle o f com puter and
m edia cables and controls. A t the m om ent o f the beep AV was noticing the sheer am ount
o f “s tu f f ’ packed in the drawer. She was aware o f the tangle o f stu ff as a whole; she was
not focused on any o f the individual items, and she was not thinking about her w allet at
that particular m om ent. In this instance, A V ’s visual experience o f the tangled mess in
the draw er had m om entarily drawn her aw ay from her w allet-finding effort. We note here
that this sample was difficult to code because it seemed to be on the border between
sensory aw areness and perceptual awareness. We elected to code it sensory awareness
because her perception o f the tangled mess in the draw er som ehow captivated her, and
we w eighted that captivation significantly in our coding. H ow ever, this sample easily
could be argued to be a perceptual awareness, as AV was not captivated by a particular
quality (like color), aspect (like shape), or feature (like one particular cord) o f the tangled
mess in the drawer. Thus it m ight be m ost accurate to say that her inner experience at the
m om ent o f the beep was o f being drawn away from the w allet-finding task tow ard her
visual perceptual aw areness o f the tangled mess in the drawer.
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Perceptual awareness occurred in five (20%) o f A V ’s samples. For exam ple, at
beep 3.3 AV was playing with a button on the table in front o f her. She was poking the
tip o f her pen in and out o f the holes, fitting it in to one hole, pulling it out, fitting it in to
another, and so on. At the m om ent o f the beep, AV was noticing the particular hole that
the tip o f her pen was in. She was m ostly aware o f the hole, not the pen, though the pen is
in the hole at the m om ent. As in beep 3.2 above (in which AV was drawn to the tangled
mess in the drawer), this sample seem s to exist on the border o f sensory aw areness and
perceptual aw areness. W e elected to code it perceptual awareness rather than a sensory
aw areness because she was not engrossed in any specific sensory characteristics o f the
hole as she was, for exam ple, when looking at the “D ” key in Beep 3.1.
Sim ilarly, at beep 3.5 AV w as noticing the m ole on a cartoon character’s face but
was not draw n in by any particular sensory aspect o f the mole. A t beep 4.4 A V felt the
needle pierce her skin when having her blood drawn. Although she noticed the sensation,
she was not engrossed in the sensory feeling o f the experience. A t beep 5.2 AV was
looking at the blue dress bordered with floral print worn by a girl on TV. A t the m om ent
o f the beep AV was looking at the bottom portion o f the dress, but not at anything in
particular— not the blueness, or the flow ered border, or the billow o f the fabric, etc. And
finally, at beep 5.4 AV was looking at a bite o f pancakes on her fork, getting ready to eat
it. She w as not absorbed in any particular feature o f the bite o f pancakes, she was simply
seeing it on the w ay to eating it.
Just D oing
AV had six sam ples (24% ) in w hich she was ju st doing various activities w ithout
any other separate inner experience. F or exam ple, at Beep 4.1 AV was logging on to
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m illsberry.com , typing in her usernam e and password. A t the m om ent o f the beep she
was pressing “A ” on the keyboard, not particularly aware o f the letter A or o f anything
else. Similarly, at beep 1.5 she was ju st reading; at 2.2 she was ju st coloring in a coloring
book; at 2.5 she was ju st talking to her mother; at beep 5.1 she w as ju st dressing her
virtual pet dog on N intendo DS; and at 5.5 she was ju st lining up during talent show
practice. In each o f these samples A V ’s inner experience sim ply was o f the activity she
was engaged in at the moment.
U nsym bolized Thinking
U nsym bolized thinking occurred in two o f A V ’s sam ples (8% ), and both
instances appeared somehow to be involved in her problem -solving efforts. At beep 2.3
AV had ju st finished singing a song by T Pain to h erself in her head. A t the m om ent o f
the beep she was ju st beginning to wonder, Should I sing another song? The beep caught
her at the outset o f that thought but ju st after the beep, apparently in response to that
thought, AV heard in her head the rapper Aeon singing “ Sm ack that on the floor” along
with the rhythm o f the song. It was as if her hearing “ Smack that” was the answ er to her
w ondering what song she should sing next. A nother unsym bolized thinking instance
occurred at beep 3.4. This time AV was w orking on a word find puzzle, trying ways to
find the word “neur.” H er strategy was to search for the letter “n ” row by row, thus at the
m om ent o f the beep she system atically was scanning the horizontal row s (specifically the
3"* row) for a letter “n.” A V was sure that at that m om ent the letter “n ” was “in m ind.” It
was hard for her to articulate how it was in m ind— there w as no im age o f the letter, and
she was not saying the letter to herself—but the letter “n” was som ehow present in her
aw areness at the m om ent o f the beep. In both o f A V ’s unsym bolized thinking instances.
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the unsym bolized thoughts (Should 1 sing another song? and “n ”) w ere part o f problem
solving processes. In the former, AV was trying to decide w hether or not to sing another
song and the unsym bolized thought was the question itself, w hich was subsequently
answered by another form o f inner experience (inner hearing). In the latter, AV had the
letter “n” in m ind as she searched for it in her word find puzzle. It w ould have been
interesting to see w hat A V ’s inner experience would have been if she had found the “n ”
in the word search. In any case, one possible explanation for the unsym bolized thinkingproblem solving connection is that for AV unsym bolized thinking is a useful way to
lightly hold inform ation in her m ind so that she can be open to receiving an answer.

D iscussion
Overall AV was an outstanding DES participant. She was tim ely, organized, and
com mitted, but m ost im portantly she was earnest in her efforts to learn the task and to do
it well. Though she was the youngest subject to participate in the current study, her inner
experience was further developed and broader across form s than som e o f her older peers.
It appears that at A V ’s current stage o f developm ent, her feelings are know n and
expressed through her speech, though her capacity to experience feelings as distinct
experiences may be on the cusp o f em erging (as evidenced in beep 1.4, w hen she was
triggered by the beep to recognize her sad feeling). AV is a strong inner speaker and
tends tow ard frequent sensory-perceptual inner experiences. U nsym bolized thinking is
also solidly w ithin her inner experience repertoire. It is notable that AV did not describe
any experiences o f images; this m ay be because image m aking occurs in later stages o f
inner experience developm ent.
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Table 4

Characteristic
Inner Speech
Just D oing/W atching/Talking
Perceptual Awareness
Sensory Awareness
Speaking Aloud to S elf
U nsym bolized Thinking
Total characteristics'*
Characteristics per sample**

N um ber o f samples = 25
Frequency"
7 (28% )
6 (24% )
5 (20% )
3 (12% )
1 (4% )
2 (9 % )
18
.72

Total instances'*
7 (28% )
6 (24% )
5 (20% )
4 (1 6 % )
1 (4% )
2 (9 % )
19
.76

Number o f samples in which characteristic occurs (there may be two or more different

characteristics per sample)
Number o f instances o f a characteristic (there may be two or more instances o f one
characteristic in a sample)
Total characteristics excludes the DES category “just doing” (just doing is not actually a
“characteristic” o f inner experience, so it is not included in the total characteristics count)
**Characteristics per sample is calculated by dividing total characteristics (excluding just doing)
by the number o f samples, which yields a statistic describing the average
richness/fullness/complexity o f A V ’s inner experience across samples.
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CHAPTER 9

“JT”
JT w as a 14 year-old male who sampled in late April 2007. D uring that time he
collected 25 samples on five separate days, and discussed 22 o f these sam ples (two
sam ples were lost to interference and one sample was deem ed private) in five separate
expositional interview s. Sensory and perceptual experiences appeared to dom inate J T ’s
inner experience. As shown in Table 5, sensory awareness occurred in 15 o f JT ’s 22
sam ples (68% ), and perceptual aw areness occurred in 10 sam ples (45% ). JT also
experienced unsym bolized thinking in eight sam ples (36% ), inner speech in four samples
(18% ), im ages in three samples (14% ), feeling in two samples (9%), and inner hearing in
one sam ple (5%). Tw enty o f JT ’s sam ples featured more than one characteristic o f inner
experience; 11 sam ples featured tw o characteristics, seven sam ples featured three
characteristics, and tw o samples featured four characteristics. In five o f these “com plex”
samples, all o f the occurring characteristics w ere them atically related, w hile in the
rem aining 15 com plex samples, som e o f the occurring characteristics w ere unrelated.

Idiographic D escription o f J T ’s Inner Experience
Sensory A w areness
J T ’s sam ples featured sensory awareness m ore frequently than any other form o f
inner experience. Fifteen o f his 22 sam ples involved sensory aw areness (68% ), and 7 o f
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these fifteen sam ples (47%) featured more than one sensory aw areness per sample. Thus,
as shown in colum n 2 o f Table 5, JT had 23 separate instances o f sensory awareness
within these 15 samples. Ten o f JT ’s 23 sensory awareness instances (43%) involved
bodily sensory aw areness in which he was specifically attending to a sensation in or on
his body. For exam ple, at beep 2.1 JT was aware o f the cool breeze on his cheek, at beep
2.4 he was aware o f his stomach feeling full, at beep 3.5 he was aware o f a burning
sensation in the w hite o f his right eye, at beep 4.2 he was aware o f a painful fire-like
burning in his hands, and at beep 5.2 he was aware o f the sensation o f sneezing, noticing
how the pressured air was blow ing out o f his nose and mouth.
Thirteen o f J T ’s 23 sensory aw areness instances (57% ) were external sensory
aw arenesses o f visual, auditory, or olfactory characteristics. JT experienced seven
instances o f visual sensory awareness (30% o f his 23 sensory aw areness) in which he was
engrossed in the visual characteristic(s) o f som ething in his environm ent. For example, at
beep 1.4 JT was looking at a box o f com ics. A t the m om ent o f the beep he was staring at
one face o f the box, engrossed in the white color and, separately, at the
brightness/vibrancy o f the white. He was focused on one central area on the face o f the
box, but the w hiteness/brightness seem ed to occupy his entire visual field. JT had been
staring at the face o f the box for a few seconds, so the sound o f the beep penetrated an
ongoing process. Similarly, at beep 1.5 he was noticing the pixilated quality o f a book
cover rendering o f O liver Twist, at beep 2.4 he was engrossed in the reflection o f a light
bulb in the shiny silver stripe o f a coke can, and at beep 3.5 he was exam ining the
characteristics o f a patch o f blue stucco wall. In beep 4.1 JT w as exam ining dark blue
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lettering on a sign, w hile at beep 5.1 he was staring at the pouffy texture o f the carpet,
and finally at beep 5.4 he was noticing the shininess o f a candy w rapper on his floor.
A dditionally, JT had five instances o f auditory sensory aw areness (22% ) and one
instance o f olfactory sensory aw areness (4%). Exam ples o f his auditory sensory
aw arenesses occurred at beep 2.2 when he was hearing the sound o f m ustard pushing out
o f the bottle as he squeezed it, at beep 2.2 when he heard the clanging sound o f pots and
pans, at 3.2 when he heard the m etallic rattle o f mints in a can, at beep 5.1 when he heard
the grinding noise o f the air conditioner, and at beep 5.3 when he heard the “crunch”
sound as he bit into a hard pretzel. JT ’s olfactory sensory aw areness occurred at beep 2.1
when he was sm elling ham burgers cooking on the grill. Overall it appears that JT ’s
capacity for sensory aw areness was skilled and well differentiated as his reports were
frequent, clear, and diverse (bodily, visual, auditory, olfactory).
Perceptual Aw areness
Perceptual aw areness occurred in 10 o f JT ’s 22 samples (45% ). These instances
appeared to be sim ilar to his sensory aw areness experiences in that they involved bodily
sensation, hearing, and seeing. H owever, in these perceptual aw areness instances, JT was
not engrossed, drawn in or captivated by the sensory stimuli. For exam ple, at beep 2.3 JT
felt a burning sensation in his throat, but he was not focused on the burning sensation
itself. Instead, he was sim ultaneously w ondering (unsym bolized thinking) why the w ater
he had ju st sipped was causing his throat to bum . A t beep 3.1 JT heard the sound o f the
bathroom door latching shut. He was listening for the sound so that he could know when
the door had com pletely closed; he was not interested in the sensory quality o f the sound
o f the latch clicking shut. Similarly, in beep 4.4 JT noticed a bug flying, and that it
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looked like a speck. His seeing o f the bug was in his awareness, but only as a perceptual
stim ulus that he was considering w hacking, he was not sensorily interested in the bug-asspeck visual experience.
U nsym bolized Thinking
U nsym bolized thinking occurred in eight samples (36% ), which suggests that it is
fairly characteristic o f his overall inner experience. H is unsym bolized thoughts were
typical and unrem arkable in form and content. For exam ple, at beep 1.1 JT was thinking
to him self som ething like, here we go again, but not in words or im ages. A t beep 2.5, JT
was thinking he ought to clean up the strawberry ju ice dripping out o f the com er o f his
mouth. At beep 4.5, JT was wondering if he should kill the bug flying around the room,
and at beep 5.3 JT was thinking that he should probably m ove his legs o ff o f the
footboard since they w ere beginning to bum from the friction.
Inner Speech
JT also experienced inner speech in four sam ples (18% ), im ages in three samples
(14% ), feelings in two samples (9%), and inner hearing in one sam ple (5%). J T ’s
instances o f inner speech were clear and straightforward: at beep 3.3 he was saying to
him self, “Tom orrow is the last tim e I ’ll get to w ear a Speedo. .

at beep 4.2 he was

asking him self, “H ow many [push-ups] do you w anna do?” ; and at 5.5 he queried
him self, “W hy w ould the tree be m oving?”
Inner Seeing
J T ’s inner seeing experiences, though infrequent, w ere very detailed— particularly
his image at beep 1.5: JT was looking at the cover o f the book O liver Twist, w hich
included a large portrait o f the young Oliver. Forem ost in his experience, JT was looking
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at O liver’s eyes and recognizing the eyes to be sad. At the same time, in his own head he
saw three screens depicting different scenes that depict JT ’s way o f thinking about what
O liver’s life was like, and what events m ight have caused O liver’s sadness. The screens
in JT ’s head were at right angles to each other, with one screen directly in front o f him,
much like the side and front walls o f an office. The screen directly in front o f JT depicts
O liver as a little boy in a dreary orphanage cafeteria begging for food, his hands cupped
and outstretched. The im age was sim ilar to a still photograph w ith only the little boy in
focus. The other tw o screens flanked JT to the right and left at right angles to the front
screen. These screens also depicted sad scenes, one o f a dog dying and the other o f a
person dying. It was difficult for JT to recall w hich scene was on w hat side, but he knew
they w ere all there in his mind.
JT experienced tw o other im ages over the course o f sam pling, and though they
were not as elaborate as the Oliver Twist related image, they w ere also well form ed (i.e.,
not in the process o f being formed) and clear. A t beep l.I JT saw an image o f his father
angrily m outhing to him to clean up his messy room; and in beep 3.2 JT was im agining
him self turning his head to the left to see the red num bers, 5:30, lit up on his digital
clock. Overall, im ages do not appear to be frequent occurrences in JT ’s inner experience,
but when they do occur, they are mature.
Feelings
Four o f JT ’s 22 samples involved feelings (18%). He reported direct inner
experience o f feelings in tw o sam ples (9% ) and recognition o f another person’s em otion
in two samples (9%). A t beep 3.3 JT experienced sadness in his head: at the m om ent o f
the beep he was saying to him self, “Tom orrow is the last tim e I ’ll get to w ear a Speedo.”
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The sad feeling was about swim season ending and JT experienced it as a separate
accom panying phenom enon to his thought. JT ’s report o f his experience o f feeling sad
was confident but he was unable to describe the feeling itself. W e have noticed a similar
reporting style regarding feelings with other adolescents in which they are able to identify
an experience o f a specific feeling but unable to discuss/verbalize/describe the
characteristics and/or qualities o f the feeling itself. A dditionally, we have noticed that
other adolescent subjects report experiencing feelings in their heads.
In beep 4.1 JT experienced another feeling, this tim e partly in his head and partly
in his body: he was lying down on the couch and his dog w as lying on top o f him. A t the
m om ent o f the beep, he felt the d o g ’s w eight pressing dow n on his stom ach and the
pressure was slightly painful. At the same tim e JT was annoyed, w hich involved wanting
to throw the dog o ff o f him. This annoyance seemed to be a feeling in his head, which
som ehow was expressed in his arms. JT was sure that this annoyance was not an explicit
thought, and he was sure that there was some sensation like throw ing the dog o ff in his
arms, but he was less sure o f the annoyance in his head.
It appeared that JT was able to recognize other’s em otions w ith m ore ease than he
was able to experience his own feelings. A t beep 1.1 JT saw an im age o f his D ad and
im m ediately recognized that his Dad was angry with him (for not having cleaned up his
m essy room). Similarly at beep 1.2 JT looked at a rendering o f O liver Tw ist and
effortlessly was aware o f sadness in O liver’s eyes. In contrast, JT labored to describe his
own experience o f sadness and annoyance, ostensibly because he had to struggle to use
words to describe his own feeling experience— w hich he is probably not accustomed to
doing. JT reported his recognition o f his father’s anger and O liver T w ist’s sadness easily.
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as he has likely had plenty o f practice reading facial cues and m atching them to the
nam es o f feelings. This discrepancy suggests that the skills o f recognizing em otion in
others may com e easier and precede the skills o f experiencing and articulating o n e’s own
feelings.
Inner H earing
Inner hearing occurred in one sample only (5%). A t the m om ent o f beep 2.3 JT
heard him self saying that it was peculiar that w ater would cause his throat to bum . He
was not innerly speaking, yet he innerly heard him self com m ent on the w ater burning his
throat. This sample is notew orthy for two reasons. First, inner hearing is a rare form o f
inner experience. It requires finely tuned introspective discrim ination, particularly when
the sound internally heard is the subject’s ow n voice, as is the case in J T ’s example.
Second, JT described that he heard his m using float through his m ind in the baekground,
term inology closely resem bles that o f our seeond subject, RD. A lthough this is the only
instance in w hieh JT refers to “floating though,” it does seem an unlikely random
coincidence.

Com plexity D iscussion
Tw enty o f J T ’s 22 samples (91% ) featured more than one eharacteristic o f inner
experienee in his aw areness at the m om ent o f the beep. That represents an unusually high
num ber o f “com plex” sam ples as eom pared to the other adolescent partieipants in this
study. These eom plex sam ples featured two, three, and som etim es up to four aspects o f
inner experienee oecurring at the same time. O ne possible explanation for this is that JT
is our oldest (14 years) adolescent subject. I f inner experienee itse lf develops over the
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course o f adolescence, it would m ake sense that older adolescents w ould have more inner
experiences than younger adolescents - after all th ey ’ve had m ore practice.
H ow ever, ju st because JT has m ore characteristics packed into his inner
experience at any given sample does not m ean that his capacity for m ature inner
experience is as developed as it would be in an adult. Adults tend to have singular or
them atically related com plex inner experience. Five o f JT ’s “com plex” samples mirrored
adult samples; they featured aspects o f inner experience that were them atically related.
H owever, fifteen o f JT ’s “com plex” sam ples featured aspects o f inner experience that
w ere not all them atically related. That is, some aspects o f inner experience were
them atically clustered, but one or tw o aspects were com pletely unrelated, alm ost as if
they w ere interferences. For exam ple, at beep 4.3 JT was in the car w ith his mom at a
drive-thru. A t the m om ent o f the beep he was looking at the very dark blue lettering on
the drive-thru w indow (sensory aw areness), w ondering w hether the lettering is blue or
black. H is thought was clear yet it did not m anifest in words or im ages (unsym bolized
thinking). A t the same tim e JT ’s m om was talking to him. A lthough he was in some way
taking in her talking (perceptual aw areness), the m eaning o f w hat she was saying was not
im pacting him. He had not “latched onto” w hat she was saying; he was not thinking
about w hat she was saying.
In this sample, JT had three ongoing characteristics o f inner experience occurring:
sensory aw areness, unsym bolized thinking, and perceptual awareness. C learly, his
sensory aw areness and his unsym bolized thinking experiences w ere related to the same
them e (deciphering the color o f the lettering.) H ow ever, JT ’s perceptual aw areness o f his
m other’s talking (as well as the heretofore uncoded experience o f “not yet latching onto”
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the m eaning o f her words) is/are relative to a separate unrelated-to-the-sign-lettering
theme. Put another way, the foreground experience in this sam ple was JT ’s looking
at/w ondering about the dark blue lettering, while the background experience was his lowgrade aw areness o f his m other’s talking to him. From a G estalt perspective, this sample
illustrates JT ’s inability to destroy background phenom ena to m ake w ay for clear
foreground experience— singular or com plex. Instead, JT ends up with backgroundnoise-inner-experience (his perceptual awareness o f his m other’s talking) bleeding
through to contam inate what would otherw ise be clear foreground inner experience
(deciphering w hether or not the blue-black lettering was actually dark blue or black).
This incom plete foreground/background phenom enon occurs in an additional 14
o f J T ’s samples; for exam ple at beep 2.2 JT was paying attention to the sound o f the
m ustard bottle blow ing air and bits o f m ustard onto his ham burger, but he was also
separately draw n into the sound o f pots and pans clanging in the background; at beep 3.5
m ost o f J T ’s aw areness was on his eye burning, but another portion o f his aw areness was
on noticing a patch o f blue stucco wall; at beep 4.4 he was speaking aloud to him self but
a tiny part o f his aw areness heard the TV in the background; at beep 5.2 he was
engrossed in looking at the pouffy texture o f the carpet but he also heard the grinding o f
the air conditioner in the background; at beep 5.3 his legs were hurting and he was
thinking about m oving them, but separately he heard the crunch o f the pretzel he was
biting into at that m om ent.
N otably, m any o f JT ’s “com plex” or “incom plete figure/ground” samples involve
a variable form o f inner experience in the foreground, but alm ost alw ays an auditory
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inner experience in the background (i.e., hearing the pots and pans clanging, the m urm ur
o f the TV, the grinding o f the air conditioner, his m other talking in the background).
There are, o f course, other possible explanations for JT ’s them atically unrelated
com plex samples. These samples could be interpreted as multiple inner experiences, but
that nom enclature does not quite fit because true m ultiple inner experience is
characterized by many equally salient inner experiences all com peting for attention.
A nother possibility is that JT characteristically is and will always be a sophisticated inner
experiencer, able to attend to many things in his experience at one time, and able to
notice the background phenom ena that m ost subjects are unable to capture. The only way
to rule this out w ould be to sample with JT in a few years. It is also possible that JT was
exhibiting a response bias tow ard reporting something in the environm ent (i.e.,
background noise) for some unknow n reason. H owever, we find it m ost plausible that
JT ’s foreground/background pattern across samples suggests that he may be in the
process o f learning how to have clear and them atically singular inner experience; that is,
he may not (yet) be capable o f destroying the background noise in his inner experience in
order to focus on the foreground/m ain figure in his inner experience. W e propose this
interpretation o f J T ’s inner experience based on inner experience sam pling with adults;
psychologically healthy adults typically have clear and them atically singular inner
experience (H urlburt & H eavey, 2006).
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Table 5

Characteristic
Feelings
Inner Seeing
Inner Speech
Inner Hearing
Perceptual A wareness
Sensory A wareness
Speaking A loud to S elf
U nsym bolized Thinking
Total characteristics
Characteristics per sample**

N um ber o f sam ples = 22
Frequency"
2 (9 % )
3 (14% )
4 (1 8 % )
1 (5 % )
10(45% )
15 (68% )
1 (5 % )
8 (36% )
44
1.51

Total instances'*
2 (9 % )
3 (14% )
4 (1 8 % )
1(5 % )
10(45% )
23 (105% )
1(5 % )
9 (41%)
53
1.83

Number o f samples in which characteristic occurs (there may he two or more different
characteristics per sample)
**Number o f instances o f a characteristic (there may he two or more instances o f one
characteristic in a sample)
**Characteristics per sample is calculated by dividing total characteristics by the number o f
samples, which yields a statistic describing the average richness/fullness/com plexity o f JT’s inner
experience across samples.
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CHAPTER 9

“JW ”
JW was a 13 year-old fem ale participant who sampled with us throughout June
and July o f 2007. She collected 32 samples during this time and m et w ith us on five
separate occasions to discuss her inner experience. As shown in Table 6, JW was ju st
doing in 17 o f those 32 samples, or 53% o f the time. Feelings occurred in six o f her
samples (19% ), and feeling fact o f body, or ongoing em otion present in her body (left
over from a ju st prior inner experience o f feeling), occurred in three o f her samples (9%).
A dditionally, perceptual aw areness occurred in five samples (16% ), inner speech in three
sam ples (9% ), sensory aw areness in one sample (3%), and unsym bolized thinking in one
sample (3%). JW did not have any inner experience o f inner seeing (aka im ages) across
sam ples but she did have one sam ple (3%) in w hich she was reading, providing us a
glim pse o f her reading process.

Idiographic D escription o f J W ’s Inner Experience
Just D oing
JW ’s m ost frequently occurring inner experience was ju st doing. In m ore than
h alf o f her sam ples (17 o f 32, or 53%), she was engaged in everyday activities, such as
talking on the phone, w atching TV, playing on the com puter, caring for her dog, and
fixing food. For exam ple, at beep 1.5 JW was talking on the phone to her friend T,
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discussing w hen she could see T ’s new ly dyed hair; at beep 2.6 she was w atching a
movie, seeing the title M o n ster’s Inc. appear on the TV screen; at beep 3.5 she
wasclicking the Spider Solitaire icon listed on the Start menu o f her computer; at beep 4.5
she was buckling a collar around her d o g ’s neck, fitting the prong into a hole; and at beep
5.1 she was putting hot sauce on her taquitoes. In each o f these instances, and in all o f her
instances o f ju st doing, JW was unaw are o f any inner experience separate from /other than
her engagem ent in those activities. There were instances o f ju st doing on all five
sam pling occasions, further indicating that ju st doing is a principle form o f JW ’s inner
experience at this stage o f her development.
Feelings
Feeling was also a prom inent form o f inner experience in JW ’s samples. Six o f
her samples (19% ) involved her experience o f feeling, including being excited, sad,
proud, and shocked. In 5 out o f 6 feeling instances, JW experienced her feelings in
various parts o f her body. For exam ple, at beep 1.2 JW experienced excitem ent as an
intense sensation o f butterflies in a small area ju st above her belly button. A t beep 1.3,
she experienced a sim ilar, though less intense, excited feeling in the same upper stomach
area. At beep 2.1 JW experienced feeling sad everyw here throughout her head and upper
body. At beep 2.2 she experienced a feeling som ewhere betw een happiness and pride,
located in her head only. And at beep 3.4 JW experienced feeling sad, again in her upper
body and head. H ow ever, in her sixth feeling instance, at beep 5.4, JW felt
shocked/surprised but she did not locate this feeling in any part o f her body as she had
done in all prior instances o f feeling experience.
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JW ’s descriptions o f her feeling experiences ranged from precise and confident to
som etim es vague and uncertain. For example, at beep 1.2 JW gave a very detailed,
succinct description o f her experience o f excitem ent as butterflies in her stomach area.
D uring the interview she described the feeling as occupying a 2-inch by 2-inch area
located about two inches above her belly button and one inch inw ard. M oreover, she
confidently nam ed her experience “excitem ent.” In contrast, at beep 2.2 JW reported that
her inner experience was a feeling but when asked about the qualities and characteristics
o f the feeling experience she had trouble describing her felt sense o f the experience
(finally settling on it being in her head only), and she had some difficulty nam ing the
feeling experience itself (settling on somewhere between happy and proud). Fven further
down the spectrum o f precision and confidence, at beep 5.4 JW struggled to discuss her
inner experience at all. By this time JW was skilled at sam pling her inner experience and
participating in expositional interviews. She clearly understood that our interest was in
know ing the precise details o f her inner experience, and she had becom e skilled at
describing her inner experience with fidelity. Y et in discussing her 30^ sample, she
struggled w ith w hether her experience was a thought or a feeling (settling on it being
som ew here betw een a thought and a feeling), she struggled w ith know ing w hat her
feeling w as (settling on som ew here between shock and surprise), and she had no bodily
aw areness o f the thought/feeling o f shock/surprise w hatsoever.
One possible explanation for JW ’s range o f feeling experience descriptions is that
JW experiences feelings in a range o f ways. That is, som etim es JW experiences clear,
mature, robust feelings w hile other times she experiences partially form ed, nascent, or
inchoate feelings. This range o f feeling experiences m ay be idiosyncratic to JW, but it
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may also be indicative o f an adolescent in the process o f developing her capacity to have
clear and consistent feeling experiences. Although inner experience o f feeling across
adult DES subjects varies in form (i.e., some adults experience emotion in the body,
others in the head, still others experience emotion cognitively as a type o f thinking), adult
feeling experiences are typically (a) very clearly feelings and (b) consistent in form
within a single subject (Hurlburt & Schw itzgebel, 2007). In contrast, JW ’s range o f
feeling experiences reveals that she is neither clear that her experiences are feelings nor
consistent in the fo n n o f experience her feelings take. A gain, perhaps that is simply a
characteristic o f JW and how she will experience feelings across her life, or perhaps the
variability in her em otional experience points to a developm ental phase.
A nother possibility to explain JW ’s range o f feeling experiences is that as she
becam e a more accurate observer and reporter o f her experience, she found feelings more
difficult to apprehend and/or describe. JW ’s clearest feeling experience occurred on the
first day (at beep 1.2 w hen she felt excitem ent m anifesting as butterflies in the 2 x 2 inch
small area above her belly button), yet her feeling experiences on days two and three
were less specific (for example, at beep 3.4 she felt sad throughout her upper body). On
the last sam pling day, JW was least sure about her last feeling experience. On the last
day, at beep 5.4, she was shocked/surprised, but the experience was betw een a thought
and a feeling, and she did not know anything else about how it w as m anifesting in her
experience. Thus the decline in JW ’s ability to report feelings could suggest that she was
actually becom ing a m ore accurate observer o f her inner experience and that she was
finding out that feeling experiences w ere far less clear to her than she had originally
thought.
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Feeling Fact o f Body
Feeling fact o f body occurred in three samples (9%). In these instances a recently
experienced feeling was somehow still lingering in her body though not expressly in her
experience at the m om ent o f the beep. For example, at beep 1.1 JW w as playing solitaire
on the com puter, m oving the king card down, not aware o f anything in her inner
experience other than the task at hand. Y et at the m om ent o f the beep she had a sense that
her feeling o f anger, experienced a few m om ents before the beep, w as somehow still
present in her, though not expressly in her experience. Sim ilarly, at beep 4.3 JW was
playing with her puppy, noticing the spots on the puppy’s nose and head. Just prior to the
beep she had been feeling the jo y o f having a new puppy. JW thought that state was
probably still bodily present in her at the m om ent o f the beep, though again it was not
expressly in her experience. A final example o f feeling fact o f body occurred at beep 5.3.
In this instance JW was w atching her puppy playfully running tow ard her. JW stated that
her feeling o f happiness was somehow present as she w atched her puppy barreling
tow ard her, but that she was not experiencing her feeling at that m om ent. These instances
o f feeling fact o f body may be further evidence to suggest that JW is in the process o f
developing her capacity to experience feelings.
P erceptual Aw areness
Perceptual aw areness was JW ’s third most frequently occurring form o f inner
experience. All o f JW ’s five perceptual aw areness experiences (16% ) occurred on the
second to last day o f sampling (Day 4). It is therefore possible that JW learned to
describe perceptual aw areness only tow ard the end o f sam pling and that she may actually
experience perceptual aw areness more frequently than is represented here. For example.
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at beep 4.1 JW was eating the last bite o f her eggs. Though she was not noticing any
particular aspect o f the eg g s’ taste, such as saltiness, or texture, she som ehow tasted the
eggs in that m om ent— she was not ju st eating the eggs. At beep 4.2 JW caught sight o f
her reflection in the bathroom m irror at the m om ent o f the beep. She saw herself from the
w aist up. A t beep 4.3 JW was noticing the spots on her puppy’s nose and head. A nd at
beep 4.6 JW felt pain on her right back ankle w here her brother’s puppy was biting her
with its tiny new teeth. A lthough she was not engrossed in the sensation o f the tiny teeth
biting into her ankles, she felt the tiny-teethness o f the biting. JW ’s perceptual awareness
o f tiny teeth biting her ankle actually may have been a sensory awareness; it was difficult
to discern. JW did experience one instance o f unam biguous sensory aw areness at beep
4.6 in w hich she was pouring dry dog food in her d o g ’s bowl. A t the m om ent o f the beep
JW was noticing the bone-shaped-ness o f the food pieces; her experience in this instance
was sensory aw areness rather than perceptual aw areness because she was draw n in by the
specific bone-shaped characteristic o f the food pieces.
Inner Speech
JW experienced inner speech in three samples (9% ), and while it was not a
frequently occurring form o f her inner experience, her capacity for inner speech appeared
to be skilled. Two instances o f her inner speech co-occurred with corresponding feeling
experiences. For exam ple, at beep 1.2 JW was saying to herself excitedly in her head,
“Ohmigod, I ’m gonna talk to my boy frien d ... w hat should I say?” while feeling excited
with butterflies in her stomach. Sim ilarly, at beep 2.1 she was cooing sadly to h erself in
her head, “Ooh, th a t’s so sad, he d ie d ...” w hile feeling sad in her upper body and head. In
each o f these sam ples JW experienced tw o form s o f inner experience sim ultaneously
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(inner speech and feeling), which illustrates a developing capacity for com plex inner
experience. Furtherm ore, the two co-occurring forms o f inner experience (inner speech
and feeling) were cohesively related (i.e., her inner speech expressed/m atched her
feeling), which illustrates a developing capacity for rich, m ulti-faceted inner experience.
However, JW ’s third instance o f inner speech conspicuously did not feature a
m atching feeling experience despite the fact that the situation appeared to warrant some
feeling. A t beep 2.5 JW was logged onto M ySpace, noticing that she had received a new
email m essage from a girl who had been sending her mean m essages for no apparent
reason. A t the m om ent o f the beep JW was saying to herself in her head, “Okay, w hat’s
gonna happen now ?” but she did not experience any feeling, despite the unpleasant
situation. The absence o f feeling experience seem ed unusual in light o f two things: 1) JW
was one o f our m ost em otionally sophisticated participants, and 2) JW ’s other two
instances o f inner speech co-occurred with m atching feeling. This could indicate that
JW ’s inner experience fluctuates in terms o f maturity: som etim es it is com plex and rich,
other tim es it is partial or not fully fleshed out, not running on all cylinders.
U nsymbolized Thinking
Regarding other forms o f inner experience, only one o f JW ’s sam ples featured
unsym bolized thinking (3%). At beep 3.2 she was playing an X box 360 game with her
brother and was thinking that sh e’s got to beat him , but that thought was not in words,
im ages, or any other kind o f mental representation. Thus, though unsym bolized thinking
was not a frequently occurring characteristic o f JW ’s inner experience, she was capable
o f experiencing it.

123

Reading Process
In one sam ple (3%), JW was reading text o ff a website, and her inner experience
at that m om ent was m ore than ju st reading. At beep 2.4 JW was looking at the
Burkholder M iddle School hom epage on the internet. She was reading the first line o f
text to herself, com prehending the m eaning o f what she was reading w ord by word. JW
seemed to understand the words one at a time, as if each word entered her consciousness
in sequence, one at a time, attached to its meaning. That is, she did not grasp a whole
phrase, or fluidly grasp the m eaning o f the read words; she linked each individual word to
its own individual m eaning. The w ords were not spoken or heard. A dditionally, she was
aware o f struggling slightly to read the text as the font was small and she w as not wearing
her glasses. The beep interrupted her in the m iddle o f this reading process, allow ing us a
glimpse o f JW reading at her current skill level, w hich is likely to im prove and change
over time. Perhaps as she becom es m ore skilled at reading, she will cease taking in words
one at a tim e in favor o f a sm oother, m ore efficient, m asterful reading strategy.

D iscussion
Overall, JW ’s samples o f inner experience suggest that she is ju st doing m uch o f
the time but that she does have a fair repertoire o f inner experience including feelings,
perceptual aw areness, sensory aw areness, inner speech, unsym bolized thinking. At times
her inner experience appeared to be mature and sophisticated, as evidenced in her
detailed descriptions o f some feeling experiences and her m ulti-faceted samples featuring
sim ultaneous inner speech and corresponding feelings. H ow ever, JW also appears to be
in the process o f learning to have m ature and sophisticated inner experience, as evidenced
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in her more vague and partially-form ed descriptions o f feelings and inner speech. It is
notable that JW did not have a single im aging experience. Perhaps im aging is not
characteristic o f JW and will never be characteristic o f JW ’s inner experience. But it is
m ore likely that the absence o f im aging reflects that JW, while ahead o f her peers in
term s o f feeling experiences, has not yet learned how to m ake im ages as many o f her
peers have to varying degrees, and that that capacity will em erge in JW ’s inner
experience over time.

Table 6

Charaeteristie
Feelings
Feeling Fact o f Body
Inner Speech
Just D oing/W atching/Talking
Perceptual A wareness
R eading Process
Sensory Awareness
U nsym bolized Thinking
Total characteristics'^
Characteristics per sample''

N um ber o f samples = 32
Frequency"
6 (19%)
3(9% )
3(9% )
17 (53%)
5 (16%)
1 (3%)
1 (3%)
1 (3%)
20
.63

Total instances'’
6(19% )
3(9% )
3(9% )
17 (53%)
5 (16%)
I (3%)
1 (3%)
1 (3%)
20
.63

Number o f samples in whieh charaeteristie oeeurs (there may be two or more different
eharacteristics per sample)
Number o f instances o f a charaeteristie (there may be two or more instances o f one
charaeteristie in a sample)
Total characteristics excludes the DES category “just doing” (just doing is not actually a
“characteristic” o f inner experience, so it is not included in the total eharacteristics count)
Characteristics per sample is calculated by dividing total characteristics (excluding just doing)
by the number o f samples, which yields a statistic describing the average
richness/fullness/com plexity o f JW’s inner experience across samples.
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C H A PTER 11

A CRO SS-SU BJEC TS RESU LTS & D ISCU SSIO N
The previous six chapters were devoted to separate idiographic analyses o f our six
subjects’ (EM, RD, BC, AV, JT, JW ) individual inner experience. In this chapter we
consider the collective pool o f sam ples across all subjects and present the eharacteristics,
patterns, and trends that emerged. W e com pare these results to H eavey and H urlburt’s (in
press) findings across a sample o f 30 young adults, and to Christy M onson’s (1987)
findings across a sam ple o f five adolescents. W e also discuss som e possible im plications
and interpretations o f our results.
As shown in Table 7, our aeross-subjeets results are based on a total o f 161
sam ples o f inner experience; EM contributed 29 o f these sam ples (18% ), RD contributed
34 sam ples (21% ), BC contributed 19 samples (12% ), AV contributed 25 sam ples (16%),
JT contributed 22 sam ples (14%), and JW contributed 32 sam ples (20% ). Sampling
began in D ecem ber 2006 and was com pleted in July 2007. W e w orked w ith one subject
at a time; five subjects (EM, RD, BC, AV, and JT) com pleted sam pling w ithin one month
and one subject (JW ) com pleted sam pling over a period o f two months. Each subject
collected an average o f five (range: three to eight) samples on at least five separate
occasions (the one exception was RD, who collected samples on six separate occasions).
A dditionally, each subject participated in an expositional interview w ithin 24 hours o f
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Table 7

Number o f samples

Feelings

SI
“FM”
12/M
29

2
(7%)

S2

S3

S4

S5

S6

“RD”

“BC”
12/F
19
—

"AV"

“JT”
14/M
22

“JW”
13/F
32
6

13/M
34
2

11/F
25
—

(6%)

2
(9%)

Feeling Fact o f Body

Inner Seeing
Incipient Inner Experience

2
(7%)

1
(5%)

—

1

(19%)

7
(24%)

23
(68%)

3

3

(2%)
6

3
(14%)

(4%)
1

7
(28%)

Inner Hearing
Just Doing
Listening Process
Meta Awareness

2
(7%)

4
(18%)

3
(9%)

1

1

(5%)

(.6%)

11

6

17

36

(58%)

(24%)

(53%)

(22%)
3

(10%)

(2%)

1

No Inner Experience

—

Open

—

2
(6%)

3

(2%)
3

—

—

3

—

—

(2%)
2
(1%)

(16%)

Reading Process

Sensory Awareness
Speaking Aloud to S elf

Unsymbolized Thinking
Worded Thinking

(.6%)
44
(27%)

3

(3%)

Perceptual Awareness

12
(7%)

(9%)

(5%)
Inner Speech

ALL
SUBJECTS
161

2
(11%)

5

10

5

37

(10%)

2
(6%)
12
(35%)

(20%)

(45%)

(16%)

(23%)

—

—

—

—

3

12
(41%)

2
(6%)

1
(5%)

—

1

1

(3%)
1

(.6%)
34
(21%)

3
(12%)

15
(68%)

(3%)

1

1

1

—

3

(3%)
6
(21%)

9
(26%)

(4%)
2

(8%)

(5%)
8
(36%)

1
(3%)

(2%)
26
(16%)

1

—

—

—

Total characteristics"

(3%)
38
(40)"

(52)

C haracteristics p e r sample"

1.31

(1.38)

—
—

—

1

(.6%)
52

18
(19)
.72

44

20

177

(53)
2.00

(20)

(189)

1.53

5
(5)
.26

.63

(1.53)

(.26)

(.76)

(2.41)

(.63)

1.10
(1.17)

Note. Bold typeface delineates the five main characteristics of inner experience (as found in adult
samples; Heavey & Hurlburt, in press).
" Total characteristics excludes just doing and no inner experience.
Parenthesized values count multiple instances of characteristics occurring at single samples.
Characteristics per sample is total characteristics divided by the num ber o f samples
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each sam pling occasion; that is, there were five expositional interview s per subject
(again, with the exception o f RD who participated in six expositional interviews).
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section presents our results
regarding the five main characteristics o f inner experience, w hich are inner speech,
sensory aw areness, unsym bolized thinking, feelings, and inner seeing. The second section
is devoted to tw o other characteristics o f inner experience found frequently across our
subjects: perceptual awareness and ju st doing. N ext, we discuss the phenom ena o f m eta
aw areness and speaking aloud to self, two characteristics o f inner experience found
infrequently but that occurred in m ore than one subject’s samples. The fourth section o f
this chapter discusses differences in the com plexity o f inner experience across subjects.
Finally, the chapter closes with a discussion o f lim itations o f this study and directions for
future research.

F ive M ain Characteristics
The five m ain characteristics are the five m ost frequently occurring forms o f inner
experience consistently found across DES subjects over tim e (H eavey & H urlburt, in
press; H urlburt & H eavey, 2002; 2005). These characteristics are know n as inner speech,
inner seeing (aka images), unsym bolized thinking, feelings, and sensory awareness. Each
o f these characteristics occurs in approxim ately one quarter o f all sam ples o f inner
experience, and current understanding o f the phenom enology and frequency o f these
characteristics prim arily is based on research conducted w ith adult subjects.
One o f the questions posed at the outset o f the present study w as. Is adolescent
inner experience the same as or different from adult inner experience? H istorically, DES
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studies have foeused on adult inner experience with few forays into adoleseent or ehild
inner experience; the two exceptions are M onson’s 1987 study, which examined the inner
experience o f five adoleseents, and H urlburt’s sampling with one youngster (see H urlburt
& Heavey, 2006). O verall, our findings in this study corroborate both M onson’s and
Hurl h u rt’s findings: it appears that adolescents ean and do experienee the same five main
eharaeteristies o f inner experienee experieneed by adults. H owever, our findings also
suggest that some o f these eharacteristics are not consistently as fully form ed and
differentiated as they are in adults, and that some eharaeteristies may develop prior to
others.
The five m ain eharaeteristies and corresponding frequeneies across subjects
appear in boldface type in Table 7. W e discuss our across subjects’ results in terms o f
each o f these five eharaeteristies here, beginning with the m ost frequently occurring
(inner speech) and ending with the least frequently occurring (inner seeing).
Inner Speech
Inner speech was the m ost frequently occurring characteristic across subjects in
our sample. It occurred in 44 o f 161 samples across subjects, or 27% o f the time. H eavey
and H urlburt (in press) found an overall frequency o f 26% inner speech across 30 young
adult subjects (mean age = 19.0 years), whieh is very sim ilar to the 27% frequency found
across our adoleseent subjects (m ean age = 12.5 years) here. M onson (1987) found inner
speech occurred 21% o f the time across her sample o f adoleseents (mean age = 13.2
years); all five o f her subjects experienced inner speech during sampling.
Five o f our six subjects (FM , RD, AV, JT, and JW ) experienced inner speech. A
sim ilar variability in frequency was reported for young adults, w here the within-
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participant frequency o f inner speech ranged from 0% to 75% (H eavey & Hurlhurt, in
press). Inner speech dominated R D ’s inner experience, occurring in 23 o f his 34 samples
(68% ), and it occuiTed fairly frequently for FM (7/29 or 24%) and AV (7/25 or 28%). JT
(4/22 or 18%) and JW (3/32 or 9%) reported inner speech less frequently. BC did not,
apparently, have any instances o f inner speech.
O verall, the instances o f inner speech described by our adolescent subjects were
quite sim ilar in nature and content to those reported hy adults. O ur subjects’ inner speech
sounded like outer speaking except it occurred internally, and the inner speech content
related to their ongoing experiences/activities/situations occurring in the moment. For
exam ple, FM innerly com mented, “Wow, this is boring,” during an in-class math lesson
on positive and negative numbers; RD asked h im self in his head, “W hat should I w ear?”
while getting ready to go to the movies; AV exclaim ed to h erself in her head, “That mole
is big!” upon seeing a lady with a big mole on her face on TV; JT m used to him self in his
head, “W hy is the tree m oving?” while tracking a reflection o f a w ind-blow n tree in the
w indow ; and JW asked h erself in her head, “Okay, now w h at’s gonna happen?” when
noticing an anticipated new m essage in her M ySpace inbox.
H ow ever, two notew orthy patterns did em erge across instances o f inner speech in
our subjects, hoth related to the tone o f the inner speaking voice. First, ju st as in adults,
some inner speech was recognized to have em otional characteristics (tone, m anner o f
speaking); there were a total o f 13 such experiences (FM =1, RD =7, A V =3, JT=1, and
JW =1). In three o f those em otionally toned inner speech experiences, RD (I), JT (I) and
JW ( I ) also experienced a sim ultaneous em otion. H owever, in ten o f those em otionally
toned experiences, RD (6), AV (3), and FM ( I ) denied, even under careful questioning.

130

the sim ultaneous experience o f emotion. One example o f this em otionally toned inner
speech occurred at R D ’s beep 3.2: he was saying to him self in his head with frustration
and irritation, “ Stupid cat, get aw ay!” but he did not feel the frustration or irritation that
was so clearly conveyed in his m anner o f speaking. We discuss this phenom enon in detail
in the Feelings seetion o f this ehapter.
The second pattern we noticed, although infrequently and only in tw o subjects
(RD=1 and A V =2), was inner speaking in dramatie eharaeter-like voices. On one
oceasion RD m used, “I w onder w hat this tastes like?” in a slightly m elodious but
decidedly snobby English aeeent. Similarly AV reported tw o instances o f innerly
speaking in a high-pitched, rapid, squeaky little voice: once w hile com m enting on a bad
haircut on TV (“Oh my god! They cut his hair wrong!), and once m ore w hile trying to
stay stoic when having her blood drawn (“E m not going to cry!”). D uring expositional
interview s, both RD and AV took care to explain the eharacteristics o f these dram atic
voices, and they w ere able to mimie the voices for us. N either RD nor AV seem ed to find
their use o f these character-like inner voices strange or surprising.
The prevalence and well-form ed quality o f inner speech across our subjects
suggests that it may be one o f the first characteristics o f inner experience to develop in
young people. H ow ever, the instances o f em otionally toned inner speech suggest that our
adolescent subjects m ay be in the process o f learning to differentiate their inner speaking
from their em otional experience. Furtherm ore, the instances o f inner speaking in dram atie
voices may indicate that inner speaking is in a more flexible-w him sical state o f
developm ent in w hich character-like voices erupt instead o f o n e’s own voice. Perhaps as
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their inner speech skills mature, RD and AV will settle into consistently using inner
speaking voices that sound like their outer speaking voices.
Sensory Aw areness
Sensory awareness was the second m ost frequently occurring m ain charaeteristie
o f inner experienee across subjects. (Perceptual aw areness was the second most
frequently oeeurring charaeteristie across subjects [36/161 or 22% ], but because it is not
one o f the five main eharaeteristies, these results are presented in a separate seetion
below .) Sensory awareness occurred in 34 o f 161 samples (21% ) and all six subjects
experieneed it at some point in their sampling. H eavey and H urlburt (in press) found an
overall frequency o f 22% sensory aw areness across their sam ple o f young adults, and a
w ithin-partieipant frequency that ranged from 0% to 100%.
M onson (1987), however, did not report any instances o f sensory awareness;
tw enty years ago, when her study was conducted, sensory aw areness had not yet been
identified as a form o f inner experienee (H urlburt, personal com m unication, 2007). Yet,
from M onson’s descriptions o f her subjects’ inner experiences, it appears that sensory
aw areness did occur but that she referred to it as either unsym bolized experienee or
feeling, evidently due to the lack o f a sensory aw areness category. For example, M onson
wrote:
A t the m om ent o f the beep Sally was thinking about calling her next door
neighbor, Nicole, and hoping she would be hom e. This thinking about N icole and
hoping she w ould be hom e had no words or im ages; it w as ju st a thought, a
know ing that she was thinking about N icole and hoping she w ould be home. At
the sam e tim e she was also w iggling her fingers and feeling undecided about
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whom to call. This indecision seem ed to be located in her fin g e rs and not
anyw here else in her body [italics added]. (M onson, 1987, p. 116)
This sample was coded as unsym bolized experience and feeling; how ever it may actually
illustrate an instance o f bodily sensoiy awareness experience. In order to determ ine that
for sure, we w ould need to go back in tim e to the expositional interview and ask more
questions o f Sally about the located-in-her-fm gers portion o f her inner experience. From
the inform ation w e do have, it seem s likely that she was experiencing sensory awareness
in her fingers at the m om ent o f the beep.
M onson described two m ore samples that she called feeling, but that seem likely
to be sensory aw areness:
A nita experienced only a couple o f Feeling m om ents (2 sam ples out o f 1 8 )...in
Sample # 3 3 .. .A nita was feeling the warmth o f her cat on her lap and the softness
o f its fur as she stroked it. In Sample #29 she was feeling the hot sauce in her
m outh as she ate her snack and watched TV. (M onson, 1987, p. 169)
It is likely that A n ita’s experience o f w arm th on her lap and softness o f fur were both
sensory aw areness experiences, not feeling experiences. Likew ise, the feeling o f hot
sauce in her m outh did not involve affect or emotion, and therefore seem s likely to be a
sensory aw areness experience. W e cite these exam ples to further illustrate that M onson’s
subjects probably did experience sensory awareness, but that it was coded as
unsym bolized experience and/or feeling at the time. Thus M onson’s frequency counts
and percentages for both unsym bolized thinking and feeling m ay be inflated as those
categories accounted for sensory aw areness experiences, too.
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In the present study, sensory aw areness was the m ost frequently oeeurring
charaeteristie in two subjects’ inner experienee: JT experienced it in 15 o f his 22 samples
(68% ) and FM experieneed it in 12 o f his 29 samples (41%). AV experieneed sensory
awareness som ewhat frequently, in three o f her 25 samples (12% ), and RD experieneed it
in two o f his 32 samples (6%). BC and JW experienced sensory aw areness only onee
each; for BC that translated to 5% o f the time (1/19), and for JW , 3% o f the time (1/32).
The deseriptions o f sensory awareness were eonsistently elear, definite, and
preeise across subjects. Five subjeets (FM , BC, AV, JT and JW ) experieneed at least one
instanee o f external sensory aw areness. For exam ple, FM was engrossed in the shiny
quality o f a single red bulb on a strand o f C hristm as lights hanging in a restaurant; BC
was foeused on the sound o f aetress H alle B erry’s aeeent; AV was staring at the size and
shape o f the “D ” key on her eom puter keyboard; JT was engrossed in the vibraney and
brightness o f a white eolored side o f a box; and JW was dawn into the bone-shaped
quality o f the individual pieces o f dog food. Four subjeets (FM, RD, AV, and JT)
experieneed bodily sensory aw areness. For exam ple, FM felt intense pain in his head
whieh he m etaphorieally deseribed like “a fire alarm ringing in my head” ; RD felt the
w eight o f his body press through his feet as he stood up; AV felt the uneom fortable
sensation o f the phlebotom ist’s needle pieree her skin; and JT felt his upper lip burning,
right along the lip line.
Similar to inner speeeh, the prevalenee and m ature quality o f sensory awareness
across all six o f our subjects suggests that it may be one o f the first forms o f inner
experienee to take hold developm entally. Rem arkably, even BC, our subject who
struggled m ost w ith DES because she rarely had any fully-form ed inner experienee at all.
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reported a sensory aw areness experience that was clear, definite, detailed, and
differentiated. As m entioned above, in that sample BC was w atching Halle B erry on TV.
At the m om ent o f the beep she was paying attention to the way H alle Berry was
speaking; specifically, BC was focused on the sound o f B erry’s accent, and this was at
the exclusion o f all the other ongoing sensory stimuli in B C ’s environm ent at that
m om ent. W hen describing this experience during the expositional interview, BC was
uneharacteristically enthusiastie, and that seemed to be because she had an actual
experience to tell us about. That is, it seems likely that BC typically had no inner
experience but on this one occasion, she did have an actual experience to report the
eharaeteristies o f (that is, to answ er our questions about)— and she enjoyed doing so.
That this actual experience was a sensory awareness lends support to the hypothesis that
sensory aw areness may be more easily experienced, aceessible, or som ehow
developm entally charaeteristie o f youngsters than the other main eharacteristics o f inner
experienee.
U nsym bolized Thinking
U nsym bolized thinking was the third most frequently oeeurring main
eharaeteristic across subjeets. It occurred in 26 o f 161 sam ples (16% ), and five o f six
subjects (JT, RD, FM , AV, and JW ) experienced it. H owever, unlike inner speeeh and
sensory aw areness, unsym bolized thinking was not the dom inant charaeteristie in any
individual subject’s inner experienee. JT experienced unsym bolized thinking in eight o f
his 22 sam ples (36% ), RD experienced it in nine o f his 34 sam ples (26% ); it occurred in
six o f F M ’s 29 sam ples (21%), in two o f A V ’s 25 sam ples (8% ), and in one o f JW ’s 32
sam ples (3%).
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H eavey and H urlburt (in press) reported an overall frequency o f unsym bolized
thinking o f 22%, and a w ithin-partieipant frequency o f inner speeeh that ranged from 0%
to 80%. M onson (1987) reported an average overall frequency o f 37% across her subjeets
and each o f her five subjeets experienced unsym bolized thinking in their samples. (As
discussed above, one possible reason for M onson’s higher average is that she was coding
some sensory aw areness experiences as unsym bolized experiences.)
As H urlburt reported (Hurlburt, 1993; H urlburt & H eavey, 2006; H urlburt &
Schw itzgebel, 2007; H urlburt & Akhter, subm itted) unsym bolized thinking initially is the
most difficult type o f inner experience for adult subjects to identify and articulate.
Eventually, how ever, because there are unsym bolized experiences to report, adult
subjects learn how to characterize the details o f those experiences with confidence, if not
ease. As would follow, our five adoleseent subjeets with unsym bolized thinking initially
struggled to describe it. Onee they figured out how to talk about it, how ever, their
experiences were found to be sim ilar to those o f adults. For exam ple, FM was thinking
specifically that he had to get to class, but that thought was not in words, images, or any
other form; RD was thinking she better not turn the channel/ d o n ’t tell me she’s gonna
turn the channel/1 hope she doesn’t turn the channel, but not in specific words; AV was
w ondering w hether or not she should sing another song, but her w ondering was not in
words, im ages, sounds, or any other form; JT was seeing a bug fly around the room and
was w ondering w hether or not he should try to hit it, but that thought did not include
words, im ages or any other symbolism ; and JW was thinking that she had to beat her
brother at the video game, but her thought, though clear and present, was symbolically
unrepresented in her mind.
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Feelings
Feelings occurred infrequently across our adolescent subjects in this study; only
12 feelings occurred in 161 samples (7%), a substantially low er frequency than the 26%
found in Heavey and H urlburt (in press) or the 42% found in M onson (1987). (Here
again, M onson’s overall frequency m ay be inflated as she was coding som e sensory
aw arenesses as feelings). In the present study, four o f our six subjects experienced
feelings; JW experienced feelings in six o f her 32 sam ples (19% ), w hile JT (9%), RD
(8%), and FM (7% ) each reported two instances. Eight o f the 12 feeling experiences
reported across subjects were fully form ed and differentiated; the other four were
underdeveloped, partially emergent, or simply am biguous. In light o f these four instances
o f quasi-feelings, the 7% reported above actually may be too high; the percentage o f true
feelings may be closer to 4%, far less than the 26% reported by H eavey and H urlburt (in
press) and the 46% reported by M onson (1987).
Psychologically healthy adult DES subjects typically experience feelings clearly
and confidently (H urlburt & H eavey, 2006). Adults quickly recognize their specific
experienced feeling (for exam ple, sadness, happiness, anger, jo y , love, em barrassm ent,
etc.), and adults do not have any doubt about their experience o f particular feelings. The
form o f feeling experience varies across adult subjects; there are body based feeling
experiences (spreading warmth in the chest), head-based feeling experiences (sadness in
the head), thinking-based feelings (thinking angry thoughts), and phenom ena-less
feelings (experiencing fear but w ithout any phenom enal features). A lthough adults may
experience different forms o f feeling experience, they are typically consistently clear and
confident about such experiences and they are readily able to distinguish their feeling
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experiences from other forms o f inner experience such as inner speech or unsym bohzed
thinking. However, even for adults, feelings are often more difficult to describe than
other forms o f inner experience (H urlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007).
The eight “true” feelings experienced by our subjects appeared sim ilar to adult
experiences o f feelings in that they w ere clearly recognized and confidently known.
Several exam ples o f true feelings follow here: JW felt intense excitem ent ju st before
talking with her boyfriend on the phone. The excitem ent m anifested as a sensation o f
butterflies in her stom ach, and the locus o f the feeling was in a small area ju st above her
belly button, about an inch inside o f her body. On another occasion JW was excitedly
blurting out baby nam es to her m other (who was on the phone w ith a new ly pregnant
friend), and she felt a sim ilar but less intense feeling o f excitem ent in the same stom acharea location. On one occasion, FM was feeling sad about his m other and father splitting
up, and described the sad feeling as being located in his head. RD experienced feeling
sorry for his friend J, right after J took a bad fall and hurt him self. The sorry feeling was
sim ilar to sadness, but not exactly like sadness, m ore along the lines o f sympathy. RD
experienced this feeling on the inside surface o f his chest. Finally, JT reported feeling sad
as he contem plated the end o f swim season. As w ith FM, JT reported that the sad feeling
was located in his head.
In contrast to “true” feeling experiences, four instances o f feelings appeared to be
underdeveloped, partially formed, or am biguous. In these sam ples, our subjects were
certain that they were experiencing a specific feeling but they could not describe the
quality, location, corresponding body sensations, or any other details about the
experienced feelings, and they w ere uncertain as to how to clearly label the feelings (i.e..
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sadness, anger, nervousness). In the first exam ple, FM felt hum or while w atehing TV, but
could not say anything more about w hat that experience was like for him; he simply said
the show was funny and that his reaction to that funniness was som ehow a part o f his
inner experience at the mom ent o f the beep. In a second exam ple, RD felt disappointm ent
when the Eagles lost a game, but he did n ’t know how or w here he felt this feeling, just
that it was there. In a third example, JT felt annoyed by his d o g ’s w eight pressing down
on his stomach; at first he reported that the annoyed feeling was in his head, but then later
said he w asn’t sure where it was. Eventually it developed that the strongest part o f this
sensation was a kinesthetic sense in his arms as if they w ere throw ing the dog o ff him.
And in a final example, JW experienced shoek and surprise as her pit bull ripped a toy in
half. JW struggled to describe her experience o f shock and surprise, but she was unable to
say w hether the experienee was m ore eognitive (thought) or em otional (feeling).
Thus we have seen that feelings in our adoleseents w ere infrequent (oeeurring in
12 o f 161 samples, or 7% overall), and that w hen feelings oeeurred, 30% o f the time
(4/12) they w ere less differentiated or com plete than in adults. M ore than that, however,
there w ere 11 samples across subjects w here our best understanding was that some kind
o f em otional processes was ongoing but that our subjeets w ere not direetly experieneing
their feelings. The most striking exam ples o f this eam e when our subjeets w ere speaking,
either aloud or innerly, and recognized from their own tone o f voiee and their m anner o f
speaking that they were in an em otional state. There were nine instanees o f em otionally
toned inner speech without corresponding experienced feelings. For exam ple, FM
lovingly innerly spoke about how cute his eat was, and deseribed the endearing tone o f
his inner voice, but denied actually feeling loving or endearing or anything at all.
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Sim ilarly, RD angrily spoke about his friend kicking him in his sore knee, reported the
p issed -o ff tone and explosive quality o f his voice, but felt nothing at the mom ent. On
another occasion RD was about to leave for the movies, excitedly w hispering-hissing to
him self in his head, “I can ’t wait!” yet he did not experience any accom panying feeling
o f excitem ent or anticipation. In one sample AV sadly spoke about her favorite m odel’s
losing a com petition and described the sad, little sound o f her voice— even replicated it
for us— , but m aintained that she did n ’t feel sad at the m om ent. On another occasion,
when having her blood draw n for the first tim e ever, AV com m anded herself in a rapid,
high-pitched inner voice, “I ’m not going to cry!” yet reported that she did not feel
anything (no anxiety/fear/w orry— nothing).
This same kind o f separation betw een em otional speech and the inner experience
o f em otion occurred tw ice in instances o f external speech. RD had jum ped o ff o f the
couch and was yelling excitedly at the TV, “C ’mon, pick up that fum ble!” H e did not,
how ever, experience any emotion despite the fact that he had jum ped up and he was
excitedly yelling. Sim ilarly, AV had found out that one o f her favorite TV characters
died. She had gone to her room, turned o ff the lights, lay dow n in her bed, and stared at
the ceiling w hile repeating out loud to herself, “I ’m sad. I ’m sad. I ’m sad. I ’m s a d ...” At
the m om ent o f the beep AV was saying the final, “I ’m sad.” R em arkably, despite
repeatedly articulating her em otional state, she was not actually feeling sad— she
apparently had no inner em otional experience at that moment.
On four occasions, however, three subjects did report experiencing em otionally
toned inner speech along with an accom panying em otional experience. For exam ple, JW,
fe lt excitem ent in the form o f butterflies in her stom ach w hile saying to herself, “I ’m
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gonna talk to my boyfriend!” and on another occasion she fe lt sad in the upper part o f her
body (waist up and head) while saying to herself, “Ooh, th a t’s so sad, he d ie d ...” JT felt
sad (in his head) while saying to him self, “This is the last time I ’ll get to w ear a Speedo.”
And finally, RD felt sorry for his friend (when the friend fell and hurt him self) while
saying, “Aw d u d e .. .man, that really sucks.” That observation elim inates the
interpretation that our subjects sim ply do not report feelings when they report inner
speech, or that our interview ing techniques som ehow prohibit that kind o f reporting.
Thus, overall our subjects experienced few feelings ( I 2 / I 6 I or 7% ), and those that
they did experience were often incom plete experiences. Furtherm ore, feelings seemed to
be expressed frequently via inner and outer speech, specifically tone o f speech— and even
when the feeling being expressed was not being experienced. Such findings seem to run
counter to the prevailing view that adolescence is a time o f em otional turbulence and
lability. One possible understanding o f our observations is that it may be easier for
youngsters to (a) engage in em otional behavior and (b) recognize/interpret emotion in
others than it is to (c) experience o n e’s own em otion directly. As a result, the experience
o f em otion may appear developm entally later, perhaps acquired som ew here around
adolescence. This potential understanding is quite different from the com m on view that
the developm ent o f the understanding o f the feelings o f others com es later than the
developm ent o f o n e’s own feelings (Saam i, Cam pos, C am ras, & W itherington, 2006).
O f course, our sample size is small and non-random , so all o f our conclusions must be
viewed cautiously; however, we propose that this kind o f understanding may make the
careful observation o f lived phenom ena worthwhile.
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Here is the (rough, speeulative) iogie o f this theory: (a) Em otional behavior is
innate: infants ery when hungry or in pain, and this suggests that one does not need to
have a elear inner experience o f em otion to engage in a behavior that can be called
em otional. The (b) third-person skill o f observing/reeognizing/interpreting em otional
expression in others is taught directly by the verbal com m unity early in development.
W hen M om appears in a certain way and says, “I love you,” the child leam s to m atch her
sm iling face and warm body language with her words. On other occasions, when M om ’s
eyebrow s furrow, and ber arms cross wbile she snaps, “I ’m angry at you,” the very young
child leam s to m atch this different em otional expression with these different words. Thus
the child leam s to recognize and interpret signs o f em otion in others by w atching facial
configuration and body language and by listening to vocal eharacteristies. H ow ever, our
proposed theory asserts that the child receives little, if any at all, direct training o f (c) the
first-person skill o f recognizing emotion in him self/herself. Y et that skill is actually quite
com plicated, perhaps involving the recognition that this feature o f my heart rate goes
along with that feature o f my skin sensitivity goes along with that other feature o f my
m uscle tension goes along with yet that other feature o f my visual perception and so on.
These are disparate m icroprocesses, represented quite separately in different regions o f
the body and the brain. Eventually, that pattem recognition becom es second nature, and
the healthy adult recognizes his or her own angry feelings directly. That recognition thus
is a skill that has to be acquired som ew here between infancy and adulthood; the
developing child/adolescent has to figure out, on his or her own, w ith no help from
outsiders, that this skin tem perature recognition is associated with anger while that
stomach gurgle is not. Furtherm ore, that developm ental acquisition has to be made
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despite suppresions or interference w ith the nascent skill o f emotion recognition: “D o n ’t
use that tone with m e!”
I f this is indeed how emotional developm ent works, or at least one w ay that it can
develop, children/adolescents may learn the first-person recognition o f their own
em otional states by observing their own behavior in the same third-person way as they
would observe the behavior o f others. For exam ple, when RD angrily spoke about his
friend kicking him in his sore knee, he discovered he was angry hy observing in a thirdperson way the angry tone o f his voice, much as he would have observed the angry tone
o f his father’s (or any other external p erso n ’s) voice, not by recognizing the first-person
experience o f his own feelings. Eventually (i.e., some num ber o f years in the making)
R D ’s pattem recognition abilities m ay enable him to integrate the features o f his own
voice along w ith his heart rate m onitor (w hatever that is), his m uscle tension
proprioceptors, etc., and he will becom e quickly, clearly, and confidently able to firstperson recognize anger and other em otions when they occur. B ut perhaps that has not yet
happened for him at age 13.
This understanding also affords one interpretation o f A V ’s lying in bed after
discovering her TV character had died and saying repeatedly out loud to herself, “I ’m
sad, I ’m sad, I ’m sad, I ’m s a d ...” On this understanding, A Y was stating a fact (I am sad)
and not stating a feeling (I fe e l sad). This is different from experiencing feeling as a
mental event; here A V is not m entally experiencing a feeling, she is experiencing inner
speech in abstract reference to a feeling. On this understanding, she is saying I am sad
precisely because she does not feel sad: this is a glim pse into em otional skill building as
it takes place in the instant. Thus her sim ple “I ’m sad” actually may m ean som ething like:
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“I am sad as a fact o f the universe. I have observed that when m y parents say they are sad
they seem to be referring to something inside them. W hat is going on with me that I
should recognize as part o f this sadness thing? Is it the itch in my shoulder— no,
yesterday when I was sad my shoulder d id n ’t itch. Is it the teary eyes? Yeah! That seems
likely.” O f course that stylized version is much more scienee-like than actually was
occurring. In reality it is emotional play, the learning how to coordinate em otional
observation, expression, and feeling, much like the stacking o f blocks leads to fine m otor
coordination.
O f course em otional developm ent may proceed along different pathw ays than the
one suggested here. However, our findings confidently suggest that the nature o f
em otional experience in adolescents may be much different from em otional experience in
adults; speeifieally, adolescents may be in the process o f developing the capacity to
experience em otions directly w hile adults have already m astered that capacity.
Inner Seeing
Inner seeing (inform ally known as seeing im ages) w as the least frequently
occurring form o f inner experience across subjects. It occurred in six o f 161 samples
(4% ) and only three subjects experienced images. This is a substantially low er frequency
than the 34% found in adults in Heavey and H urlburt (in press) and the 26% in
adolescents reported by M onson (1987). JT experienced inner seeing in three o f his 22
sam ples (14% ), w hile FM experienced it in two o f his 29 sam ples (7%). BC reported a
single instance o f inner seeing across her 19 sam ples (5% ), although this instance may
not have occurred strictly at the m om ent o f the beep.
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D espite the low frequency o f inner seeing across our subjects, those that were
reported represented a range o f ways to experience inner seeing. O f the three subjects
who experienced inner seeing, JT ’s experiences were the m ost elaborate. In his first
instance o f inner seeing JT had an im age o f his dad, looking angry w hile m outhing
som ething like, clean up your room and d o n ’t make me ask you again. H is second
instance was by far the m ost com plex as it involved him seeing in his m ind three screens
at right angles to one another. Each screen depicted a different scene relating to poverty
and death, eirea the tim e o f O liver Twist. JT experienced him self as being surrounded by
these three screens, facing one directly while another was on his right side and the other
was on his left side. JT ’s third and final inner seeing w as o f his digital clock registering
the num bers “ 5:30” in red light. In his inner seeing, JT was turning his head to the right
so that he w ould see his digital clock. FM experienced one very detailed m oving im age o f
his teacher’s ear accident as she was describing it to the class. He pictured a white ear
stopped at a stoplight and a van com ing up from behind, ju st about to hit the ear. F M ’s
other inner seeing experience was o f seeing the w ord “eat” spelled out in bright orange
lower case letters. The inner seeing o f letters and words is an infrequent oeeurrenee even
in adult subjects. E C ’s inner seeing involved her picturing h erself standing on a
basketball court with the ball in her hands. H er brother was behind her, frustratedly
gesturing because BC had won their one-on-one game. Though E C ’s im age occurred just
after the beep, we report it here, as it is noteworthy that our subject with scant inner
experience w as able to produce, identify, and describe an im age at all.
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Both M onson (1987) and H urlburt (Hurlburt & H eavey, 2006) reported on
adolescent subjects w ho were “slow -im age-builders.” For exam ple, M onson described
one o f her subject’s incomplete images:
[Wendy] was reading the book F ive Little Peppers about a little girl who got a
nail stuck through her foot ju st behind the toes. W endy had ju st put the book
down when the beep occurred. A n image was present in her im agination at that
m om ent, and was black and w hite and dark and fuzzy, a little out o f focus. The
image was o f a foot, side view, with a dark spot on it ju s t above the toes. The foot
was located a bit above W endy’s eyes so that she had to look up to see it; W endy
did not notice the ankle or leg. She was o f the opinion that this image was in the
process o f fo rm in g (italics added); that if the beep had not interrupted her, this
image would have becom e clear and in color. Furtherm ore, the dark spot on the
foot in the Im age would likely have become the nail that stuck through the foot in
the story. (M onson, 1987, p .88)
A lthough there were no samples involving slow -im age-building discovered in the present
study, there were instances o f m ovem ent and change in one o f our subject’s inner
experience. RD experienced his inner speech and unsym bolized thoughts to “come up” or
“pass through” his head, changing density and som etim es even m eaning, along the way.
These samples appeared sim ilar to W endy’s im age-building sam ples in that both reflect
in-process forms o f inner experience.
Taken together, the low frequency o f inner seeing in our subjects, the much
higher frequency in adults, and the slow -im age-form ing found in M onson (1987) and
H urlburt (Hurlburt & H eavey, 2006), leads to a speculation about inner seeing that is
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sim ilar to that for feelings discussed above: Inner seeing (“image m aking”) is a skill that,
like the experience o f feelings, may need to be acquired gradually over a long period o f
time. It seems quite possible that many if not m ost people do not develop facility in the
quick creating o f inner seeings until relatively late in adolescence. This speculation is
based on very few subjects and therefore needs much additional investigation, but if true,
it w ould be (like the observation o f the developm ent o f feelings) an im portant
contribution to the understanding o f human development.
Sum m ary
Three-quarters o f all samples across subjects ( I 2 I / I 6 I or 76% ) involved at least
one o f the five main eharacteristies o f inner experience. Thus our adolescent subjects did
experience the five m ain eharacteristies found in adults, although w ith som ew hat
different frequencies. W hile adults experience each o f the main five characteristics, on
average, 25% o f the time, our six adolescent subjects experienced inner speech 27% o f
the time, sensory aw areness 21% o f the time, unsym bolized thinking 16% o f the time,
feelings 7% o f the tim e, and im ages 4% o f the time. This suggests that inner speech and
sensory aw areness may be am ong the first phenom ena o f inner experience to develop and
mature, w hile unsym bolized thinking, feelings, and inner seeing m ay take longer to
develop. Furtherm ore, the low frequency o f feelings and the underdeveloped quality o f
30% o f the feeling experiences strongly suggests that em otions are am ong the more
com plex forms o f inner experiences to master. Likewise, the low frequency o f images
found in our sample, com bined w ith H urlburt’s (2006) and M onson’s (1987) observations
o f slow -im age building in adolescents, suggests that im ages, too, m ay be am ong the m ore
com plex inner experience skills to acquire. Thus although adolescents can and do
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experience the five main eharacteristies, there seem to be substantial differences in the
m aturity o f these experiences.

O ther Frequently O ccurring C haracteristics
In addition to experiencing the five main eharacteristies o f inner experience, our
six adolescent subjects also frequently experienced perceptual aw areness (23%) and just
doing (22%) w hen sampled.
Perceptual awareness is not a main category o f inner experience, nor a wellestablished category o f inner experience, and therefore it is not cited in many previous
DES publications and manuals. The inner experience o f perceptual awareness is the
noticing o f perceptual stimuli as a function o f w hatever a subject is doing at the sampled
mom ent. Perceptual awareness is sim ilar to sensory aw areness in that it involves noticing
eharacteristies o f internal or external stim uli, but unlike sensory awareness, perceptual
aw areness does not involve being engrossed in/drawn to/taken in by the sensory
eharacteristies them selves. Instead, perceptual aw areness is the experience o f consciously
perceiving things as a natural fu nction o f being/living/doing/acting in the world. For
exam ple, at the m om ent o f the beep I m ay be noticing the red stop sign in conjunction
w ith my slow ing down to stop at the intersection; although the red sign is a specific part
o f my inner experience, I am not engrossed in the redness only for the sake o f the
redness, as I w ould be if I were experiencing sensory awareness.
However, perceptual aw areness also is different from the experience o f ju st doing
(results discussed below). In ju st doing a subject is sim ply being/living/doing/aeting
w ithout any separate sensory-perceptual aw arenesses or other form s o f inner experience.
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For exam ple, at the m om ent o f the beep my inner experience is o f ju st driving the car. It
may be objectively true that I am looking at the red stop sign and slow ing down at the
intersection, but those things are not distinctly or separately in my experience at that
m om ent. A lso, I am not having another form o f inner experience such as an inner speech
or an unsym bolized thought. Instead, my inner experience is o f ju st driving. In contrast to
perceptual aw areness, ju st doing is a w ell-established and frequently cited category o f
inner experience.
In the tw o subsections that follow, we discuss our perceptual aw areness and just
doing results across subjects.
P erceptual A w areness
Perceptual aw areness was the second m ost frequently occurring characteristic
found across subjects (that is, it was second in frequency after inner speech). It occurred
in 37 o f 161 sam ples, or 23% o f the time. N either H eavey and H urlburt (in press) nor
M onson (1987) reported instances o f perceptual awareness. A lthough perceptual
aw areness was not the dom inant characteristic in any subject’s inner experience, all six
subjects experienced perceptual aw areness while sampling. It occurred frequently for JT
(10/22 or 45% ) and RD (12/35 or 35%), fairly frequently for AV (5/25 or 20% ) and JW
(5/32 or 16%), and som etim es for FM (3/29 or 10%) and BC (2/19 or 11%).
JT experienced perceptual awareness when he heard the m etal latch scrape across
the strike plate o f the bathroom door. A t that m om ent he was listening for this sound in
order to know that the door had closed com pletely. Thus he was perceptually aware o f the
sound, not engrossed in any characteristic o f it, but not oblivious to it either. Similarly,
FM experienced perceptual aw areness when w iping o ff a Pirates o f the Caribbean DVD.
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A t the beep, he was noticing a half-w iped away fingerprint on the DVD. FM was
perceptually aware o f the fingerprint as part o f his overall effort to get the disk to work—
but he was not engrossed in a particular quality or characteristic o f the fingerprint itself
(like the smudgedness or the pattern o f the fingerprint— that w ould have been sensory
awareness). O ther exam ples o f perceptual aw areness included RD noticing a pretty girl
walk by while com m enting on her “hotness,” AV looking at a small bite o f pancakes on
the tip o f her fork while eating breakfast; JW noticing the spots on her pu p p y ’s nose and
head as the puppy ran tow ard her.
As perceptual awareness is not a w ell-established category o f inner experience, it
is hard to determ ine w hether the 23% frequency we found across our subjects is typical
o f adults as well, or if perceptual aw areness occurs with greater frequency during
adolescence for some developm entally relevant reason. It is possible that perceptual
aw areness is related to the process o f developing mature inner experience. One
hypothesis is that perceptual aw areness is actually a nascent form o f sensory awareness;
that is, an adult JW w ould have been engrossed in the brow nness o f the spots on her
puppy’s head but the adolescent JW only perceptually notices the spots because her
sensory awareness apparatus is not yet fully mature. A nother perhaps more likely
hypothesis is that the phenom enon o f perceptual aw areness actually represents a failure to
destroy background inner experience in order to focus on a singular foreground inner
experience. The samples them selves seem to support this second hypothesis: thirty-tw o o f
the 37 total instances o f perceptual aw areness across our subjects (86%) co-oeeurred with
other forms o f inner experience at the m om ent o f the beep. This suggests that the inner
experience o f perceptual awareness in adolescents reveals a developm ental phase in
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w hich background aw areness bleeds through into foreground aw areness. This theory is
discussed further in the section below on variations in the com plexity o f inner experience.
Just D oing
A s m entioned above, ju st doing is an established DES category o f inner
experience defined as “being engaged in some activity but w ith no aw areness o f thinking
about it, and no other aspect o f inner experience is in aw areness” (H urlburt & Heavey,
2000). In the present study our subjects were ju st doing in 36 o f 161 sam ples, or 22% o f
the time. Thus ju st doing was the third m ost frequently oeeurring inner experienee aeross
subjects (that is, it was third in overall frequency after inner speech and perceptual
aw areness). M onson (1987) discovered a sim ilar overall frequency o f 21% aeross her
adolescent subjects, how ever Heavey and H urlburt (in press) reported an overall
frequency o f only 2% aeross their adult subjects. Thus ju st doing appear to occur more
frequently in adolescents than in adults.
In the present study, four out o f six subjects (BC, JW , AV, and FM ) experienced
just doing, and two (RD and JT) did not. Just doing was the dom inant inner experienee
aeross B C ’s sam ples (I I / I 9 or 58% ) and JW ’s samples (17/32 or 53% ), and it occurred
less frequently across A V ’s sam ples (6/25 or 24%) and infrequently aeross F M ’s samples
(2/29 or 7%). W e note that our fem ale subjects reported ju st doing m ore frequently than
our m ale subjects (34 to 2).
In a sam ple that illustrates ju st doing, JW was in the process o f w alking out o f the
front door o f her apartment. H er hand was on the doorknob, but she was not aware o f
anything at that m om ent— she w as ju st w alking out the door. Sim ilarly, in a ju st doing
sam ple, AV was logging on to M ilberry.com . She was pressing the letter “A ” while
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looking at the keyboard but she was not aware o f anything else at that moment. In
another instance o f ju st doing, BC was scrubbing the part o f the kitchen counter next to
the stove. It was a fact o f the universe that she was scrubbing the counter hard, but she
was not explicitly aware o f that or anything else at the m om ent. In a final exam ple o f just
doing, FM was unw rapping a package o f cheese to make a quesadilla, but he was not
explicitly aware o f any them atic thing.
Our finding that adolescents are ju st doing 22% o f the time (in M onson, 21% )
may help explain why when parents ask an adolescent w hat th ey ’re doing, the recurrent
answ er is, “Oh, nothing.” A dolescents are often criticized (som etim es harshly) for their
apparent doing nothing (think o f the prototypical m om yelling at her son to be useful
once and a while). B ut w hat if the adolescent’s supposed doing nothing actually reflects
an inner experience o f ju st doing? How is an adolescent supposed to explain that he
spends a fifth o f his time in an inner experiential state o f ju st doing? A nd how is he
supposed to explain that to an adult, who, according to H eavey and H urlburt only
experiences ju st doing 2% o f the tim e? Thus when criticized for saying, “Oh, nothing”
the adolescent is perhaps put in a position o f having to defend h im self for being in a
developm ental phase, som ething he doesn’t even know about him self. This finding may
shed at least a small beam o f light into the giant chasm in com m unication betw een teens
and their parents. M aybe teen s’ and p arents’ inner experiences are fundam entally
different enough from each other that each feels that talking to the other is like talking to
a M artian. (How m any times have parents heard teenagers scream , “H ow could yow
possibly understand m el)
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Less Frequently O ccurring Characteristics
Ten other characteristics o f inner experience em erged across subjects in the
present study. Eight o f these characteristics occurred in single subjects only and were
discussed in the idiographic chapters; those characteristics are feeling fact o f body
(JW =3), incipient inner experience (BC=1), inner hearing (JT=1), listening process
(FM =3), no inner experience (BC=3), open (RD=2), reading process (JW =1), and worded
thinking (FM =1). Flowever, two o f these characteristics (m eta-aw areness and speaking
aloud to self) occurred in more than one subject, and thus are addressed here.
M eta-Aw areness
M eta-aw areness occurred in three o f 161 sam ples (2%), and only in two subjects
(FM and RD). N either Fleavey and Flurlburt (in press) nor M onson (1987) reported any
instances o f m eta-aw areness in their subjects’ inner experience, so we are unable to make
com parisons o f m eta-aw areness frequency aeross studies. H ow ever, m eta-aw areness is
know n to occur in some adult subjects, as described by H urlburt and H eavey (2000;
2006). RD experienced m eta-aw areness tw ice in his 34 sam ples (6% ). The first instance
occurred w hile he was looking at his friend’s m oon sand, and at the same time he was
aware o f h im self looking at the m oon sand. R D ’s second experience o f meta-aw areness
occurred w hile w atching an Eagles game on TV. He was saying to h im self in his head,
“C ’m on, the Eagles have to w in,” but m ost o f his aw areness was focused on him self
w atching the game; that is, at the m om ent o f the beep he was m eta-aw are o f him self
w atching the game. Similarly, FM experienced m eta-aw areness w hen the headphone fell
out o f his ear and he w as catching it. At that m om ent (which, incidentally, was also the
m om ent o f the beep), FM was thinking about him self catching the headphone while
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actually catching it. Although this may have been a case o f induced-by-the-beep m eta
awareness (there was a lot happening related to sampling at the m om ent o f the beep,
which may have facilitated FM to m eta-think about his experience), it illustrates that at
least some adolescents, like adults, have the capacity for meta-aw areness.
Speaking A loud to S e lf
Speaking aloud to self occurred in three o f all 161 sam ples (2% ) across subjects.
A lthough Flurlburt and Fleavey (2000) acknow ledge the phenom enon o f speaking aloud
to oneself, they did not find any instances in their study o f young adults (Fleavey and
Hurlburt, in press). M onson (1987) did not report instances o f this phenom enon either.
Three subjects experienced this phenom enon once each. The first exam ple o f this
occurred in one o f F M ’s samples (1/29 or 3%). He spoke aloud to h im self in a lowered,
breathless tone, saying “1 need to go talk to my m om .” A t the same tim e he was feeling
sad. The second exam ple occurred in A V ’s experience (1/25 or 4% ). One o f A V ’s
favorite characters on a TV show had died. She turned o ff the TV, w ent into her room,
turned o ff the lights, and lay down in her bed. She stared at the ceiling w hile repeating
out loud to herself, “F m sad. I ’m sad. I ’m sad. I ’m sa d ...” A t the m om ent o f the beep AV
was saying the final, “I ’m sad.” A lthough AV was not feeling sad at the m om ent o f the
beep, her speech itse lf was about feeling. The third and final exam ple o f speaking out
loud to self occurred in one o f J T ’s sam ples (1/22 or 5%). In this instance JT was
thinking about w hat he should w atch next on TV. A t the sam e time, he w as saying to
him self out loud, “That movie is going to be over soon.” In this exam ple, there w as no
feeling experience or im plied em otion; JT ’s speaking out loud to h im self was in a m atter
o f fact tone. One possible explanation for the phenom enon o f speaking out loud to
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oneself in adolescence may be that it is actually a nascent form o f inner speech. Clearly
the speech is private, meant for self only, much like inner speech is.

Variations in Com plexity o f Inner E xperience
This section o f this results-across-subjects chapter presents differences in the
com plexity o f our subjects’ inner experience. W e m easured com plexity o f inner
experience as the average num ber o f characteristics experienced p er sample. As shown in
Table 7, 161 total sam ples o f inner experience were collected aeross subjects. However,
as it is possible for m ore than one characteristic to occur in any one sample o f inner
experience, the total characteristics count for each subject not alw ays is equal to the total
num ber o f sam ples collected. In the present study, 177 eharacteristies o f inner experience
occurred aeross 161 samples. (The calculation o f 177 characteristics aeross subjects
excludes the categories o f ju st doing and no inner experienee, as these do not constitute
apparent and p resen t characteristics o f inner experience.) The follow ing two samples
illustrate the difference betw een a single characteristic sample and a com plex sample in
which three characteristics occurred at the m om ent o f the beep:
A V Beep 5.4; AV is eating breakfast before going to school. A t the m om ent o f
the beep she is looking at a bite o f pancakes on her fork, getting ready to eat the
bite. She is not interested in any particular characteristic o f the bite o f pancakes;
instead she is sim ply looking at it on the w ay to eating it. (Coding: Perceptual
A w areness)
JT Beep 3.3: JT is thinking about the end o f swim season sort o f retrospectively.
A t the m om ent o f the beep he is saying to him self, “Tom orrow is the last time I ’ll
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get to w ear a Speedo.” At the same time, JT feels sad, and the sadness is in his
head. The sadness is about swim season ending and JT experiences it as a separate
aceom panying phenom enon to his thought. A dditionally, at the m om ent o f this
beep, a good deal (50%) o f JT ’s awareness is on noticing the m essiness o f his
room. He sees the mess o f everything in his room at once and he cannot see the
floor for all the stu ff on it. However, JT is not noticing anything in particular, nor
explicitly thinking anything about the m essiness at the m om ent. (Coding; Inner
Speech; Feeling; Perceptual Awareness)
Thus we see that am ong subjeets there were differenees in the eom plexity o f inner
experience samples. To describe the relative com plexity o f each subject’s inner
experienee, we calculated a characteristie-per-sam ple (cps) statistic by dividing the
num ber o f eharacteristies (177) by the num ber o f samples (161) to arrive at an average
com plexity rating o f 1.10 aeross subjects, as shown in the bottom right-hand com er o f
Table 7. A lthough this eps statistic has not been referred to in previous DES literature, we
introduce it here so that we have a grounded way to discuss differenees in the com plexity
o f inner experienee aeross our subjeets. W e then calculated a eharaeteristie-per-sam ple
statistic for each individual subject by dividing the num ber o f eharacteristies reported by
each subject by that subject’s total num ber o f samples, as shown in the last row o f Table
7. There are two w ays that these cps statistics can be calculated; w e illustrate using JT as
an exam ple (see the third-from -right colum n o f Table 7). As the table shows, JT had 15
samples in which sensory awareness occurred. But in 7 o f those 15 sam ples, there were
m ultiple instances o f sensory awareness (for exam ple, in beep 3.5, there w ere three
separate sensory aw arenesses: the sensation o f his right eye burning, his absorption in the
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blue color o f the wall, and his interest in the stucco texture o f the wall. The question
becom es, should the num erator o f the cps statistic count the num ber o f occasions in
which sensory awareness occurred (in which case, beep 3.5 counts as one occasion) or
the num ber o f instances o f sensory aw areness (in w hich case, Beep 3.5 counts as three
instances). A rgum ents can be made for both ways, so the last tw o row s o f Table 7 present
both w ays o f counting, putting com putations based on the num ber o f instances in
parentheses. Thus JT ’s total num ber o f characteristics based on the 15 occasions that
sensory aw areness occurred is 44, resulting in a cps o f 44/22 = 2.00. H owever, JT ’s total
num ber o f characteristics based on the 23 instances o f sensory aw areness and the nine
instances o f unsym bolized thinking (instead o f the eight occasions in which
unsym bolized thinking occurred) is 53, resulting in a cps o f 53/22 = 2.41. As the last row
o f Table 7 shows, these two different w ays o f counting give approxim ately the same
results: JT is the only subject where the two w ays provide substantially different results,
and by either m easure, JT has easily the m ost com plex inner experience. Therefore, in
what follows we will use the occasion (non-parenthesized) m ethod o f com puting cps.
As discussed above, the average eps aeross subjeets was calculated to be 177/161
= 1.10; that is, for every sample o f inner experience, there w ere an average o f 1.10
characteristics reported (excluding ju st doing and no inner experienee). Three subjects
(JT, RT), and FM ) exceeded this average. JT had the m ost com plex inner experience
am ong subjects, with a cps o f 2.00 (44 characteristics/22 samples). Tw enty o f his 22
samples (90% ) featured m ore than one eharaeteristie. RD had the second most com plex
inner experience am ong subjeets, with a cps rating o f 1.53 (52/34). Tw enty-two o f his 34
samples (65% ) featured m ore than one characteristic. FM had the third m ost com plex
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inner experience am ong subjects, with a cps rating o f 1.31 (38/29). Sixteen o f his 29
samples (55% ) featured more than one characteristic. All three subjects w ho exceeded the
cps average across subjects were male.
Each o f the three female subjects in this study (AV, JW , and BC) had a
characteristic-per-sam ple average less than the average across subjects (1.10) and less
than one characteristic-per-sam ple (1.00). A V ’s cps was calculated to be .72 (18/25).
Only one o f her 25 sam ples (4%) featured multiple characteristics. JW had a cps rating o f
.63 (20/32) and five o f her 32 sam ples (16%) featured m ultiple characteristics. And
finally, BC had cps o f .26, which was the lowest am ong all subjects. She did not have a
single sample in w hich she experienced multiple characteristics.
One possible explanation for finding greater com plexity o f inner experience in
some subjeets, for instance JT, is that highly com plex inner experience in adolescence
suggests a failure to organize perceptual stimuli. That is, an overabundance o f inner
experienee m ight reflect a developm ental stage in which one cannot yet achieve clear and
singular inner experienee. Eiurlburt (Personal com m unication, 2007) drew on Fritz P eris’
G estalt Therapy theory (Peris et al., 1951) to better understand J T ’s com plex inner
experience. Peris (Peris et al., 1951) was o f the opinion that healthy people create clear,
differentiated, vivid figures (or G estalten) out o f the undifferentiated general perceptual
world. That process, Peris held, is both constructive and destructive. It is constructive
because no G estalt exists in nature; a G estalt is the result o f a p erso n ’s construction
superim posed on natural bits o f sensation. For exam ple, consider the well known
faees/vase am biguous figure. It is not the case that the face and the vase exist on the
paper; instead, bits o f black ink and w hite patches exist. The view er constructs now the
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faces, now the vase out o f the raw material o f the ink bits and paper patches. The healthy
process is also destructive in the sense that when one now constructs the vase, one must
destroy the faces that one had been seeing.
For Peris, psychological health is thus the continual, fairly rapid (every second or
so) destruction o f the past and the creation o f a present clear, vivid. Gestalt. From that
point o f view, a healthy person selects one thing or cluster o f things out o f the w elter o f
available stimuli and m akes that thing or cluster o f things her figure or Gestalt (Peris (and
Flurlburt) use the terms figure and G estalt interchangeably). That thing m ight be an inner
speaking, or an image, or a visual perception, whatever. And it m ay be an organization o f
disparate things, such as the sm elling o f the arom a and the sim ultaneous imaging o f a
barbecue. But healthy G estalten are clear and vivid, and the healthy G estalt-building
process destroys the com peting G estalt opportunities that exist in the welter.
From that point o f view, J T ’s inner experience (at beep 5.3) o f simultaneous
burning in the back o f his legs, thinking to him self that he should m ove his legs, hearing
the pretzel crunch as he bites into it, and hearing droning o f the TV in the background is
an exam ple o f an incom pletely form ed Gestalt. A healthy adult w ould construct a Gestalt
o f the painful burning sensation, perhaps along with the thought o f m oving his legs. The
crunch o f the pretzel would be destroyed into the ground, as w ould the undifferentiated
noise com ing from the TV. Perhaps a second later, that healthy adult w ould create a
G estalt that consisted o f the pretzel crunch/taste, which would entail the total destruction
o f the leg-burning experience. Then in the next second, the TV sound m ight becom e the
Gestalt, entailing the destruction o f the pretzel crunch/taste. Then in the next second, the
pain in the legs m ight return, entailing the destruction o f the TV sound. A nd so on.
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Our observations o f JT ’s pattern o f inner experience are, lightly held, consistent
with the view that Gestalten may be much slower to form in adolescents than they are in
adults. Peris took for granted the almost instantaneous creation o f G estalten, but that may
be an adultom orphie point o f view. I f one accepts the possibility that children/adolescents
have to learn to create Gestalten, then that makes it seem quite reasonable that they have
to learn to coordinate the constructive/destructive elem ents o f that skill. That m akes it
reasonable that J T ’s leg-bum ing/thinking/pretzel-eruneh/TV -hearing is the result o f his
not-yet-skillful destruction o f the pretzel and the TV aspects o f the w elter o f his
experienee. A ssum ing he is healthy, w hich he appeared to be, he will leam to perform
that constructive/destructive skill faster and m ore com pletely, although it m ay take him a
few m ore years o f practice to becom e rapidly skilled at it, as is the healthy adult.
On the other end o f the spectrum from JT ’s possible failure to organize an
overabundance o f inner experience, a paucity o f inner experience suggests a different
type o f im m aturity in inner experience. BC, for exam ple, apparently had very little inner
experienee at all: only five o f her 19 sam ples involved salient characteristics o f inner
experienee, and she never experienced m ore than one characteristic o f inner experience at
a time. H er cps o f .26 thus may reflect a profound lack o f inner experienee overall.
Clearly BC had the ability to identify and articulate her inner experience w hen it was
there— in fact, she did so with enthusiasm and specificity w hen discussing her sensory
aw areness experienee o f Halle B erry’s accent in one o f h er samples. That BC enjoyed
discussing her experience o f B erry’s accent far m ore than repeatedly reporting “nothing”
in her inner experienee strongly suggests that her reports o f no inner experienee were
accurate. W hy else w ould an 11-year-old choose to take the harder/duller road o f
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reporting “nothing”? W e feel confident that if BC had had other inner experiences to
report to us, she gladly w ould have.
Thus we speculate that B C ’s lack o f inner experience reflects her early stage o f
developm ent w ith regard to inner experience. Furtherm ore, although she experienced it in
only one sam ple, BC was the only subject to have an incipient inner experience. In that
instance she was sure that som ething was in her inner experience but she had no idea
what it was; som ething coalesced enough for her to recognize its presence, but her skills
were not yet developed enough to form the experience into som ething recognizable or
describable. Perhaps in a year or two her inner experience capacities will have matured
enough to produce identifiable characteristics.
JT and BC can be viewed as w orking on different developm ental challenges with
regard to inner experience. BC is ju st learning to have inner experience w hile JT has
mastered the capacity to have several forms o f inner experience (including the five main
forms), yet his current challenge seems to be to figure out how to have clear and singular
inner experience, to focus on the figure and allow the ground to fall away.

N ascent Inner Experience
B ased on our adolescent subjects’ sam ples o f inner experience, we have
speculated that the experiences o f feelings and o f inner seeing are skills ju st beginning to
be acquired in adolescence. As a way o f focusing on those nascent skills, let us exam ine
the work o f the Flavells (1995), who, m ore than any other researchers, have explored the
thinking o f children. They find in their studies that kids o f age 5 or 6 consistently report
having no thinking, but they assert that their young subjects report no thinking because
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they lack the attention/cognitive capacities/language skills necessary to be able to
describe their thoughts. Thus the Flavells do not believe their child subjects’ reports o f no
thinking. Instead they construct a theory to explain why the kids aren ’t telling the truth.
This theory is based on a presupposition: It can ’t possibly be true that kids don’t
experience thinking— everyone experiences thinking!
H owever, H urlburt (in H urlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007) proposed the possibility
that the kids that participate in F lavell’s studies are accurately describing their inner
experience: that they in fact did not experience them selves as thinking, even in situations
w here m ost if not all adults w ould experience thinking.
In a typical Flavell experiment, the child is seated on a carpet and the
experim enter says:
I ’m going to ask you a question, but I don’t w ant you to say the answ er out loud.
K eep the answ er a secret, OK? M ost people in the w orld have toothbrushes in
their houses. They put their toothbrushes in a special room . N ow d o n ’t say
anything out loud. Keep it a secret. W hich room in your house has your
toothbrush in it? (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1995, p. 57).
The child is then moved to a table and asked if she had been thinking while seated
on the carpet, and if so, about what. A dults and older children typically say they were
thinking— saying “bathroom ” to them selves or seeing an im age o f their bathroom .
H owever, the m ajority o f 5-year-olds deny they were thinking. Flavell and his colleagues
conclude that, “children lack the disposition and the ability to introspect. Lacking
introspective skills, they w ould be unlikely spontaneously to notice and reflect on their
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own m ental experiences and, consequently, unlikely to attribute such experiences to
others” (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1995, p. 52).
H urlburt (in H urlburt & Schw itzgebel, 2007) disagreed with this interpretation,
reasoning that inner experience (including thinking, feeling, and so on) does not
autom atically occur when a person is bom . Like other basic skills and capacities, for
instance w alking or talking, he asserted that perhaps children leam , gradually over time,
how to experience (how to experience thinking, how to experience feeling); that the
ability to have differentiated inner experience may be the end result o f a developm ental
process that begins at birth and stretches into young adulthood. Thus it is reasonable to
interpret that the Flavells, with painstaking care, have dem onstrated precisely the absence
o f thinking in young children. That is diam etrically counter to the FlavelFs interpretation,
the result, perhaps, o f the F lavells’ failure to bracket presuppositions about inner
experience (H urlburt, in H urlburt & Schw itzgebel, 2007).
H urlburt further suggested that if inner experience is built via slow skill
acquisition with practice over time, this process may occur in fits and starts, contingent
on other ongoing developm ental processes (such as cognitive developm ent) and
environm ental opportunity. On this view, it w ould make sense that (a) young children
may not have inner experience at all; and that (b) as youngsters begin acquiring the skills
necessary for inner experience, the inner experience they do have m ay not be full-form ed,
and thus may be quite different from adult inner experienee. The present study was
designed to explore these issues, specifically targeting young adolescents to try to “catch”
inner experienee in the m iddle o f this proposed developm ental process.
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The results o f this study lend support to H urlburt’s assertions. W e observed that
am ong the five main characteristics, feelings and images occurred in much lower
frequencies than they occur in adults. O f the feelings that did occur across our adolescent
subjects, one-third o f these were rem arkably underdeveloped. Instead, we found that our
subjects most often cam e to know their feelings through the tone and content o f their own
inner and outer speech rather than through direct experience o f em otion. This suggests
that feelings are com plex forms o f inner experience that require skill building over time,
and that young adolescents appear to be sm ack in the m idst o f that feeling acquisition
process. Similarly, H urlburt (Hurlburt & H eavey, 2006) and M onson (1987) both
observed slow -im age-building in their adolescent subjects. Those findings, com bined
with the low frequency o f inner seeing am ong subjects in the present study suggests that
inner seeing is also a com plex form o f inner experience that develops over time with
practice. In contrast, inner speech, sensory aw areness, and unsym bolized thinking were
found to occur with sim ilar frequencies as found in adults. Thus these forms o f inner
experience may develop and m ature earlier on, perhaps in late childhood; future DES
research with younger subjects is needed to bear this out.
In addition to our findings on the five main eharacteristies, we also observed that
perceptual aw areness and ju st doing occurred with far greater frequency than found in
adults. This suggests that young adolescents spend m any m om ents not generating inner
experienee; that is their organism s are not presenting or selecting or coalescing abstract
or sym bolic or com plex forms o f inner experienee. The prevalence o f perceptual
aw areness and ju st doing in our subjects’ samples suggests that young adolescents are
ju st living/being/doing a good deal m ore o f the tim e than adults.

164

Finally, we observed differences in the overall prevalence and com plexity o f inner
experience in our subjects. One o f our subjects, BC, had very little inner experience at all,
which suggests that she is in the process o f developing her basic capacities for inner
experience. O ur subject with a great deal o f inner experience, JT, also appeared to be in
the process o f developing his inner experience skills. Unlike B C ’s challenge to develop
inner experience, J T ’s developm ental task appeared to be focusing on one dom inant form
o f inner experience w hile allow ing background interference to fall away. Both cases
reveal young adolescents in the m idst o f inner experience developm ental processes,
lending strong support to H urlburt’s views.

Study Lim itations and Suggestions fo r Future Research
B ecause DES studies are time and labor intensive, the sam ple size was small
(7V=6). To apply the DES m ethod thoroughly, as described in the M ethods section
(Chapter 3), approxim ately 50 hours w ere devoted to “running” each subject
(coordinating m eeting logistics and transportation, introducing the m ethod, training the
subject, expositional interview s, digitizing the interview s, several iterations o f writing
narrative descriptions o f each sample, coding the sam ples w here appropriate, several
iterations o f w riting idiographic narrative descriptions o f each su b ject’s inner experience,
considering all samples across all subjects, several iterations o f w riting a narrative
description o f the salient characteristics across all subjects). Furtherm ore, two
investigators w orked on all aspects o f the process. Future studies m ight be stream lined by
conducting on-site investigations in settings where there is access to several adolescents
at one time, for exam ple in schools, camps, m ental-health facilities, juvenile detention
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facilities. This m ight allow investigators to sample with m ore adolescents in a shorter
period o f time.
A nother limitation o f this study related to the small sample size is that statistically
significant conclusions cannot be drawn from the data. Because the proper data o f this
study are the sam ples o f inner experience, these data cannot be reduced to m ere numbers
and analyzed accordingly. The closest we cam e to statistical analysis was our coding o f
the samples for salient characteristics and then taking frequency counts o f those salient
charaeteristies. To conduct tests o f statistical significance, larger sam ples o f adolescent
subjects are needed. However, even with larger sample sizes yielding m ore samples o f
inner experienee, any statistical analysis would be o f codings only as the actual
experiences them selves cannot be reduced to numbers.
A third lim itation o f the present study is that the data w ere not correlated with any
extant standardized psychological m easures. A lthough statistical correlations w ould have
been im possible (as stated above, because o f inherent reductionism in codings and small
sample size), it m ight be w orthw hile qualitatively to com pare subject’s inner experiences
to perform ance on standardized tests (for example, the W ISC -IV and the M M PI-A).
Future studies m ight consider conducting standardized assessm ents with subjects after
sam pling has occurred so as not to “contam inate” DES. For a m ore rigorous design,
investigators could rem ain blind to standardized testing results throughout DES (both
sam pling and analysis phases), and only consider testing results after all DES narrative
descriptions had been written.
A fourth lim itation o f the present study is that it w as not theoretically grounded
and no hypotheses were made at the outset o f the study. In the present study we elected to
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conduct basic exploratory research, that is, to apply DES to adolescents to see (a) if they
were capable o f doing the method and, if so, (b) to explore their sam ples o f inner
experience. O ur rationale for this approach was that by conducting atheoretical basic
research we m ight be free to discover aspects o f adolescent inner experience that would
otherw ise be tram pled by preexisting viewpoints and questions. Prior to eonducting this
study, m ethodologically relevant literature was reviewed but only in the service o f
understanding the types o f data on adolescent experience derived from other methods.
The aim here was to rem ain free o f theoretical and hypothetical trappings; how ever this
approaeh can also be seen as a m ajor weakness in the sense that the study does not
explieitly advance any psychologieal theory. Future research into adolescent inner
experienee may use theoretically-grounded hypotheses— but those hypotheses will be
inform ed by clues derived from basic studies, such as the present study, in w hich there
were no agendas or externally im posed influenees.
A fifth lim itation o f the present study is the lack o f interrater reliability. Although
two investigators, a student and her advisor (Hurlburt, the originator o f D ES), colleeted
the data and review ed the data independently and together, the study may have benefited
from additional data reviewed and rated by a third investigator. It is difficult to estimate
how m uch benefit that w ould add to the clear seeing o f the data them selves, but in terms
o f providing a m easure o f rating reliability, this step would have strengthened the study.
Future studies m ay ehoose to build in such a step to the design.
B ased on our findings in the present study, w e believe that m ore research on
adolescent inner experience using DES would be w orthw hile. DES research is needed on
healthy adoleseents, but future studies m ight also consider exploring the inner experience
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o f special adolescent populations. One exam ple o f such a population is teenagers who
suffer from as yet “undifferentiated” mental illness. Research exploring the inner
experience o f this population may shed new light on the etiology o f psychopathologies,
such as schizophrenia (particularly first breaks, which often occur during adolescence) or
personality disorders (which often begin expressing during adolescence). A nother
direction for future DES studies on youngsters w ould be to use cross-sectional and
longitudinal designs to explore the inner experience o f different age groups o f kids and
teens. Basic research would need to be conducted first, addressing questions such as, At
w hat age are children able to identify and discuss the phenom ena o f their inner
experience? W hat are the developm ental differences in inner experience across childhood
and adolescence? H ow do those findings com pare to the linchpin theories o f
developm ent?
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APPEND IX

SUBJECT SAM PLES
F M ’s Sam ples (See Chapter 5)
Interview: 1
Date: 12/11/06
Tim e: 3:45pm
Interview ers: SA & RH
N um ber o f Beeps: 6
D ate(s) Beeps Collected: 12/10/06, 5pm -6:30pm & 12/11/06, 7am -8:30am
1.1 (12/10/06): EM is a little hungry and is standing in the kitchen thinking about w hat to
eat. A t the m om ent o f the beep he is thinking to him self a thought, w hich if expressed in
words would be som ething like, “w hat should I get to eat?” but no w ords were actually
present. At the same time, he is also saying to him self in his head, “I gotta hurry up and
go w atch my show ” (A m erican D ad on TV). This thinking is experienced as being in his
own voice with it natural characteristics, ju st as if spoken aloud. O f the two thoughts
present in his awareness, thinking about rushing because he d o esn ’t w ant to miss his
show is m ore prom inent than w ondering w hat to eat. (U nsym bolized Thinking; Inner
Speech)
1.2 (12/10/06): EM is in his room w atching the TV show, A m erican Dad. On the show,
Roger, an alien, has squirted reproductive fluid into the potato salad as a m ayonnaise
substitute. The family eats the potato salad and likes it very m uch and FM finds this
funny. At the m om ent o f the beep FM is experiencing hum or in reaction to the scenario.
H e is com pletely absorbed in the funny TV show. (Feeling)
1.3 (12/10/06): The TV show has ended and FM is back in the kitchen. H e is hungry and
his brother has ju st suggested he m ake a quesadilla. At the m om ent o f the beep FM is
unw rapping the cheese from the packaging, though he is not explicitly aw are o f this.
Instead he is getting the cheese out know ing h e ’s gonna m ake a quesadilla. (Just Doing)
1.4 (12/10/06): FM is back in his room w atching The Fam ily Guy on TV. A t the m om ent
o f the beep, FM is w ondering to him self, though not particularly in w ords, when is the
beep going to go off? Though the TV is on, FM is thinking about the beep and not really
paying attention to the show. (U nsym bolized Thinking)
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1.5 (12/11/06): FM is in hom eroom at school. The substitute teacher is handing FM some
papers to take to the front office. At the m om ent o f the beep, FM is in the act o f taking
the papers from the teacher. Sim ultaneously, he is aware o f hearing some kids saying
som ething in the background and he is trying to make out w hat they are saying. He later
deduces that they were w ondering w hat he had in his ear (the earphone). (Doing;
Listening Process)
1.6 (12/11/06): FM is in hom eroom and his teacher is talking about her recent car
accident. A t the m om ent o f the beep, FM is paying attention to his im age o f the accident.
He is trying to pay attention to his teacher and he is picturing in his head a white car
stopped at a stoplight with a van ju st about to hit it from behind. This is a m oving picture
and FM sees several cross traffic cars going through the intersection as if view ed from
the back. The beep seem s to stop the im age from continuing. FM isn ’t sure w hat color his
teach er’s car actually is, or w hether she was rear-ended by a van or some other kind o f
vehiele, but in his im age those details are clear to him. Also at the m om ent o f the beep,
FM is thinking to him self— almost saying to him self, OK, when is the beep going to go
off? (Listening Process; Image; U nsym bolized Thinking)
Interview: 2
Date: 12/13/06
Tim e: PM
Interview ers: SA & RH
N um ber o f Beeps: 6
Date(s) Beeps C ollected: 12/12/06 & 12/13/06
2.1 (12/12/06): FM is at school in orchestra class w here the m ovie White Christmas is
playing. H is eyes are closed and he is not really w atching the movie. FM starts to yawn
w hen the beeper beeps. A t the m om ent o f the beep he is aware o f yaw ning, though not in
w ords or im ages. (Just Doing)
2.2 (12/12/06): FM is in the library at school. It’s lunchtim e and he w ants to play a
eom puter gam e w ith his friend. A t the m om ent o f the beep FM is reaching for the pow er
button (located on the baek side o f the m aehine) to turn on the com puter. He is aw are o f a
thought process about reaehing baek to turn it on, that he w ants to get the com puter on so
that he can play the gam e. A t that same m om ent he is saying out loud to his friend, “ I
w anna hurry u p ...” (U nsym bolized Thinking; Talking)
2.3 (12/12/06): The bell rings signaling the end o f lunch and FM shut down the
computer. He is w alking out the library door on his w ay to class and he is looking at the
classroom he is heading toward. A t the m om ent o f the beep FM is aw are o f his
physicality engaged in the act o f walking. He feels the soft step o f his right foot on the
ground. A t that m om ent he is also aw are o f a thought proeess about having to get to elass,
though that thought is not in w ords or im ages. (Sensory A w areness; U nsym bolized
Thinking)
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2.4 (12/12/06): FM is in class and the teacher is explaining positive and negative
numbers. A t the m om ent o f the beep FM is saying to him self in his head, “W ow, this is
boring.” If he were saying this aloud it would have been a low m uttering to himself.
(Inner Speech)
2.5 (12/12/06): FM is in his
period class w atching The Grinch. In the film the Grinch
is pushing Cindy Lou into the package-sorting machine. A t the m om ent o f the beep FM is
just w atching and listening as Cindy Lou falls into the machine. FM also hears the sounds
o f the guy sitting next to him playing with a skateboard. The sound is pulling his
attention away from the m ovie and FM is aware o f being pulled away at the mom ent o f
the beep. (W atching; Listening Process)
2.6 (12/13/06): FM is in the car on his way to U NLV with SA. They are talking about the
pick-up football game in the neighborhood that afternoon. SA has ju st finished speaking
and they are ju st driving. At the m om ent o f the beep FM is thinking to him self that he
was going to go play football but this (DES m eeting) is m ore im portant. This thought is
not in w ords yet it is clear to him. FM is also noticing the building and wall they are
passing, and the m om ent o f the beep he is seeing the wall. (U nsym bolized Thinking;
Perceptual A w areness)
Interview: 3
Date: 12/14/06
Time: 3pm
Interviewers: SA & RH
N um ber o f Beeps: 6
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 12/14/06
3.1 (12/14/06): FM is eating cereal with his little brother, A dam , in the morning. Adam
has ju st spilled some o f his cereal and FM is getting a napkin for him. At the mom ent o f
the beep FM is reaching for a napkin and thinking, “A dam needs to clean up that m ess.”
He is thinking these exact words but he is not saying them nor seeing them. All o f the
words are there at the same time. Though FM is reaching for a napkin at the moment o f
the beep, he is not aware o f it in the m om ent. (W orded Thinking)
3.2 (12/14/06): FM is lying on his couch, w atching a movie, closing his eyes, about to
fall asleep. A t the m om ent o f the beep FM is ju st being tired though he is somewhat
aware that he is tired. H is awareness o f this is not a thought process. He is not paying
attention to the TV. (Tired)
3.3 (12/14/06): F M ’s m om and dad have ju st broken up. He is at his m om ’s house,
they’ve been talking, and he goes into his sister’s room to see w hat it looks like. At the
m om ent o f the beep FM is saying to h im self out loud in a low ered, almost breathless,
voice, “I need to go talk to m y M om .” He is aw are o f feeling sad and knows that the
sadness is somehow in his mind. He is not aware o f anything else at the m om ent o f the
beep. (Talking out loud to him self; Feeling)
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3.4 (12/14/06): FM is talking with his older brother, Drew, and D rew has ju st spoken the
phrase, “L et’s go eat.” A t the m om ent o f the beep F M ’s m ind is stuck on the word “eat.”
He is innerly seeing the word “eat” printed in big, bold, low er case orange letters against
a blaek background. He is seeing this word straight on from the front. He is hungry but
that fact is not in his awareness at the mom ent o f the beep. (Im age o f a word)
3.5 (12/14/06): FM is in a restaurant and his sandwieh has ju st been brought to the table.
He is looking up at the string o f Christm as bulbs on the eeiling, notieing the different
colors. A t the m om ent o f the beep FM is looking at the red bulb. He is som ehow aware
that the red bulb appears shinier than the other bulbs. (Sensory A w areness)
3.6 (12/14/06): FM has gone (with a family m em ber) to his u n ele’s house to drop o ff
some board. He gets into the truek to go hom e and thinks to him self, “Phew! W e’re
done.” A t the m om ent o f the beep, FM is thinking, “Phew !” and is at the same time
letting out a deep breath. (He is not saying an onom atopoeia-ish “Phew !” aloud; the
thinking and the breathing are distinet proeesses, though eonneeted.) M ost o f his
aw areness is foeused on thinking, “Phew !” and only about 20% o f his aw areness is on his
exhale. (Inner Speeeh; Sensory A w areness)
Interview: 4
Date: 12/16/06
Time: 12pm
Interview ers: SA
Num ber o f Beeps: 6
Date(s) Beeps C ollected: 12/15/06
4.1 (12/15/06): FM w ent downstairs to get the disk Pirates o f the Caribbean: Curse o f
the B lack Pearl. His D ad said that the disk didn’t w ork so FM was eleaning the disk off
when the beeper beeped. He noticed a big fingerprint on the disk and was going over it
with the eloth. A t the m om ent o f the beep FM pieked up the rag and is notieing that the
fingerprint is still halfw ay there. A t the same time he is saying to h im self in his head, “I
hope I ean get the disk to w ork.” (Inner Speech; Doing; Perceptual A w areness)
4.2 (12/15/06): FM has a stuffy nose and feels siek. He is in his room and his little
bother, Adam, eom es in. FM says, “A dam , I ’m so sick.” The beep oceurred in the middle
o f his saying the w ord “siek, right at the “i.” In a separate proeess at that m om ent FM is
also m ildly aw are o f A d am ’s eow liek, specifically the circulam ess o f it. A fter the beep he
feels am used at the w ay A dam ’s hair sticks up in that circular area, but this comes after
the beep. (Talking; Sensory A w areness)
4.3 (12/15/06): FM finished watching the movie and is lying in bed w anting to get some
sleep. N ext to the pow er button (presum ably to the TV or D VD player) there is a little
green light, w hich m eans the pow er is on. A t the m om ent o f the beep FM is just staring at
that little green light. The yellow ish-green color is draw ing his eye. He is not aware o f
anything else at that mom ent. (Sensory Awareness)
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4.4 (12/15/06): FM has a bad headache. A t the mom ent o f the beep he is mostly (50% ) is
aw are o f the pain in his head. The pain is like the sound o f a fire alarm ringing in his
head. He is also aware (25% ) o f holding his head, specifically o f pressing his fingertips to
his temples. He feels the sensation in his fingertips. The rest o f F M ’s awareness (25% ) is
on speaking words aloud about the pain in his head. Those words could be, “Oh, my
headache” or “M y headache” or “Oh, I have such a headache” but he is not sure o f the
exact phrasing. (Sensory A wareness; Sensory A wareness; Talking)
4.5 (12/15/06): FM is eating cereal. A t the m om ent o f the beep he notices the bright
lem on yellow ness o f the Pops in his bowl. N early all o f his aw areness (90%) is on the
color. The rem aining portion o f his aw areness (10% ) is on his saying to him self in his
head with surprise, “W ow, th ey ’re yellow .” (Sensory A wareness; Inner Speech)
4.6 (12/15/06): A m inute or so before the beep, FM was lying dow n again when his
brother’s cat, Kix, cam e in. K ix attacked F M ’s hand and scratched it but eventually FM
calm ed Kix and got him to lie down. FM then sat up and was looking at how cute Kix
looked curled up a little ball. A t the m om ent o f the beep FM is saying to him self in his
head w ith endearm ent, “Aw, h e ’s so cute.” A t the same m om ent a new process is
beginning: F M ’s eyes have ju st landed on the white tuft o f fur on K ix ’s chin. FM is
focusing m ainly on the w hiteness, though he is also aware o f the goateeness o f the tuft.
A t the m om ent o f the beep roughly h alf o f F M ’s aw areness is on the latter end o f the
process noting K ix ’s cuteness and the other h a lf is on the rising o f a process noting, in a
different way, K ix ’s goatee. (Inner Speech; Sensory Awareness)
Interview: 5
Date: 12/17/06
Tim e: 1pm
Interviewers: SA & RH
N um ber o f Beeps: 5
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 12/16/06 & 12/17/06
5.1 (12/16/06): FM is fixing cereal for h im self and the headphone fell out o f his ear. At
the m om ent o f the beep FM is in the process o f catching it and he is thinking about
catching it. He cannot rem em ber exactly w hat or how he was thinking about catching it
but he know s he was thinking about it in addition to doing it. The onset o f the beep is
clear to him despite the headphone being m id-fall, approxim ately neck level. (Doing;
M eta-A w areness)
5.2 (12/16/06): FM is in the car with SA and they are talking about getting his W II (video
gam e system). A t the m om ent o f the beep FM hears SA say the “-ey” in the word
“m oney.” Though he has been listening to w hat SA has been saying, at that m om ent he
sim ply hears the sound “-ey.” A t the same m om ent a small portion o f his awareness
(roughly 5%) is focused on hearing the “clunk, clunk” sound o f SA changing gears.
(Sensory A wareness; Sensory A w areness)
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5.3 (12/16/06): FM is sitting on his bed looking down at his phone. A t the m om ent o f the
beep he is in the midst o f staring at the blue color on part o f the phone. M ost o f his
awareness is focused on the blue-ness o f the phone but he is also aware o f thinking in
words to him self, m atter-of-factly, “The edge o f my phone is blue.” The beeper beeps on
the word “edge.” (Sensory A wareness; Inner Speech)
5.4 (12/16/06): FM is staring at the green basket in his closet. At the m om ent o f the beep
he is absorbed in the yellow-green color o f the basket. He is holding his cat but is
unaware o f this fact. (Sensory Awareness)
5.5 (12/17/06): FM is walking hom e from R D ’s house and has ju st passed S A ’s house.
There is a blue van parked on the side o f the road and at the m om ent o f the beep FM is
looking at the blue tire cover on the van. He is equally aware o f the blue-ness and the
tire-covem ess. (Sensory Awareness; Perceptual A w areness)

R D ’s sam ples (See Chapter 6)
In terv iew : 1
D ate: 12/04/06
T im e: 7:45pm
In te rv ie w e rs: SA & R H
N u m b e r o f B eeps: 5
D ate(s) B eeps C ollected: 12/03/06 & 12/04/06
1.1 (12/03/06): RD is skateboarding, flanked by two o f his friends, J and S. A t the
m om ent o f the beep RD is saying to him self, “please, d o n ’t hit a rock.” He says this to
him self in his own voice, inside his head, in those specific words. RD is also somewhat
aware o f his two friends, J and S, who are ju st slightly ahead o f him . A lthough he is on
his skateboard in m otion he is not aware o f the act o f skating or o f m oving/speed/etc. RD
is also w atching out for J and S; should one o f them fall, he know s he will stop skating to
help, but this is m ore a fact o f R D ’s universe than in his aw areness at the m om ent o f the
beep. (Inner Speech; Perceptual Awareness)
1.2 (12/03/06): R D is skateboarding, this time down a hill tow ard an intersection. At the
m om ent o f the beep he is thinking he hopes there isn ’t a car com ing and he experiences a
sense o f m ental hesitation. This thought/m ental hesitation is not in w ords, but instead
encom passes the w hole idea o f hoping there isn ’t a car w ith hesitation in his mind. After
the m om ent o f the beep, the hill steepens and RD gains speed. He feels some fear about
the possibility o f encountering an oncom ing car but decides to h im self to “ju st go for it;
w hatever happens, happens.” (U nsym bolized Thinking)
1.3 (12/03/06): RD is w atching TV with his room m ate. The room m ate is ju st com pleting
the act o f taking the rem ote control from his hand. A t the m om ent o f the beep RD is
thinking, she better not turn the channel/don’t tell m e sh e’s gonna turn the channel/I hope
she do esn ’t turn the channel. The idea is not in specific w ords, though the idea itself is
specific and apparent to him. R D ’s experience at the m om ent o f the beep is m atter-of-

186

fact; he is not aware o f any accom panying affect or bodily sensations. A fter the m om ent
o f the beep, he thinks/feels to himself, “I ’ll get you back for that.” (Unsym bolized
Thinking)
1.4 (12/04/06): RD is in his house w orking on polishing his m o m ’s table. At the m om ent
o f the beep he is saying to himself, “I gotta fix the table.” The notion that he has to and
wants to is “solid” to him (as in, this notion is unquestioningly present to him), and this
solid know ing is part mind, part body. Bodily, he feels this m ainly in his arms, and
m entally he is focused on the thought o f having to fix the table. Close to the m om ent o f
the beep— but probably not at the exact m om ent o f the beep— he is aware o f hearing the
sounds o f his friend skateboarding in front o f his house; part o f him w ould rather be
outside skateboarding with his friend. RD know s/understands/is aw are that he is fixing
the table because his m om had been sad about it earlier, but w hether or not this is in his
aw areness at the m om ent o f the beep is unclear. (Inner Speech)
1.5 (12/04/06): RD is still w orking on fixing his m om ’s table, w anting to finish it as a
surprise for her before she gets home. Just before the m om ent o f the beep he hears the
sounds o f his m om ’s car and realizes that she is home. A t the m om ent o f the beep he says
to him self, in his head, in his own voice, “crap, sh e’s hom e!” (Inner Speech)
Interview: 2
Date: 1/8/07
Time: 3:45pm
Interview ers: SA & RH
N um ber o f Beeps: 5
Date(s) Beeps Collected: I/7/07& 1/8/07
2.1: RD is in the act o f bow ling, in the w indup (arm swinging backw ard) before the
release o f the ball. A t the m om ent o f the beep RD is deeply focused on a thought: I have
to get a strike. This thought is not com prised o f specific words, and its m eaning could
also be rendered by I gotta get a strike, or I need a strike, or please let me get a strike. The
m eaning is unam biguously elear to RD. N early all o f his aw areness is involved in this
thought, w hich lies deep inside his head. Though his body is engaged in aetivity (aim
pulling back, eyes on the pins at the end o f the lane) he is not aw are o f anything other
than the thought.
RD used two terms to describe his experience in this beep that seem ed to have particular
significance for him. H e said his thought was “solid,” by which he apparently m eant that
he was absorbed in it, that it oecupied his entire awareness in a thorough, steady,
extended in time way. In attem pting to define solid, he said that this thought was so solid
that if one o f his friends w ere to speak to him at this mom ent, the sound w ould not
penetrate into his awareness.
The second term was “quiet”. He said that exeept for the solid thought, the rest o f his
thoughts w ere quiet, by w hieh he apparently m eant that there w ere other nascent, or soft,
or incom pletely artieulated, or hinty thoughts ongoing at a very low level. The solid
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thought occupied 90% o f his experience, he said; the quiet part w as 10%. W e o f course
don’t know what his understanding o f 90% and 10% is, but it did seem that he was not
confusing 10% with zero. That is, he was not saying that there were no other thoughts,
only that the other thoughts were quiet. (Unsym bolized Thinking)
2.2: RD is doing a trick on his skateboard. The skateboard m eets the ground on its thin
lateral side and RD is mom entarily balanced on the opposing lateral side, mid-trick. At
the m om ent o f the beep his mind is open and a light thought is floating through; I gotta
land this trick; please, let me land this trick. The thought is not in specific words, but it is
a clear thought. It is not a “solid,” heavily concentrated, deeply focused thought (as in
Beep 2.1) and he is quite perm eable to external stimuli. Roughly h alf o f his awareness is
devoted to this “light” thought floating through, and about a quarter o f his awareness is
devoted to checking the position o f the skateboard and visually confirm ing that his stance
is OK to successfully execute the trick. The rem aining quarter o f his aw areness is just
open. H e is not m eta-aw are o f being m entally open but a portion o f his m ind is simply
“free o f thoughts.”
In this beep RD described the state o f his mind as being “open.” B y this he seems to
m ean that there is nothing occupying his mind, that it’s free from encom brances, there’s
no residue o f past thoughts, worries about the future, or even stuckness on the present
thought.
RD describes the present thought as “light,” m eaning that as the opposite to “solid,” as
used in Beep 2.1. A light thought m eans that he is not deeply focused on the thought or
working on the thought. I f we could see into R D ’s head, w e ’d see that thought easily,
whereas w e’d have to look deep to find a solid thought.
Sim ilarly RD says the present thought is “floating through.” W hen describing this he uses
his hands to show an im aginary thought passing through his head from left to right at
about forehead level. W hen asked if he has a sense o f the thought traveling through his
head, he says no. In this instance it is plausible that the lightness o f the thought is related
to it’s floating through his open mind. (U nsym bolized Thinking; Perceptual Awareness;
Open)
2.3: RD is hungry and is looking at various food items. A t the m om ent o f the beep he is
saying to him self in a low, slow, alm ost m um bled voice, “W hat - should - I - eat?” He is
not speaking aloud, but speaking inside his head, “kinda talking to m yself.” (Inner
Speech)
2.4: At the m om ent o f the beep RD is saying to him self, “W hat should I do?” As in Beep
2.3, he is speaking to him self internally rather than aloud but this time he is speaking with
an even slower, bored sounding cadence, “W h a t
s h o u ld
I
do
?” (Inner
Speech)
2.5: RD is looking at his skateboard. He has it flipped on its side and ju st sent the front
right wheel spinning with his hand. A t the m om ent o f the beep he is w ondering to
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him self, how fast can I go? The thought isn ’t in specific words. A t the same time he hears
the sound o f the wheel spinning. His eyes are looking at the skateboard but he is not
aware o f that at the m om ent. (Unsym bolized Thinking; Perceptual A w areness)
Interview; 3

Date: 1/9/07
Time: 3:45pm
Interview ers: SA & RH
N um ber o f Beeps: 6
D ate(s) Beeps Collected: 1/8/07
3.1: RD is saying to h im self in his head, in a pissed off voice, “W hy did he kick me in
my sore knee?” H e internally speaks these exact words angrily and rapidly. All o f his
aw areness is com pletely focused on this thought at the m om ent o f the beep. In R D ’s
lingo, it was a “solid” thought. Solid means that all o f his aw areness is devoted to the
thought, that he is com pletely concentrated on the thought, that the thought is perfectly
clear to him, and due to being so deeply concentrated and focused on the thought, he is
deep inside him self, insulated from the outside world, that it seems that someone would
have to shake him by the shoulders to rouse him out o f that thought. A fter the beep he is
aware that he is angry and wants to take revenge by kicking J. A lso after the beep, RD is
aware o f feeling pain in his sore knee. (Inner Speech)
3.2: RD is saying to h im self in his head with frustration and irritation, “Stupid cat, get
aw ay!” The thought is less than solid in that it’s not a focused, concentrated thought, but
it is m ore than light and fleeting. In R ’s lingo, this constitutes a “m edium ” thought, which
means he is partially absorbed in it and that it would not be very difficult to get his
attention at that m om ent. RD know s that he is frustrated and irritated by recognizing
those qualities in his inner voice and it seems his understanding o f his em otional state is
deduced by hearing the tone o f his own voice. He does not feel the frustration/irritation in
his body, not is he aw are o f it in any other way. (Inner Speech)
3.3: RD is singing/chanting along in his head to the song on the radio, “I-like-bigb u tts.. . ” He is innerly singing/chanting the lyrics quietly but with rhythm and in sync
with the music. M ost o f his aw areness (75% ) is on his singing in his head w hile the rest
(25% ) is on listening to the song. RD is lying on his bed, arms folded behind his head,
arms, head, and upper body pulsing to the music— but none o f this is in his aw areness at
the m om ent o f the beep. Note: It was quite em barrassing, difficult for RD to say he was
singing about butts. It seem ed evident that he had to fight down the urge to avoid telling
us about this, and then w ent forward. He said the em barrassm ent w as about the prospect
o f telling us, not a feature o f the singing at the m om ent o f the beep. (Inner Speech;
Perceptual A w areness)
3.4: RD is looking out the car window. At the m om ent o f the beep he is saying to him self
in is head, “Oh snap, sh e’s hot!” The words are clear and specific and it’s a light thought
in that it seems to be on the surface o f his m ind rather than deep w ithin. I f w e could see
inside R D ’s m ind w e’d be able to access this thought easily because it’s right there on the
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surface. M ost o f his awareness is on the thought (85% ) but a small am ount o f his
awareness is on the girl (whom his thought is referring to) crossing the road. He is
looking at all o f her, not a specific part or aspect o f her. (NOTE: R D ’s solid-mediumlight continuum seems to have more to do more with focus/attention/deepness than with
clarity. Here we have a light but clear thought.) (Inner Speech; Perceptual Awareness)
3.5: RD is saying to him self in his head, “W ow .” The “w ow ” is uttered slowly and is
loaded with meaning: w hat-you-are-doing-is-unbelieveably-stupid-looking-but-I-can’tstop-w atching-because-it’s-so-ridiculous. Roughly h a lf o f his aw areness is on this
thought, while the other h alf is on w atching his friend, S, dance. A fter the beep he is
aware o f laughing at her. (Inner Speech; Perceptual Awareness)

3.6 (1/8/07): RD is thinking a w ordless thought in his mind. I f w ords were to be used to
translate the m eaning o f the thought, they m ight be som ething like: W hat on earth is she
doing? Though no words are spoken, heard, pictured, or otherw ise known, the thought
itself is clear. Sim ultaneously RD is m aking a face expressing his thought, though he is
not aw are o f this at the mom ent o f the beep. (U nsym bolized Thinking)
Note: the beeps appear at the end o f each o f these thoughts, w hether worded or
unworded. That is, the beep is understood as arriving im m ediately after the conclusion o f
the thought (or a slight delay thereafter).
Interview: 4
Date: 1/10/07
Time: 4:45pm
Interviewers: SA & RH
N um ber o f Beeps: 5
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 1/9/07
4.1: At the m om ent o f the beep I ’m w ondering to m y self w hat this cheese tastes like.
Specifically, in my head I ’m m using in my own voice, “I w onder w hat this tastes like?”
The way I ’m saying this is a touch dram atic, with a slight accent on “taste,” like a snobby
English butler m ight pronounce the word. Also, my voice kind o f has a stylized melodic
lilt to it, sim ilar to the voice you m ight use playing hide-and-seek w ith a little kid: “Iw onder-w here-R ory-is?” But my voice isn ’t loud as it w ould be in that situation where
you want the little kid to “overhear” you. Instead my voice is rather low and quiet,
definitely to myself, for myself. D o n ’t get me wrong, I ’m not exactly paying attention to
all o f these vocal qualities, I ju st know th a t’s what my voice sounded like. At the mom ent
o f the beep, m ost o f my awareness is on w hat I ’m saying to m yself, a m edium thought,
and I ’m som ew hat aw are o f looking at the cheese in my hand. (Inner Speech; Perceptual
Awareness)
4.2: I ’m m ostly aware o f asking m y self in my own voice in my head, “W hat should I
w ear?” I ’m in hurry, I don’t want to be late, and my body is a little bit jittery and anxious,
but I ’m only slightly aware o f this, say I0 % -I5 % . M ost (85% -90% ) o f my aw areness at
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the m om ent o f the beep is absorbed in my saying to myself, “W hat should I w ear?” Just
before the beep I was aware that 1 was going to the movies. I m ight have even said out
loud to m yself, “I gotta get to the m ovies.” But that the m om ent o f the beep I ’m no longer
aware o f the m ovies, only o f asking m yself about what I should w ear and the slight
jittery-anxiousness o f needing to hurry. This is a medium thought. (Inner Speech;
Sensory A w areness)

4.3: I ’m w ondering to myself, how do I look? This “m edium ” thought is not in words,
unlike the thoughts in the previous two beeps, but it is clear and nearly all o f my
aw areness is on thinking it. A small am ount o f my awareness, m aybe 10%, is on looking
at m y self in the m irror, checking out the way I look overall. I ’m in the midst o f posing
m yself in various cool stances, but I ’m not aware o f this at the m om ent o f the beep.
(Inner Speech; Perceptual Awareness)
4.4: Just before the beep I heard J fart, and said aloud, “Oh! Snap! That sm ells!” B ut I
had said that based on the sound o f the fart, before I actually sm elled the fart. N ow, at
the m om ent o f the beep, I ju st caught wind o f J ’s fart and I ’m aw are o f smelling the fart
and quietly exclaim ing to m yself in my head, “Oh crap, that really does sm ell!” A bout
h a lf o f my aw areness is on smelling the fart and the other h a lf is on w hat I ’m saying to
myself. I t’s a light thought, in words, ju st passing through, not deeply focused. (Inner
Speech; Perceptual A w areness)
4.5: I ’m excitedly w hispering-hissing to m yself in my head, “I can ’t w ait!” It’s a small,
light thought. I ’m at the m ovies about to go in and w hat I can ’t w ait for is the movie
itself, b u t I ’m not aw are o f that at the m om ent o f the beep. (Inner Speech)
Interview : 5
Date: 1/12/07
Time: 3:30pm
Interview ers: SA & RH
N um ber o f Beeps: 7
Date(s) Beeps C ollected: 1/11/07
5.1 : M y friend, J, ju st fell and is hurt. At the m om ent o f the beep I ’m saying to m y self in
my head, “Aw, m an ....d u d e, that really sucks,” and I ’m feeling sorry for him. M ost o f
my aw areness (about 70% ) is on the thought/w ords. It’s a light/m edium thought and my
voice has a feeling bad sort o f sound. The rest o f m y aw areness (about 30%) is on feeling
sorry for him because I can see that he is really hurt. The sorry feeling seems natural to
me, like my natural response to seeing someone get hurt. It is sim ilar to a sad feeling, but
not exactly the same. I feel it in my chest - definitely not in m y heart or anything - but
it’s like on the inside surface o f my chest. The feeling is a light/m edium one, and if I
w ere to rank it on a scale o f black (heavy/solid) to white (light), it w ould be white. It’s
w eird because the feeling is in my head too, so both in my chest and head, but not in any
other part o f my body. The feeling m ight be sort o f connected to the thought but it also
seems distinct from the thought I ’m having. I ’ve never had a beep quite like this before
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(where I ’m having a feeling) so it’s hard for me to say exactly how it was. (Inner Speech;
Feeling)
5.2: M y mom is show ing me the D V D s she got. A t the m om ent o f the beep I ’m
exclaim ing to m y self in my head, “Oh crap! You got R ocky?!” M y voice is a mix o f
delighted surprise and excitem ent, but unlike Beep 5.1 I d o n ’t experience my feelings
directly. It is a fact that I am happy, and my voice in my head evidences happiness but I
don’t experience the happiness separately from my thought. Even so, I know I ’m happy
and if you were to see me at that exact mom ent, y o u ’d know ju st from looking at me that
I was happy. It’s a light thought and m ost o f my aw areness (80% ) is on this thought. A
sm aller percentage o f my aw areness (about 20% ) is on looking at the cover o f the Rocky
DVD case that m o m ’s holding in front o f me. I ’m not looking at anything in particular on
the case cover, ju st the overall thing. (Inner Speech; Perceptual Awareness)
5.3: I ’m saying to m yself in my head, in a quiet yet surprised voice, “W ow, those are
nice shoes.” It’s a light thought, but it’s different than any other thought I ’ve had while
being beeped because it started o ff as a thought deep inside m y head, and then came up
through my mind getting progressively lighter the closer it got to the surface. So on it’s
way from the depths o f my mind to the surface o f m y m ind the thought becam e a medium
thought, and then becam e a light thought— and th at’s when I grabbed it. O ther light
thoughts I ’ve had seem to pass through, from som ew here (no specific location, could be
from any direction, though in previous beeps I ’ve gestured as though th ey ’re com ing in
from the left and exiting right at about tem ple level) outside my head to inside my head
and then out again. This thought, on the other hand, feels like it originated from within
the depths o f my m ind and sort o f floated forward, changing density along the way.
I ’m not sure why this thought happened in this way but I do think that I can sort o f
control w hether I ’m going to have a solid, medium , or light thought. For exam ple, when
I ’m having an argum ent with som eone, I can focus really hard to think up deep,
intelligent facts and angles that are very difficult for my opponent to dispute. I f my
opponent com es back at me with som ething ju st as deep and sophisticated— on the
level— then the gam e is on and it’s a solid conversation.
In the case o f this beep, however, th ere’s no deep or otherw ise conversation happening in
relation to my thought. Earlier my friend told me he had on really nice shoes, but h e ’s
often w rong/m isrepresents things so I did n ’t really believe him. B efore the mom ent o f the
beep I was gazing at his shoes and at some point I realized that his shoes really were nice.
At the m om ent o f the beep that thought had com e forw ard in the way I described and I
grabbed it at light, saying to myself, “Wow, those really are nice shoes.”
One last thing about this beep: I ’m chillin’, ju st relaxed during this whole thought
process. The fact that his shoes really are nice isn ’t some huge, big deal. I t’s ju st a chilled
out noticing kind o f process happening in me. (Inner Speech)
5.4: The game had ju st ended and I sem i-yelled out loud w ith a m ixture o f glee and gloat
to my friend, J, “I told you the Eagles w ould w in!” A t the m om ent o f the beep I ’m saying
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to m yself in my head— w ith a good deal m ore gloat— , “Uh! [As in, “take that” or “in
your face, punk”] I told you the Eagles would win!” repeating w hat I had ju st said aloud.
I ’m not yelling this second thought in my head, but it’s not exactly quiet either. It has
m ore force, m ore sm artass-ness to it—rcspecially in the “ Uh!” w hich is a pretty big deal
in my awareness. I ’d say about 99% o f my awareness is on the thought in my head and
only about 1% o f my aw areness is on w hat I ju st said to J out loud. A fter the beep I ’m
thinking about the fact that J would probably have gotten mad at m e had I waited to gloat
about the E agles’ win, but that came after the beep. (Inner Speech)
5.5: I ’m looking at my friend’s moon sand and I ’m saying to m y self in my head, “W hat’s
that stuff?” A bout 50% o f my awareness is on this thought/question and the other 50% is
divided betw een seeing the moon sand (25% ) and know ing/being m eta-aw are o f m yself
seeing the m oon sand (25% ). The quarter o f my awareness devoted to ju st seeing the
m oon sand isn ’t focused on any particular characteristic o f the m oon sand, I ’m ju st seeing
the m oon sand overall. ((Inner Speech; Perceptual A wareness; M eta-A w areness)
5.6: I ’m saying to m yself in my head, “That stu ff is really cool,” (referring to the moon
sand) and I ’m looking at my friend, m aybe even talking to my friend. I ’m not sure
exactly. A bout 70% o f my awareness is on my thought, w hich seem s to be ju st passing
through but not from any particular direction. A nother way to describe the passing
through thing is to say the thought is like a pop-up - those m ean pretty much the same
things to me, either way w ould explain it. It seems to take a couple o f seconds to pass
through/pop up. The other 30% o f my awareness is on looking at my friend overall.
(Inner Speech; Perceptual Awareness)
5.7: I ’m saying to m y self in my head, “I d o n ’t wanna w atch this, it looks scary.” All o f
m y aw areness is on this thought. It’s a light thought, ju st passing though. T here’s
som ething w im py about my saying this but th a t’s not in my aw areness at the m om ent o f
the beep. (Inner Speech)
Interview: 6
Date: 1/15/07
Tim e: 7:30pm
Interview ers: SA & RH
N um ber o f Beeps: 6
D ate(s) Beeps Collected: 1/14/07
6.1: I ’m asking m y self in my head, “H ow is she doing that?” Shana is doing something
freaky but at the m om ent o f the beep all o f my aw areness is on m y thought, none o f it is
actually on S. (Inner Speech)
6.2: M ost o f my aw areness is on me, RD, w atching the game. T h at’s different from my
ju st w atching the game; in this case I ’m actually aware o f m y self w atching the gam e— I
know I ’m w atching the gam e. A t the same time a little bit o f my aw areness is on my
saying to m y self in my head, “C ’mon, the Eagles have to w in.” It’s a m edium thought,
but I ’m saying it in a hard and dem anding way. (M eta-A w areness; Inner Speech)
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6.3: I ’m yelling out loud, “C ’mon, pick up that fum ble!” My voice is loud and excited,
and this is a m edium thought. I ’m also aw are o f my standing as I ’m yelling and I know
this m entally and physically. I feel the w eight in my feet and the difference in my body
from how it was when I was sitting ju st a m om ent ago. (Talking; Sensory Awareness)
6.4: I ’m thinking a definite thought, but the thought does not have words, unlike the last
three beeps. If I were to put words to this thought, it would be som ething like: The Saints
can ’t win, dude. They can ’t. It’s a disappointing thought, sort o f sad, and it seems to
come up from deep inside my head. I ’m not separately aware o f my sadness or
disappointm ent; those things are part o f the thought.
Thoughts like this that originate from deep inside my head are developing or evolving or
transform ing as they come up and they do not really have specific words to them. They
start out solid, deep in my head, and as they eom e outw ard they becom e m edium and then
light, all the w hile developing. D epending on w here I grab/catch the thought, it has a
certain density (on the solid-m edium -light continuum ) and a certain meaning. In order for
me to tell you the m eaning o f a thought I ’ve grabbed, I put words to it— in this case the
best words to articulate my though are: The Saints can ’t win, dude.
Thoughts that com e up are different from the kinds o f thoughts that pass through. The
passing through thoughts can also be solid, medium , or light, but they seem to always
come with specific words and those words don’t change as they pass through. Also, the
passing through thoughts seem to com e from outside o f my head, enter my head, and then
pass out o f my head. I can grab them at any point as they’re passing through, and
depending on the point, th ey ’re either solid, m edium , or light. B ut with passing through
thoughts, the longer I w ait to grab them , the solider they are. (U nsym bolized Thinking)
6.5: I ’m thinking to myself, 21 to 20. A gain, there are no specific w ords even though the
concept is perfectly clear. This is a light thought th a t’s come up from inside my head.
Although this is the only thing in my aw areness at the m om ent o f the beep, only about
50% o f my aw areness is dedicated to it. The other 50% is ju st room for som ething else,
although at the m om ent there’s nothing else there. (U nsym bolized Thinking; Open)
6.6: I ’m exclaim ing-lam enting out loud w ith frustration, “How could they lose?!” It’s a
light thought and it’s passing though. A lso at that m om ent I ’m a tiny bit aware o f my
disappointm ent about the E agles’ loss. I d o n ’t feel the disappointm ent anyw here in my
body, I ju st know I ’m disappointed and that is som ehow distinct from w hat I ’m saying
out loud. This was a passing through exclam ation and is an exam ple o f the fact that
things spoken aloud can be passing through. (Talking; Feeling)

B C Sam ples (See Chapter 7)
Interview: 1
Date: 2/12/07
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Time: 3:45pm
Interview ers: SA & RH
N um ber o f Beeps: 5
D ate(s) Beeps Collected: 2/11/07
1.1: BC is talking to her cousin, Angelic, on the phone. A ngelie is telling BC about how
her boyfriend ended up in jail. A ngelie’s m other is yelling at her to get o ff the phone and
at the sam e time, B C ’s m other is yelling at BC to do the dishes. It is difficult for BC to
pinpoint the m om ent o f the beep and she is unable to report her experience at that
m om ent. (Task Issue)
1.2: B C is cleaning her closet and eating a piece o f ice. She is w orking on cleaning up the
shoes and blankets on the floor o f the closet and not particularly liking the task. She does
not know w hat she is aware o f at the m om ent o f the beep. (Task Issue)
1.3: A t the m om ent o f the beep BC is in the m idst o f telling her little sister that she is
doing a good jo b in school. BC knows that they are bonding, som ething they do not do
often, though this is not in her awareness at the exact m om ent o f the beep. (Task Issue)
1.4: BC is w atching the TV show “The Suite Life o f Zack & C ody.” At the m om ent o f
the beep, she is com pletely absorbed in w atching the show. (Just watching TV)
1.5: BC is eating a dinner o f cereal. H er m other is w atching TV, but BC is not paying
attention to the show th a t’s on. A t the m om ent o f the beep her brother is talking to her
about going to play basketball. S he’s not sure w h at’s in her experience at the mom ent o f
the beep— m aybe nothing. After the beep, BC has an im age o f h erself and her brother
playing one-on-one on a basketball court. In the image BC has the basketball and is
standing in front o f her brother who is gesturing in frustration because BC has won. She
sees h erself from the side. Though she knows it’s a basketball court, she doesn’t see the
basketball hoops or any other distinctive features o f the court. The image is still and in
black and white. (Im age - but not ATM OB)
Interview: 2
Date: 2/16/07

Time: 3:45pm
Interview ers: SA & RH
N um ber o f Beeps: 6
D ate(s) Beeps Collected: 2/16/07
2.1: BC is sitting down waiting for her sister and her m other to com e home. She is
looking out the w indow at the tree in her front yard. At the m om ent o f the beep she is
looking at the leaves on the tree. She is not focused on any particular aspect or sensory
property o f the leaves (i.e., color, shape, m ovem ent, etc.), she is ju st looking at the leaves
overall. (Perceptual Awareness)
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2.2: BC is w atching Sponge Bob Square Pants on TV. At the m om ent o f the beep she is
just w atching and listening as Sponge Bob screams, “Can I have a job at the Crusty
Crab?” as he ju m p s up and down. The beep comes at the word “C rusty.” (Just W atching
TV)
2.3: A t the m om ent o f the beep BC feels pain in her front right tooth. She is pressing her
pointer finger against her tooth, but at the m om ent o f the beep she isn ’t sensing that, only
the pain in her tooth. She had been drinking cold m ilk ju st before the beep, and it was the
coldness o f the m ilk on her tooth (sh e’d had dental work earlier that day) that had
apparently caused the pain. (Perceptual Awareness)
2.4: At the m om ent o f the beep BC is not aware o f anything. She had ju st finished taking
an aspirin for her tooth pain, but at the m om ent o f the beep nothing was in her awareness.
(No Inner Experience - W aiting))
2.5: BC is scrubbing the counter closest to the stove. At the m om ent o f the beep there is
nothing in her aw areness. She had finished doing the dishes— finished w ashing the last
knife— and had begun to wipe dow n the counters. It was a fact o f her universe that at the
m om ent o f the beeps she was scrubbing the counter hard, but she was not aware o f that,
nor o f anything else at that mom ent. (Just Doing)
2.6: B C ’s m om had finished m using aloud about how long it w ould take SA to get to the
house. BC had heard and com prehended w hat her m other said but had m oved on. H er
attention had not yet landed on som ething new and so at the m om ent o f the beep, BC is
not aware o f anything. (No Inner Experience - W aiting)
Interview: 3
Date: 2/23/07
Time: 2:45pm
Interviewers: SA & RH
N um ber o f Beeps: 4
Date(s) Beeps C ollected: 2/23/07—LIVE
3.1: BC is looking at her cat and talking to him, telling him how handsom e he is. She is
w aiting to see if he is going to m eow back. The beep com es in the m idst o f this
“conversation” but BC does not know exactly when it com es or w hat her experience is at
that precise m om ent. (??)
3.2: BC is w alking hom e from next door and is ju st passing her m ailbox at the mom ent o f
the beep. She is not aware o f anything at that moment. (Just D oing)
3.3: BC is writing her sister a letter telling her why it took so long for her to write back.
She has stopped w riting and is holding the pencil up w aiting to see w hat to write next
when the beep com es. A t the m om ent o f the beep she is not aw are o f anything. (No Inner
Experience - W aiting)
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3.4: BC is watching Halle Berry on TV. At the m om ent o f the beep, BC is paying
attention to the way Halle Berry is speaking; H alle Berry is speaking with an accent that
BC recognizes is not the way Halle usually sounds. BC is uncharacteristically clear and
precise about what she was attending to (Halle B erry ’s accented speech) at that m om ent
o f the beep; she indicates with apparent confidence that it is the speech pattern she is
paying attention to, not Halle B erry ’s white dress or the Oscar statuettes that were also on
the screen at the same time. BC is also uncharacteristically enthusiastic during the
interview about this beep. (Sensory Awareness)
Interview : 4
Date: 2/28/07
Tim e: 6:00pm
Interview ers: SA & RH
N um ber o f Beeps: 3
D ate(s) Beeps Collected: 2/28/07—LIVE
4.1: BC is spending time with her family. The m usic is playing loud and everyone is
dancing. A t the m om ent o f the beep BC has stopped dancing. She is w atching everyone
else and laughing at the way th ey ’re dancing. She is not aw are o f anything at the m om ent
o f the beep. (Just Doing)
4.2; A t the m om ent o f the beep BC is w alking next door to her sister’s house to tell her
sister w hat her m om said. She is holding Isaiah in her arms. BC is not aware o f anything
at the m om ent o f the beep. In particular, she says she is not thinking about what her mom
has said even though that is the intention o f going next door. (Just D oing)
4.3: BC is w atching the end o f the m ovie The L a n d Before Time. A t the m om ent o f the
beep she is not aware o f anything. A bit before the beep she had w ondered if the m ovie
w ould end before the next beep came, but that thought had passed by the tim e the beep
actually came. (Just W atching TV)
Interview : 5
Date: 3/2/07
Tim e: 2:30pm
Interview ers: SA & RH
N um ber o f Beeps: 4
D ate(s) Beeps Collected: 3/2/07—LIVE
5.1: B C is having a danee-off with her friend. A t the m om ent o f the beep she is dancing
with h er friend to hip-hop. She is not particularly aware o f anything. (Just Doing)
5.2: A t the m om ent o f the beep BC is hitting her friend in the face w ith her right hand.
A gain, she is not particularly aw are o f anything. (Just D oing)
5.3: BC is picking out a m ovie to take to her frien d ’s house. A t the m om ent o f the beep
BC is saying out loud, “Do you w ant the Winnie the Pooh or the Tigger m ovie?” There
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may be som ething in her awareness at the m om ent o f the beep but BC is not sure, and is
unable to identify it. (Talking; Incipient Inner Experience)
5.4: BC is eating apple slices and listening to her step-dad talking. He is jokingly telling
BC that she should tell us that h e ’s w hupping her the mom ent o f the beep. BC is ju st
about to put an apple slice in her m outh at the m om ent o f the beep, but she is particularly
not aw are o f anything at that mom ent. (Just Doing)

Â V ’s Sam ples (See Chapter 8)
Interview: 1
Date: 4/3/07
Time: unrecorded
Interview ers: SA & RH
N um ber o f Beeps: 5
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 4/2/07
1.1: AV is w atching TV and a big, bald man w earing a tuxedo has ju st appeared on
screen. At the m om ent o f the beep AV is looking at the m an’s head, noticing a small
rogue patch o f hair protruding, apparently m issed last tim e he got his hair cut. W hile
looking at the patch o f uncut hair, A V is saying to herself in her head, “Oh m y god, they
cut his hair w ro n g ...1 d o n ’t know w hy he went to those p eo p le.. . ” H er inner voice is
high-pitched, squeaky, and dram atic, sort o f like Fran Dresher, as if AV is acting out a
character’s lines in her head. (Inner Speech)
1.2: AV is standing in the grass in her yard while the sprinklers are on. A t the m om ent o f
the beep she is feeling her right foot get slowly soaked by w ater seeping into her tennis
shoe and through her sock. AV can also feel the sensation o f w et grass clippings stuck to
her right ankle, partially lodged in her now som ew hat w et sock. She is solely focused on
these sensations at the m om ent o f the beep. (Sensory A wareness; Sensory A wareness)
1.3: AV is carrying a bag o f trash to the trash can. A t the m om ent o f the beep, she is
holding the bag and w alking tow ard the trash can. She is not aw are o f anything at that
moment. A fter the beep sounds, AV throws the trash bag down and watches it settle
among the other trash bags— but that occurs after the beep. (Task Issue)
1.4: A V is reading the book Bridge to Terabithia. W hen the beep sounds, she is absorbed
in reading the part o f the story in w hich the main character finds out that his friend,
Leslie, is dead. (It was not clear w hether she was reading lines or looking at a picture in
the book at that m om ent.) The beep causes AV to notice that she is sad, and that she is
trying not to cry, but none o f that w as apparently in aw areness at the m om ent o f the beep.
After the beep, she feels the sadness deep inside her eyes and she debates to herself,
should I cry or not? She know s that if she begins to cry her parents will notice. (Just
Reading)
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1.5: A few seconds before the beep, AV is w ondering w hether to eat ice cream or cereal.
The beep sounds as she is saying to herself in her head, “I should eat both.” This time her
inner voice sounds sad and is softly lilting— like a sad little girl— and yet AV does not
feel sad at the m om ent. She has been sad all day though, crying a lot due to her friend’s
sudden death and now im pending funeral. (Inner Speech)
Interview: 2
Date: 4/4/07
Time: unrecorded
Interview ers: SA & RH
N um ber of Beeps: 5
D ate(s) Beeps Collected: 4/3/07
2.1: AV is w atching a show about m odels on TV. At the m om ent o f the beep, she is
focused on saying to herself in her head, “M elrose was going to lose,” and she is no
longer paying attention to the TV. The tone o f her inner voice is sad, though she is not
aware o f feeling sad at that moment. (Inner Speech)
2.2: AV was ju st beginning to color in a small patch o f grass on a page o f her coloring
book at the m om ent o f the beep. She was paying attention to the outline shape o f the
grass pictured in the coloring book, and had some faint aw areness o f trying to color
w ithin the lines. (Just Doing)
2.3: AV ju st finished singing a song (to h erself in her head??) by T Ping. At the m om ent
o f the beep she is ju st beginning to think an unw orded thought— or wondering— should I
sing another song? The beep catches her at the outset o f that thought. A fter the beep, and
in response to that thought, AZ hears in her head Aeon singing “ Sm ack that on the floor”
along with the rhythm o f the song. It is as if the hearing o f this is the answ er to her
w ondering w hat song she should sing next: she should sing “ Sm ack That.” At the same
time that AZ hears A eon singing in her head, which is to say, slightly after the beep, she
is aware o f hearing a Gwen Stefani song eom e on the radio. (U nsym bolized Thinking)
2.4: One o f A V ’s favorite characters on a TV show died (on the show??). AV turned o ff
the TV, w ent into her room , turned o ff the lights and lay dow n on her bed. She stared at
the ceiling w hile repeating out loud to herself, “I ’m sad. I ’m sad. I ’m sad. I ’m s a d ...” A t
the m om ent o f the beep, AV is saying the final, “I ’m sad” in the repetition (though it is
possible that the beep aborted the repetitive process). The beep sounds during the word
“sad.” Though AV is saying she is sad, she is not actually feeling sad at that mom ent.
(Speaking A loud to Self)
2.5: AV is saying aloud to her mom, “M ama, I know the address at w hich my friend’s
funeral will be held.” She is speaking to her m om in Spanish, and at the m om ent o f the
beep AV is speaking the w ord “yo” (or “I”) at the beginning o f the sentence. Though the
beep sounds, she finished speaking her sentence. She is not aw are o f anything other than
speaking at the m om ent o f the beep. (Just Talking)
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Interview: 3
Date: 4/5/07
Time: unrecorded
Interview ers: SA & RH
N um ber o f Beeps: 5
Date(s) Beeps C ollected: 4/4/07
3.1: AV is typing on the com puter keyboard in the family room. At the m om ent o f the
beep she is looking at the “D ” key, specifically staring at the size and shape o f letter “D ”
on the key. Prior to the beep, A Z had been typing steadily until she was about to press the
“D ” key. She paused as she noticed that the letter “D ” on the keyboard she was using was
much sm aller than the letter “D ” on her brother’s keyboard. H ow ever, at the m om ent o f
the beep she is no longer aware o f the com parison between “D ” keys; she is sim ply aware
o f the size and shape o f the “D ” key in front o f her. (Sensory A w areness)
3.2: AV is searching for her wallet and she opens a draw er to see if the w allet m ight be in
there. The draw er is filled with a tangle o f com puter/m edia cables and controls. At the
mom ent o f the beep AV is noticing the sheer am ount o f “s tu f f ’ packed in the drawer. She
is aware o f all the stu ff packed in the draw er as a whole; she is not focused on any o f the
individual items in the drawer, nor is she thinking about her w allet at that particular
moment. (Sensory A w areness)
3.3: AV is playing w ith a button on the table in front o f her. She is poking the tip o f her
pen in and out o f the holes, fitting it in to one hole, pulling it out, fitting it in to another,
etc. At the m om ent o f the beep, AV is noticing the particular hole that the tip o f her pen
is in. She is m ostly aw are o f the hole, not the pen, though the pen is in the hole at the
moment. (Perceptual Awareness)
3.4; AV is w orking on a word find puzzle. H er task at this tim e is to find the word
“neur”; her way o f executing that task is to search for the letter “n ,” and if she finds it, to
determ ine w hether the next letter is an “ e.” Thus at the m om ent o f the beep she is
system atically scanning the horizontal row s (she said the 3"^^ row ) for a letter “n.” The
letter “n” is in mind. It is hard to say how it’s in mind— th ere’s no im age o f the letter,
she’s not saying the letter to herself, etc.— but the letter “n ” is som ehow present in her
awareness at the m om ent o f the beep. (U nsym bolized Thinking)
3.5: AV is w atching The Suite Life o f Zae & Cody on TV. On the show a lady is walking
past a group o f kids who are laughing at her. At the m om ent o f the beep, AV is staring at
the big m ole on the lady’s face while exclaim ing to h erself in her head, “That m ole is b-ii-i-g!” H er inner voice sounds exactly as it would had she spoken the words aloud. (Inner
Speech; Perceptual Awareness)
Interview: 4
Date: 4/6/07
Time: unrecorded
Interviewers: SA & RH
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Num ber o f Beeps: 5
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 4/5/07
4.1: AV is on the com puter, ju st beginning to log on to m illsberry.com by typing in her
username and password. Her username is her name, which begins with the letter “A .” At
the m om ent o f the beep she is pressing the letter “A ” on the keyboard while looking at
the keyboard. She is not aware o f anything else. (Just Doing)
4.2: A V is w atching “T h at’s so R aven” on TV. A t the m om ent o f the beep she is
w ondering to herself in her head in words, “How should I tell my m om about my
frien d ...”? A t that m om ent all o f her attention is on her thought; A V is not at all paying
attention to the TV show. A V ’s thought does not get com pleted though— the beep
sounded around the word “friend,” interrupting her. The com plete thought would have
been, “How should I tell my m om about my friend, that there was no practice at my
friend’s house.” Earlier in the day, AV told her m other that she needed to practice for the
upcom ing talent show at her friend’s house that afternoon. A V ’s m om rescheduled A V ’s
appointm ent at the doctor’s office so that she could go the practice. N ow the practice was
cancelled and, at the m om ent o f the beep, A V is contem plating how she would tell her
m other about this given the arrangem ents she had made. A V was not thinking any o f this
background inform ation at the m om ent o f the beep, nor was she feeling
w orried/anxious/eoncem ed about telling her m other about the cancellation. She was
sim ply w ondering about how she w ould say it to her m other, in w ords in her own head at
the m om ent o f the beep. (Inner Speech)
4.3: A V is at the doctor’s office and she has ju st found out that she needs to have a blood
test. A t the m om ent o f the beep A V is saying aloud, “Dr. Powell, is the blood test, like,
gonna hurt m e?” She speaks the question w ith curiosity (my word, thus likely a
eontam ination/not valid) but does not experience any sense o f euriosity/w anting to
know /low grade desperation/w orry/fear/anxiety. A t the m om ent o f the beep, AV is
simply w ondering aloud to the doctor w hether the blood test will hurt. (M aybe a big fat
presupposition, but I have a very hard tim e believing that this last sentence is true, though
it’s w hat was reported— even after some pretty strong nudging in the feeling direction.)
(Talking Out Loud - em otional significance)
4.4; AV is having her blood draw n for the first tim e ever. H er eyes are squeezed shut and
the needle is ju st beginning to pierce the skin in the inside crease o f her right arm. A t the
m om ent o f the beep A V is com m anding herself in a rapid, high-pitched, dramatic
squeaky little inner voice, “I ’m not going to cry!” Sim ultaneously she feels the sensation
o f the needle entering her skin. I t’s not exactly pain; uncom fortable is the best way to
describe the sensation. Next, she quickly rem inds herself in her head in her normal
speaking voice, “Rem em ber AV, d o n ’t put your hand too strong because then it’s gonna
hurt m ore.” This utterance com es after the beep, ju st after the m ore desperate, “I ’m not
going to cry!” (Inner Speech; Perceptual A w areness)
4.5: A t the m om ent o f the beep A V is asking her older brother, “M areo, are y o u ...? ” The
beep sounds right after she speaks the word “you,” and interferes w ith AV com pleting
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her question. She w as going to ask, “M arco, are you sad?” H er younger brother had
m essed up som e o f M arco’s com puter games and AV w anted to know if this had upset
him. (Talking Out Loud)
Interview: 5
Date: 4/9/07
Time: unrecorded
Interview ers: SA & RH
N um ber o f Beeps: 5
D ate(s) Beeps Collected: 4/8/07
5.1: AV is playing with her virtual pet dog on N intendo DS. She is dressing her dog by
using the pencil tool to drag a shirt icon to the puppy icon. A t the m om ent o f the beep AV
is in the process o f dragging the shirt tow ard the puppy, about halfw ay there. Though AV
is able to describe the shirt as “purple with white stripes,” she is not particularly aware o f
the purpleness or stripedness— or anything else— that m om ent; she is ju st dragging one
icon tow ard another. (Just Doing)
5.2: AV is w atching TV, looking at a girl in a blue dress. A t the m om ent o f the beep AV
is looking at the bottom part o f the dress. She is not focused on any particular aspect o f
the bottom o f the dress (blueness, rose pattern, shape, etc.) at that m om ent, though prior
to the beep she had been thinking that the dress was pretty. (Perceptual A w areness)
5.3: A V is about to close her eyes, w ondering to h erself if she should sleep. A t the
m om ent o f the beep, AV is asking herself in her head in her usual voice, “ Should I
sleep?” Specifically, the beep sounds as she says the word “I,” but it does not interrupt
her saying the com plete phrase to herself. (Note: D uring the interview we asked AV to
im itate her inner voice exactly as it was at the m om ent o f the beep. AV said aloud, “Am I
sleeping?” and another phrase, but not “ Should I sleep?” W hen queried about the word
discrepancy, AV firm ly m aintained that the exact w ords were, “ Should I sleep?” and that
she had sim ply m isspoken during the imitation. There seems to be som ething im portant
here, but w h at’s going on rem ains unknown. I ’m curious about w hether this phenom enon
m ay be a spin o ff o f the bilingual issue. That inner speech is hard when you are speaking
Spanish using English words.) (Inner Speech)
5.4: AV is eating her breakfast before going to school. A t the m om ent o f the beep she is
looking at a bite o f pancakes on her fork, getting ready to eat it. She is not aw are o f
anything in particular, ju st looking at the bite o f pancakes. (Perceptual A w areness)
5.5: AV is at her friend’s house after school practicing for the talent show. A t the
m om ent o f the beep, AV is hurrying to line up before the m usic starts. She is not aware o f
anything at that m om ent, she is ju st quickly lining up. Soon after the beep she becom es
concerned about m essing up the dance steps, but that is not in her experience at the
m om ent o f the beep. (Just Doing)
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J T ’s Sam ples (See Chapter 9)
In terv iew : 1
D ate: 4/22/07
T im e: 7 :0 5 p m
In te rv ie w e rs: SA & R H
N u m b e r o f B eeps: 5
D ate(s) B eeps C ollected: 4/21/07
1.1: JT is in his room at his d ad ’s house. He has ju st noticed a candy w rapper that looks
out o f place. At the m om ent o f the beep he is picking up the candy w rapper and looking
at it, and sim ultaneously seeing the entire room , noticing how filthy it is. Also at that
m om ent, JT sees an im age o f his Dad close in front o f him, in his face, so to speak
looking a little angry (due to the messy room). JT sees ju st his D ad ’s face, from the collar
up; his D ad is looking straight at JT and saying som ething to the effect of, clean up your
room, and d o n ’t make me ask you again. Though JT sees his d ad ’s m outh moving, he
doesn’t hear anything, nor apprehend the exact words his dad is saying to him— yet he
knows w ith certainty the main m essage his dad is conveying. A dditionally at that
m om ent, in the back o f his mind JT is thinking, here we go again. This thought is not in
words, but the idea is clear and present, though in the background o f his experience.
A lthough J T ’s dad is seen to be angry/perturbed, JT him self is not experiencing any
em otion. (Perceptual Awareness; Image; U nsym bolized Thinking)
1.2: JT w as ju st setting his notebook dow n after w riting notes in reference to beep 1.1
when the beeper sounded. Because o f the quick beep, there w as too m uch interference to
capture his experience at that mom ent. (Task Issue)
1.3: At the m om ent o f the beep JT was holding a coke to his m outh and drinking. He
does not recall his inner experience at that m om ent. (An excellent answer, dem onstrating
that he com prehends the exact criteria o f the DES task.) (Task Issue)
1.4: JT is looking at a box o f comics. A t the m om ent o f the beep he is staring at one face
o f the box, engrossed in the w hite color and, separately, at the brightness/vibrancy o f the
white. H e is focused on one central area on the face o f the box, but the
w hiteness/brightness seems to occupy his entire visual field. JT has been staring at the
face o f the box for a few seconds, so the sound o f the beep penetrates an ongoing process.
(Sensory Awareness)
1.5: JT is looking at the cover o f the book O liver Twist, w hich included a large portrait o f
the young Oliver. At the m om ent o f the beep, his attention was divided between w hat we
m ight call the sadness-in-O Iiver’s-eyes them e and the eolor-of-the-pieture theme.
Forem ost in his experience, JT is looking at O liver’s eyes; he recognizes the eyes to be
sad and in his own head is seeing three screens depicting different scenes that depict JT ’s
way o f thinking about w hat O liver’s life was like, and w hat events m ight have caused
O liver’s sadness. The screens in J T ’s head are at right angles to each other, with one
screen directly in front o f him, m uch like the side and front w alls o f an office. The screen
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directly in front o f JT, which is the scene JT thinks is m ost probably, depicts Oliver as a
little boy in a dreary orphanage cafeteria begging for food, his hands cupped and
outstretched. The image is sim ilar to a still photograph w ith only the little boy in focus.
The other tw o screens flank JT to the right and left at right angles to the front screen.
These screens also depict sad scenes, one o f a dog dying and the other o f a person dying.
It is difficult for JT to recall which scene is on what side, but he know s they are there.
The second “them e” o f JT ’s experience at the m om ent o f the beep involves JT noticing
the worn, pixilated quality o f the printed image o f O liver’s face on the front o f the book.
This was a sensory experience, a noting o f the lined-ness and pixilated colors o f the
printing. (Perceptual Awareness; Images; Sensory A w areness)
Interview: 2
Date: 4/25/07
Time: 7:05pm
Num ber o f Beeps: 5
Date(s) Beeps C ollected: 4/24/07
2.1: J T ’s family has guests visiting for dinner. They are talking in the living room but at
the m om ent o f the beep JT is thinking about eating ham burgers. He also smells the
ham burgers cooking and, at the same time, he feels a cool breeze on his right cheek. At
that m om ent, m ost o f his awareness is on the smell o f the ham burgers, less is on the air
on his cheek, and none is on the conversation happening. (U nsym bolized Thinking;
Sensory A w areness; Sensory Awareness)
2.2: At the m om ent o f the beep roughly 70% o f JT ’s aw areness is on squeezing mustard
out o f m ustard bottle onto his ham burger. Specifically, he hears the sound o f the mustard
bottle pushing out air and bits o f m ustard while seeing the m ustard on his burger. He is
aware o f the am ount and location o f the m ustard on his burger (som e kind o f gauging
process?). A t the same time, in the background, JT hears pots and pans clanging in the
kitchen. Roughly 30% o f his aw areness is attending to the sound. (Sensory Awareness;
Sensory A wareness)
2.3: JT has ju st taken a sip o f water. At the m om ent o f the beep, he is experiencing a
slight burning sensation/w eird taste in the back o f his throat. Sim ultaneously he hears
him self saying that it’s peculiar that w ater w ould cause that sensation. The sound seems
to float through his mind in the background, but he is unsure o f the exact words he hears.
(Suspect?) (Perceptual A wareness; Inner Hearing)
2.4: A t the m om ent o f the beep, JT is looking at a can o f D iet Coke and seeing the
reflection o f the light bulb in the light fixture overhead in the shiny silver stripe o f the
can’s design. R oughly 80% o f his awareness is focused on seeing this reflected image,
and the other 20% o f his awareness is allocated to the sensation o f his stomach being very
full (from eating all those ham burgers). (Sensory A w areness; Sensory Awareness)
2.5: JT has ju st taken a bite o f a strawberry. A t the m om ent o f the beep he is feeling the
sensation o f straw berry juice dripping out o f the com er o f his m outh w hile thinking that
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he should clean it up/w ipe his face. His thought is not in words or im ages, but rather is an
idea/know ing/concept o f w hat he should probably do. Equally salient in his aw areness at
that m om ent is his recalling o f the story his sister is telling. JT is gradually detaching
from what she is saying, being drawn aw ay by the sensation o f the straw berry juice and
through the realization that h e ’s already heard what she is talking about. (Sensory
A wareness; U nsym bolized Thinking; U nsym bolized Thinking)
Interview: 3

Date: 4/27/07
Time: 7:05pm
N um ber o f Beeps: 5
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 4/26/07
3.1: JT has ju st w alked into the bathroom and the door is closing behind him. A t the
m om ent o f the beep m ost o f his aw areness (70% ) is on saying to him self in his head, “If
it beeps in another 10 seconds it will be private.” The beep sounds as he is saying the
word, “private.” His inner voice sounds exactly like his usual spoken voice, som ewhat
m onotone and slightly dispassionate. A t the same time, a sm aller portion (20%) o f JT ’s
awareness is on hearing the door “on its w ay to closing.” Speeifieally, he is hearing the
m etal latch scrape across the outer edge o f the strike plate, the sound it m akes before the
door finally clicks into place. JT is perceptually interested in the closing o f the door, that
is, he is listening for the door closing; he is not drawn into the sensory aspect(s) o f the
sound itself. (Inner Speech; Perceptual Awareness)
3.2: At the m om ent o f the beep JT is thinking about w aking up early the next day in the
form o f an image. Speeifieally, JT is im agining him self turning his head to the left until
his digital clock comes into his visual field. He sees the red num bers, 5:30, on the clock.
Everything in the room appears darkened and he can’t really see anything else in the
room aside from the red num bers on the clock. At the same m om ent, JT has picked up a
can o f mints and hears the m etallic sound o f the mints rattling in the tin. A t the m om ent
o f the beep he is drawn to the m etallic sound, not by the mints them selves. (Image;
Sensory A wareness)
3.3: JT is thinking about the end o f swim season sort o f retrospectively. A t the m om ent o f
the beep he is saying to him self, “Tom orrow is the last time I ’ll get to w ear a Speedo.”
At the same time, JT feels sad, and the sadness is in his head. The sadness is about swim
season ending and JT experiences it as a separate accom panying phenom enon to his
thought. A dditionally, at the m om ent o f this beep, a good deal (50% ) o f JT ’s aw areness is
on noticing the m essiness o f his room. H e sees the mess o f everything in his room at once
and he cannot see the floor for all the stu ff on it. However, JT is not noticing anything in
particular, nor explicitly thinking anything about the m essiness at the mom ent. (Inner
Speech; Feeling; Perceptual A w areness)
3.4: PRIVATE. (Body function.)
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3.5: A t the m om ent o f the beep, JT is aware o f his right eye burning. The sensation seems
to be only on the white part o f his eye and though it is not painful, JT experiences it as an
annoying sensation. M ost o f his aw areness (60%) is on this sensation but a sm aller
portion o f his awareness (30%) is also noticing the characteristics o f a patch o f the blue
stucco wall in front o f him. The wall has been painted blue and JT is looking at the higher
areas o f texture, which are blue, but he is also noticing the low er areas o f texture are still
white. He predom inantly is drawn to the blueness o f the wall, but because o f the
discrepancy in the white areas and blue areas, he is also aware o f the stucco texture.
Finally, roughly 10% o f JT ’s aw areness is on his feeling “hot and stuffy.”
This is a physical sensation and he experiences it all over his body as a result o f the
tem perature in the room. (Sensory A w areness; Sensory A wareness; Sensory Awareness)
Interview: 4
Date: 4/29/07
Time: 7:05pm
N um ber o f Beeps: 5
D ate(s) Beeps Collected: 4/29/07
4.1: JT is lying down on the couch and his dog is lying on top o f him. A t the m om ent o f
the beep, he feels the dog’s weight pressing down on his stom ach and the pressure is
slightly painful. A t the same time JT is annoyed, which involves w anting to throw the
dog o ff o f him. This annoyance seems to be a feeling in his head, w hich som ehow gets
expressed in his arms. JT is sure that this annoyance is not an explicit thought, and he is
sure that there is some sensation like throw ing the dog o ff in his arms, but he is less sure
o f the annoyance in his head. Also at the m om ent o f the beep, JT know s that his m other is
speaking to him; this know ing is som ew here betw een a thought and a hearing o f
som ething like m urm uring. He is not hearing her articulated words. This recognition o f
her speaking is least prom inent in his aw areness. (Sensory A w areness; Feeling)
4.2: JT is doing push-ups on astro-turf. A t the m om ent o f the beep he is asking him self in
his head in his norm al voice, “How m any do you w anna do?” A t the same time, JT is also
aware (40% ) o f a pretty painful, fire-like burning sensation in both palm s o f his hands.
His hands have been burning like this since doing pull-ups on a m etal bar earlier in his
exercises. (Inner Speech; Sensory Awareness)
4.3: JT is in the ear with his m om at a drive-thru. A t the m om ent o f the beep he is looking
at the very dark blue lettering on the drive-thru w indow , w ondering w hether the lettering
is blue or black. His thought is clear yet it does not m anifest in w ords or images. At the
same tim e J T ’s mom is talking to him. A lthough he is in som e way taking in the meaning
o f w hat she is saying, that m eaning is not im pacting him. H e ’s not “latched onto” what
she’s saying; h e ’s not thinking about w hat sh e’s saying. (U nsym bolized Thinking;
Sensory A w areness; Perceptual Awareness)
4.4: A t the m om ent o f the beep JT is saying out loud, “That m ovie is going to be over
soon.” A t the same time, rather in parallel to the out-loud talking, he is thinking to
him self som ething like, I need to watch som ething else... w hat should I watch?
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A dditionally, a very small am ount o f his awareness (5%) is on hearing and seeing the TV
at the m om ent o f the beep. (Talking Out Loud to Self; U nsym bolized Thinking)
4.5: JT is seeing a bug fly around the room. At the mom ent o f the beep he sees the bug, a
little black speck m oving quickly, while w ondering to him self w hether her should try to
hit it or not. (U nsym bolized Thinking; Perceptual Awareness)
Interview : 5
Date: 5/1/07
Time: 7:05pm
N um ber o f Beeps: 5
D ate(s) Beeps Collected: 5/30/07
5.1: JT is sitting in his room looking at the carpet. A t the m om ent o f the beep he is
noticing the pouffy texture o f the carpet. His entire visual field is filled w ith carpet and he
is engrossed in the pouffy aspect o f the carpet overall, rather than only in a small focused
area. R oughly 90% o f J T ’s awareness is on the carpet and the rem aining 10% is on
hearing the grinding noise o f the air conditioner in the background o f his awareness.
(Sensory A wareness; Sensory A wareness)
5.2: A t the m om ent o f the beep JT is w holly engrossed in the act o f sneezing. The beep
sounds ju st at the tail end o f the sneeze and at that m om ent JT is aw are o f the built-up
pressure blow ing out o f him. He does not have any thoughts at that m om ent, he is totally
focused on the act o f sneezing. (Sensory Awareness)
5.3: JT is sitting on his bed with the bottom h alf o f his legs hanging over the wooden
footboard. A t the m om ent o f the beep he feels a painful burning sensation in the back o f
his knees, w here the footboard is pressing into him. At the same m om ent, JT is thinking
that he should probably m ove his legs. The thought is not in w ords, it is ju st an idea that
has not yet translated into a decision to act. Though the thought is in reference to the
burning sensation in the back o f his legs, it is som ehow disconnected from the sensation,
as if the sensation and the thought are abstracted from one another. W hen they finally do
eome together, a m om ent after the beep, JT takes action and m oves his legs o ff o f the
footboard. A lso at the m om ent o f the beep, JT hears the crunch o f the pretzel he is biting
into. O nly 20% o f his attention is on the sound. A nother 5% o f his aw areness is on the
undifferentiated noise com ing from the TV at that mom ent. The rem aining 75% o f his
aw areness is on the burning pain behind his knees and his thinking about m oving his legs.
(Sensory A wareness; U nsym bolized Thinking; Sensory A w areness; Perceptual
Awareness)
5.4: A t the m om ent o f the beep, JT is noticing the shininess o f a candy w rapper lying on
the floor. He is sim ultaneously thinking that it’s pretty shiny, though that thought is not in
words. A t the same m om ent, JT is aware o f his upper lip burning right along the lip line,
and he is aware that his nose is dripping. Just prior to the beep, JT felt the sensation o f
cold m ucus slow ing running dow nward out o f his right nostril in a straight line tow ard his
upper lip. This sensation is w hat caused him, a second later, to becom e aw are o f the fact
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that his nose was dripping. (Sensory A w areness; U nsym bolized Thinking; Sensory
Awareness; Perceptual Awareness)
5.5: JT is looking at the reflection o f a tree in a pane o f glass. Just before the beep, he
realized that the tree was not in the sam e place it had been a m om ent before. At the
m om ent o f the beep, JT is looking at the reflection and asking him self som ething like,
“W hy would the tree be m oving?” A t that same m om ent, JT hears the TV in the
background. H e can discern that distinct w ords are being spoken, but he is not focusing
enough on the sounds to know w hat those specific words are. (Inner Speech; Perceptual
Awareness)

J f V ’s Sam ples (See Chapter 10)
Interview: 1
Date: 6/13/07
Time: 1:45pm
Interviewers: SA; RH; JKL
N um ber o f Beeps: 8
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 6/12/07 & 6/13/07 (last two)
1.1: JW is playing solitaire on the com puter. At the m om ent o f the beep she is moving
the K ing card down to fill an em pty spot. She had been feeling mad because her mother
and brother w ere fighting but at that m om ent she is not aw are o f her anger, even though
she believes that the anger process is still ongoing in her body. (Doing; Feeling Fact o f
Body)
1.2: JW is talking on the phone to her friend Tiffany and they have ju st decided to 3-way
call JW ’s boyfriend. JW is on hold w hile Tiffany places the call to JW ’s boyfriend. At the
m om ent o f the beep JW is saying excitedly to herself in her head, “O kay/O hm igod, I ’m
gonna talk to my boyfriend...w hat should I say?” She also feels excited, which she
experienees as having butterflies in her stomach. The butterfly sensation is intense and
seems to be located in a rather small 2 x 2 inch area ju st above her belly button, about an
inch inside o f her. A t the m om ent o f the beep JW ’s attention is split evenly between what
she is saying and w hat she is feeling. (Inner Speech; Feeling w / Bodily Features)
1.3: JW ’s m om is talking to her friend on the phone. The friend is going to be having a
baby girl and JW ’s m om is brainstorm ing g irl’s names. A t the m om ent o f the beep JW
blurts out loud to her mother, “W hat about A lisha?” M ost o f JW ’s aw areness (70%) is on
w hat she is saying aloud but she is also aware o f feeling m ild excitem ent (30%). This
excitem ent m anifests as butterflies in the 2 x 2 inch area ju st above her belly button (the
same area as in Beep 1.2), but it is not a very intense sensation. (Speaking Aloud;
Feeling)
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1.4: JW is leaving her house with her friend Cassidy. At the m om ent o f the beep JW ’s
hand is on the doorknob and she is in the process o f walking through the door. She is not
aw are o f anything. (Just Doing)
1.5: JW is on the phone with her friend Tiffany. At the m om ent o f the beep she is talking
to Tiffany (JW can ’t rem em ber exactly w hat she was saying, but know s that part o f the
conversation involved her figuring out if she could stop by to see T iffany’s new ly dyed
hair.) (Just Talking)
1.6: JW is h a lf asleep w hile listening to music. A t the m om ent o f the beep she is partially
paying attention to the music (can’t recall what it was exactly) and partially asleep.
(Coding: Just Doing)
1.7: JW is talking on the phone to her friend Tiffany when her brother tells her he needs
to use the phone. A t the m om ent o f the beep, JW is saying, “O kay” in response to her
brother’s request. She is not paying attention to her conversation w ith Tiffany at that
m om ent. (Just Talking)
1.8: JW is in the back seat o f the ear. A t the m om ent o f the beep she is w atching her
brother, who had been sitting in the front seat, get out o f the ear to greet a passing friend.
JW is not aware o f anything other than ju st watching. (Just W atching)
Interview : 2
Date: 6/15/07
Tim e: 1:30pm
Interview ers: SA; RH; JKL
N um ber o f Beeps: 6
D ate(s) Beeps Collected: 6/14/07 (first three) & 6/15/07 (last three)
2.1: JW is w atching the m ovie The Lion K ing, specifically the scene in w hich Simba
discovers that his father, M oufasa, is dead. In the film Simba craw ls under M oufasa’s
paw as he m ourns his loss. At the m om ent o f the beep JW is w atching that scene and
cooing sadly to h erself in her head, “Ooh, th a t’s so sad, he died...” A t that same m om ent
JW is also feeling sad, w hich she experiences as being everyw here throughout her head
and upper body. The feeling in her head is about the same as the feeling in her body (that
is, it is a bodily, not a m ental, feeling). Beyond that, JW cannot describe her feeling in
any m ore detail. (Inner Speech; Feeling)
2.2: JW is w atching the final scene o f the m ovie The Lion King. In this scene Simba has
becom e king and is standing on high, surveying his kingdom w ith his young son at his
side. A t the m om ent o f the beep JW feels happy/proud for Simba, w hich she experiences
in her head only. (Feeling)
2.3: JW at her friend’s swim m ing pool. A t the m om ent o f the beep she is ju st about to
dive o ff o f the diving board and into the pool. She has leaned into the dive but her feet
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have not yet sprung off o f the board. She is not aware o f anything at that m om ent, she is
simply engaged in the action o f diving. (Note: Use o f on-board speaker) (Just Doing)
2.4: JW and her m other are looking at the B urkholder M iddle School hom epage on the
internet. At the m om ent o f the beep JW is reading the first line o f text to herself,
com prehending the m eaning o f w hat she is reading w ord by word. Somehow the words
seem to be understood word by word, as if each word enters her consciousness somehow
attached to its meaning; these individual words are not spoken or heard, but appear
sequentially as she reads. The font is small and she is not w earing her glasses so she
struggles slightly to read the text. The beep interrupts her reading m id-sentence but at the
m om ent before the beep interrupted her she was ju st reading. (Reading)
2.5: JW has ju st logged onto M y Space and is looking at her hom epage. A t the m om ent
o f the beep she is looking at the ‘new m ail’ icon, w hich is indicating that she does indeed
have new mail, and saying to h erself in her head in a m onotoned voice, “Okay, now
w hat’s gonna happen?” 1 recall this as being “Okay, w h at’s gonna happen now ?” And 1
also recall that she already knew that there was mail from that girl. However, I ’m not sure
about either. Jackie and 1 did bum the DVD, w hich is in your plastic tray in the lab. JW
says this in reference to the fact that sh e’s been receiving m ean m essages from a girl who
does not like her, though this is not explicitly in her aw areness at the m om ent o f the beep.
In her saying, “Okay, now w hat’s gonna happen?” she is w ondering to herself if the new
messages in her inbox are from this girl and if so w hat she’s w ritten this time. (Inner
Speech)
2.6: JW is w aiting for the m ovie M o n ste r’s Inc. to begin. The title has ju st appeared on
the screen and at the mom ent o f the beep JW is looking at the screen but not registering
what she is seeing. There is nothing in her aw areness at that m om ent. (Just W atching TV)
Interview: 3
Date: 6/27/07
Time: 1:30pm
Interviewers: SA; RH; JKL
N um ber o f Beeps: 6
Date(s) Beeps Collected: 6/26/07
3.1: It’s m orning and JW has ju st finished eating breakfast. At the m om ent o f the beep
she is w alking tow ard her room. She is not aware o f any inner experience at that moment.
(Just W alking)
3.2: JW is playing an Xbox 360 gam e with her brother. At the m om ent o f the beep she is
pressing the nitrousY button, w hich gives a quick speed boost, w hile w atching her car (?)
begin to overtake her brother’s car on the screen. A t the same tim e she is thinking that
she’s got to beat him, but that thought is not in w ords or im ages, it’s ju st there in her
awareness. H er inner experience at the m om ent o f the beep is m ost like a “collage” o f
sem i-autom atically pressing the Y button, w atching her ear overtake his, and thinking
she’s got to beat him. That is, her inner experience is not differentiated into three separate
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experiences; rather those three experiences are intertwined in her inner experience at that
m om ent. (D oing; U nsym bolized Thinking)
3.3: JW is talking to her friend T on the phone. At the m om ent o f the beep she is
speaking to T, saying something like, “ .. .1 couldn’t go to the p ool.” There is nothing else
in her aw areness at that moment. (Just Talking)
3.4: JW is w atching the film Finding Nem o (the part about the M om and 3000 baby fish
being m assacred?). A t the mom ent o f the beep she is feeling sad. She is aw are o f the sad
feeling throughout her upper body (waist up) and head, but she cannot describe anything
else about her experience o f the feeling except to say that w h at’s in her head seem s to be
the sam e as w h at’s in her body (that is, it is not a cognitive thing in her head and an
affective thing in her body). Though most o f her awareness is on her experience o f
feeling sad, some o f her attention is focused on the film. (Feeling)
3.5: JW is preparing to play Spider Solitaire on the com puter. A t the m om ent o f the beep
she is clicking on the Spider Solitaire icon listed on the Start menu. She is looking at the
icon on the com puter screen while clicking the mouse, but she is not aware o f any inner
experience at that m om ent. (Just Doing)
3.6: JW is looking at M ySpace.com. She has ju st read a posting by h er friend. A, on a
bulletin and JW w ould like to ask A a personal question (about that posting?). That is,
just before the beep, JW had some sense o f the question she w ould like to ask; that sense
was not com pletely articulated or differentiated. A t the m om ent o f the beep, JW is not at
all aw are o f w hat sh e’d like to ask A; she is simply proceeding tow ard A ’s M y Space
profile page, w here she will be able to privately type her question to A. A t the m om ent o f
the beep, JW is looking at A ’s icon (which is next to A ’s bulletin posting) and clicking it.
Though a m om ent before she had had the (yet verbally unform ulated) personal question
in mind, at the m om ent o f the beep JW is not aware o f anything. (Just Doing, preceded by
U nsym bolized Thinking)
Interview : 4
Date: 7/25/07
Tim e: 1:30pm
Interview ers: SA & RH
N um ber o f Beeps: 6
Date(s) Beeps C ollected: probably 7/25/07
4.1: JW is eating breakfast, taking the last bite o f eggs. A t the m om ent o f the beep she
tastes the egg, which is now in her mouth. She is not noticing anything particular about
the taste (like saltiness or the texture o f the eggs). A m om ent before, JW had been
som ehow aw are that this is her last bite o f eggs, but at the m om ent o f the beep that
aw areness is no longer present. (Perceptual A wareness)
4.2: JW is on her w ay to the bathroom to run a shower. She is ju st about to w alk through
the bathroom doorw ay at the m om ent o f the beep. A t that m om ent, JW sees her reflection
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in the m irror on the wall o f the bathroom directly through the doorway. She sees herself
from the waist up, but she is not looking at/foeused on anything in particular in the
reflection. (Perceptual Awareness)
4.3: JW is playing with her puppy. At the m om ent o f the beep she is noticing the spots on
the p u p p y ’s nose and head. JW had been feeling the fun-ness o f having a new puppy, and
that state was probably still present in JW in some way, but not in JW ’s experience at that
mom ent. (Perceptual Awareness; Feeling Fact o f Body)
4.4: JW is preparing food for her puppy. At the m om ent o f the beep she is placing the
bottle o f form ula in a pot o f boiling w ater to w arm it up. She is not aware o f anything
aside from ju st doing that task at the m om ent o f the beep. (Just Doing)
4.5: JW is buckling a collar around her d o g ’s neck. At the m om ent o f the beep she is
fitting the prong into a hole. JW is not aware o f anything other than the task at hand. (Just
Doing)
4.6: JW is pouring dry dog food into her dog’s bowl. A t the m om ent o f the beep she is
looking at the food in the bowl, noticing the bone-shaped-ness o f the pieces o f food. M ost
o f her aw areness is on the shape o f the food, but in the background a small part o f her
feels pain on her right back ankle, w here her brother’s puppy is biting her w ith it’s tiny
new teeth. (Sensory A wareness (external); Perceptual A w areness (bodily))
Interview: 5
Date: 7/30/07
Time: 1:30pm
Interviewers: SA & RH & JKL
N um ber o f Beeps: 6
Date(s) Beeps C ollected: probably 7/29/07
5.1: JW is turning on her PlayStation 2. She is pressing the pow er button, on which there
is a small red light. A t the m om ent o f the beep JW is not aw are o f anything other than
w hat she is doing. (Just Doing)
5.2: JW is in the kitchen preparing taquitoes. A t the m om ent o f the beep she is putting
hot sauce on the taquitoes. She is not aw are o f anything other than the doing o f this task.
(Just Doing)
5.3: JW is looking at her puppy running tow ard her. She is paying attention to the
puppy’s playful running and sudden stopping. JW thinks that she was feeling happy/joy
as she watched her puppy come tow ard her, but that that feeling was not in her awareness
at the m om ent o f the beep. (JW was also in the act o f clim bing over the gate to get into
the puppy’s room to play. She was struggling slightly to m aneuver over the gate, but
none o f this was in her aw areness at the m om ent o f the beep; all attention was on her
puppy.) (Perceptual Awareness; Feeling Fact o f Body)
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5.4: JW is playing tug-of-w ar with her adult dog, Beautiful. JW is holding one end o f the
toy and Beautiful is tugging on the other end o f the toy. A t the m om ent o f the beep the
toy rips and JW is shocked/surprised. The shock/surprise seems to be betw een a thought
and a feeling, but it is hard for JW to describe the experience beyond that. JW explained
to us that she felt shocked/surprised because her dog, Beautiful, had not displayed that
kind o f aggression w hile she was pregnant. JW was shocked/surprised to see that her dog
w ould rip a toy like that, though none o f this background inform ation was in JW ’s
aw areness at the m om ent o f the beep. (Feeling)
5.5: JW is w alking down the hallw ay tow ard her room. At the m om ent o f the beep she is
turning the com er from the hallw ay into her room. She is not aw are o f anything at that
m om ent. (Just Doing)
5.6: JW is playing Streetball on her PlayStation 2. A t the m om ent o f the beep she is about
to press the X button on the rem ote in order to pass the football to another player on her
team. She is looking at the screen and w hile pressing o f the X button, and this comes
autom atically to her. She is paying attention to the game, but she is not paying speeific
attention to an aspect o f the game or to pressing the X button. (Just D oing)
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